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 My interest in Samuel Beckett’s contributions to the philosophy of nothing was first 
ignited in a course “On Nothing” taught by Anthony Gottlieb at The New School for Social 
Research. Pairing philosophy and literature, Professor Gottlieb asked us to discuss the ways in 
which Beckett contributed to intellectual history on the concept of nothing. While it was fairly 
manageable to summarize the views of the philosophers who predated him, when it came time to 
discuss Beckett’s own views on nothing, I found myself paralyzed. It was not so much that 
Beckett appeared to contribute to a philosophical debate on the matter, what seemed most 
original about his work was his formal play with the word “nothing.” From that course forward, I 
decided to dedicate my graduate work to exploring the conundrum of the relationship between 
philosophy and literature in Beckett’s work. For sparking my interest in this topic, I sincerely 
thank Professor Gottlieb. 
 At Louisiana State University, I received further support in exploring this topic through a 
course with Dr. Joseph Kronick on the relationship between ethics and literature. Dr. Kronick not 
only gave me invaluable reading lists and helpful comments on my papers, he also spent 
countless hours discussing the topic with me. I thank him enormously for all of his feedback and 
encouragement in the process of formulating my topic and writing my dissertation.  
 I also thank Dr. William Demastes for serving as the chair of my committee, for lending 
me books, for all of his positive reinforcement throughout the process, and for his challenging 
questions that pushed me to think more deeply about my arguments. I am sincerely grateful that 
he has supported my project. 
 Dr. John Protevi’s contributions to the committee have also been much appreciated. From 
his initial agreement to serve on the committee, even though he didn’t know me, and his detailed 
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attention to every word in my proposal, his feedback has helped me to define my terms more 
precisely.  
 For personal support, I thank my parents who encouraged me to complete the dissertation 
even when the research and writing process grew tiresome. I am also deeply grateful to my 
spouse, Ari Marks, who sacrificed our time together to allow me to complete the dissertation. He 
also patiently listened to me while I tried to verbalize this abstruse topic. When I began to feel 
like everyone in the world wrote about Beckett and nothing, it was a comfort to learn that, at 




 What is Beckett’s relationship to philosophy? This question has long dominated the 
critical discussion on Beckett’s work from early existentialist and Cartesian critiques to the 
current trend to figure Beckett as a post-structuralist. The dominant answer to this question has 
been offered in a mode of identification: Beckett’s writing aligns with this philosopher or that 
philosophical movement. The current drive toward interdisciplinarity lends itself to the idea that 
the barriers between the fields ought to be dismantled, yet this sense of “oughtness” fails to 
investigate whether the border between the fields can indeed be transgressed. That is why the 
purpose of my dissertation is to trouble a neat identification that often appears in the scholarship 
on Samuel Beckett, which suggests his writing represents a literary manifestation of philosophy, 
one that disrupts the longstanding separation of the two fields. Instead, I highlight the difficulty 
of assimilating Beckett’s writing with philosophy by arguing that he maintains a circuitous 
relationship to philosophy that does not resolve itself into identification with one movement even 
while his essayistic style approximates experimental philosophical prose. 
 I arrive at this conclusion by first responding to the dominant strand in Beckett criticism 
that figures him as a philosopher whether of “existentialist,” “deconstructionist,” or Cartesian 
traditions. While such analyses are designed to undermine the “ancient quarrel” between 
literature and philosophy, in the first chapter, I argue that they actually serve to re-subordinate 
literature to philosophy since they depend on the preexisting philosophical text to explain the 
literary one. I thereby select a comparative approach as a way of exploring areas of intersection 
as well as disparity, which prevent the fields from being identified with each other.  
 In chapter two, I provide a theoretical basis for highlighting the difficulty of assimilating 
philosophy with literature. To do so, I review twentieth-century theory on the ancient quarrel 
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between literature and philosophy—turning to Derrida, Blanchot, Kristeva, and Levinas—to 
demonstrate that the figures who are often employed to support the disintegration of the 
disciplines actually express hesitations at such a vision of sameness. As I discuss, many of these 
thinkers affirm Plato’s original characterization of literature as a field that remains philosophy’s 
other since it depends on rhythm rather than a rigorous, logical methodology (Levinas and 
Kristeva); raises questions of ethics since it does not necessarily advocate for a moral perspective 
(Levinas and Blanchot); and unlike philosophy, does not argue systematically for a particular 
thesis (Blanchot). Furthermore, Beckett’s separation of literature and philosophy, circuitously, 
places him in a Platonic camp. 
 Since the question of the relationship between literature and philosophy is such a broad 
one, I then take a turn to examine one philosophical and aesthetic concept, “nothing,” that has 
long dominated discussions of Beckett’s work to understand where Beckett’s use of the term fits 
on a continuum between the two fields. In chapter three, I argue that, contrary to a longstanding 
tradition in Beckett studies, exemplified by Lance Butler and Michael Benne tt who posit that 
Beckett promulgates a consistent position that the nature of being is nothing, Beckett actually 
incorporates multiple, inconsistent philosophical positions on “nothing” into his work. For 
instance, his work both suggests that nothingness is impossible and that nothingness is an 
attainable goal as well as indicates that language proffers no meaning and that communication 
through language is inevitable. Instead of consequently arguing that Beckett’s preference for 
multiplicity indicates that he is a post-structuralist, I contend that his enduring uncertainty 
remains distinct from deconstruction’s systematic exploration of tenable possibilities. 
 In chapter four, I turn to Beckett’s aesthetic sources to argue that his primary contribution 
to intellectual history was not to make an original argument about nothing, but to alter the formal 
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properties that are conventionally associated with the word. For instance, while his predecessor 
Joyce often used the term “abyss” or “void” at moments of recognition and reversal, Beckett uses 
the word “nothing” repeatedly and continuously, indexing his turn away from narrative arcs. 
Similarly, while Baudelaire uses the word “abîme” to convey a sense of the terror and bliss of the   
sublime, Beckett’s abstract and empty “nothing” takes a turn toward the philosophical in the way 
it moves from the natural and toward the conceptual. After all, while the “abyss” has a physical 
referent in the oceanic deep, “nothing” is a pure concept in the sense that it has, by definition, no 
physical presence in the universe. Yet Beckett may have adopted such philosophical language 
not to contribute to intellectual history, but to surpass his literary predecessor’s negative 
aesthetics.  
 In the fifth chapter, I return to the question of the relationship between philosophy and 
literature in Beckett works, but this time with the goal of investigating a formal area of overlap 
between the two fields, the essay. While acknowledging that such a comparison on the basis of 
style remains incomplete, I conclude that Beckett’s aggregation of inconsistent philosophical 
sources, his preference for abstraction, and his preference for a fragmented sentence structure 
mirrors the form of the Montaignian essay in the sense that it reflects the movements of an ever-
shifting mind instead of a unified system of thought. In that way, Beckett’s writing falls on a 
continuum next to philosophy since his work approximates the style of more literary thinkers 
such as Montaigne, Nietzsche, and Derrida, but also remains distinct from the more systematic 
tradition exemplified by Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel. To return to the trope of nothing, Beckett’s 
aggregations of multiple, philosophical and aesthetic sources for his use of the word “nothing” 
can be considered essayistic because it allows for the accumulation of inconsistent concepts 
without promoting their assimilation into a unified conceptual theory. 
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 My dissertation, “Gathering Thinglessness”: Samuel Beckett’s Essayistic Approach to 
Nothing, responds to the dominant strand in Beckett criticism that figures the writer as a 
philosopher of “nothing” whether of Democritean, existentialist, or deconstructionist voids. In 
contrast, I argue that Beckett’s literary texts approximate philosophy in their essayistic style, 
characterized by the incorporation of multiple, contradictory sources in a fragmented form. 
While philosophical analyses are often designed to demonstrate that the literary texts are the 
equivalent of philosophical discourse, in the first chapter I argue that they actually serve to re-
subordinate literature to philosophy since they depend on the pre-existing philosophical text to 
explain the literary one. In the second chapter, I review twentieth-century theory on the 
relationship between the fields to substantiate the point that the border between literature and 
philosophy remains unresolved since many of Plato’s original characterizations of poetry 
persist in varied forms. Since the question of the relationship between literature and philosophy 
is such a broad one, I then take a turn to examine “nothing,” a concept/image that is shared by 
both fields of thought to understand where Beckett’s use of the term fits on a continuum 
between the two fields. In chapter three, I argue that, contrary to a longstanding argument that 
Beckett proffers a consistent position on the nature of being as nothing, Beckett’s actually 
incorporates multiple, inconsistent philosophical positions on “nothing” into his work. In 
chapter four, I focus on Beckett’s aesthetic influences to demonstrate that his primary 
contribution to intellectual history was not to make an original argument about nothing, but to 
alter the formal properties that are conventionally associated with the word. In the final 
chapter, I conclude that Beckett’s aggregation of inconsistent philosophical and aesthetic 
sources and his adoption of a fragmented structure mirror the form of the Montaignian essay in 
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the sense that it reflects the movements of an ever-shifting mind. In that way, Beckett’s writing 
falls on a continuum next to philosophy since his work adopts the style of the essay but also 
remains distinct from systematic thought. 
 
1
CHAPTER 1: NEAT IDENTIFICATIONS IN THE PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACHES 
TO BECKETT 
 
The danger is in the neatness of identifications. . . .  Poetry is essentially the antithesis of 
Metaphysics: . . . Metaphysics are most perfect when most concerned with universals; Poetry, 
when most concerned with particulars. Poets are the sense, philosophers the intelligence of 
humanity—Samuel Beckett, “Dante . . . Bruno . Vico . . Joyce,” 500. 
 
 Countless articles and book chapters offer the claim that Beckett is a philosophical writer 
who explores the concept of nothing, but not all of them mean the same thing by “philosophical” 
or “nothing.” It has been said that Beckett dramatizes, manifests, contributes, and offers theses 
on nothing: that there is no knowing1 or meaning,2 that there is nothing at the center of being, 3 
language,4 or the subject.5 What many of these claims share is an assumption not only that 
literature can be philosophical, in the sense that it bears traces of philosophy, but that it can be 
philosophy itself, that differences in matters of form or aim between art and philosophy do not 
significantly influence their content. Yet in Beckett’s own critical writings, as is evident in the 
epigraph above, he argued for a fundamental separation between his work and philosophy on the 
basis that philosophy is concerned with universals while literature is concerned with the 
particulars that undermine generalities. With such a separation in mind, it is worth investigating 
                                                 
1 For a discussion of the nothingness of uncertainty see Hugh Kenner’s essay “Comedian of the 
Impasse” 67; and David Hesla’s book The Shape of Chaos v, 9. 
2 For Martin Esslin’s famous remark that Beckett’s texts are marked by the meaninglessness see 
Theatre of the Absurd 21-22. Adorno’s observation that Beckett’s writing manifests the sense 
that “metaphysical meaning is no longer possible” can be found in “Trying to Understand 
Endgame” 10. 
3 According to Peter Boxall, Beckett “develop[s] a form that not only accommodates itself to this 
‘being of nothing’ but is in some way derived from it, drawing its value and significance directly 
from an encounter with the ‘nothing’ 29. Alain Badiou ties Beckett’s definition of being as 
“nothing other than its own becoming-nothingness” to his readings of Heraclitus 48. Martin 
Esslin argues that Beckett’s existentialism surfaces in his efforts “to reach the innermost core, 
the nothingness at the centre of being” The Novelist as Philosopher 129. 
4 Linda Ben-Zvi provides an extensive discussion of Beckett’s readings of Mauthner, which 
influenced his notion of language as a type of nothing 189.  
5 Terry Eagleton writes, “At the highpoint of its mastery, then, the modern subject confronts 
itself as a void” xx. 
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the ways in which Beckett’s work has been linked to philosophy and whether the connection 
accounts for the “particular” representations of nothing in his texts. In this literature review, I 
argue that the interdisciplinary drive to topple the hierarchical relationship between philosophy 
and literature in the criticism on Beckett has encouraged arguments that unexpectedly re-
subordinate his work to a philosopher’s thesis. This observation leads me to adopt a comparative 
approach for interpreting Beckett’s works, one that accounts for his proximity to philosophical 
writers while allowing his work to remain other than philosophy. 
 The philosophical approaches to Beckett’s work can largely be broken down into three 
main categories: 1) “Illustrative” approaches wherein philosophers use Beckett’s work to 
illustrate their theses 2) “Analytic” approaches wherein literary critics identify Beckett’s writing 
with particular philosophical movement 3) “Comparative” approaches wherein critics compare 
Beckett’s work to philosophical constructs while nonetheless highlighting his status as, 
primarily, a literary writer.  
 The “illustrative” arguments about Beckett’s work by philosophers rest on the notion that 
the writer is philosophical because his work demonstrates the philosopher’s point as a thought 
experiment would. These philosophers generally debate, in relation to nothing, the question of 
whether nihilism encapsulates the ultimate meaning of Beckett’s texts or whether his texts 
demonstrate the inescapability of generating meaning and value through language. Philosophers 
who use Beckett’s work to illustrate their ideas—here exemplified by Adorno, Cavell, Deleuze, 
and Badiou—simultaneously suggest that the work of literature communicates philosophical 
ideas and yet remains subordinate to the philosopher who has the capacity to identify those 
concepts. Defining philosophy in a general way as the pursuit of truth or knowledge, these 
arguments depend on a notion Derrida attributes to Nietzsche that all language is metaphorical so 
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that the language of philosophy is as subject to obscurity as the language of literature (“White 
Mythology” 217). Yet the very philosophers who seem to welcome literature as a valid medium 
for philosophical discourse suggest the opposite when they adapt Beckett’s writing to suit their 
own theses.  
 The “analytic” arguments, on the other hand, apply a theoretical construct to the writer’s 
works based on passages from Beckett’s writing that cohere with the philosophical movement at 
hand. These arguments have situated Beckett an existentialist (for demonstrating that nothing 
exists at the core of human Being), Cartesian or Geulincxian (for manifesting radical uncertainty 
about what can be known), and a deconstructionist or proto-deconstructionist (for highlighting 
the empty center of language structures). Defining philosophy as the historical instantiation of 
what philosophers have argued, the “analytic” approach suggests that Beckett’s similarity to 
particular historical schools of philosophy means that he is a member of those schools. But the 
idea that Beckett merely regenerates the ideas of philosophers neglects to answer one of the old 
critiques that Plato lists in The Republic that literature is “the bitch yapping and baying at her 
master” (Plato 76). Moreover, what this approach demonstrates more than Beckett’s 
philosophical allegiances is perhaps the ease with which his writing can be molded to suit almost 
any theoretical construct. 
 The third type of criticism hinges upon the observation that Beckett’s references to 
philosophers and philosophical ideas are diverse and disparate. These arguments follow a 
“comparative” approach, which accounts for the philosophical allusions that appear in his work 
while maintaining the idea that his work is primarily the product of literary modes: to entertain, 
to obscure, and to create something new. The comparativists highlight the ways in which 
Beckett’s texts depart from the philosophers who influenced him, opposing these divergences 
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and ambiguities to the thesis-driven ideas of those he references. The work of the comparativist 
lies in identifying the gap between literature and philosophy, which ultimately suggests that one 
field cannot be assimilated into the other. I argue that the comparativist approach is the one that 
best coheres with an ethics of reading in which the writer’s work is least modified to demonstrate 
a theoretical construct. 
 Both the illustrative forms and analytic forms of criticism rest largely on the 
hermeneutics of “critical pluralism,” defined by Alexander Nehamas as the notion that critics are 
entitled to their interpretations regardless of the “author’s intentions” (133). Pertinently, one of 
the seminal texts of critical pluralism, Michel Foucault’s “What is an Author,” uses a misreading 
of Beckett’s line, “What matter who's speaking,” to support the thesis that contemporary thinkers 
ought to be indifferent to authors (115). However, Beckett’s text remains ambivalent on the 
question of authorial significance since “what matter who’s speaking” can mean both “What 
does it matter who’s speaking?” and “What a great matter it is who is speaking.” It is precisely 
Foucault’s interpretive pluralism, which allows the critic to select one aspect of a dualistic 
statement in order to demonstrate a singular thesis that leads to limited interpretations. 
 The “comparative” approach often follows, whether overtly or not, the theory of “critical 
monism,” as defined by Nehamas, in which the critic may use information from letters and the 
entire body of work to arrive at an interpretation that best approximates the writer’s meaning 
(133, 145). While I do not wish to return in a naive way to the “intentional fallacy” by 
identifying Beckett’s life experiences with the details of his stories, it seems worthwhile to 
acknowledge, as Nehamas does, that the writer is the immediate cause of the text (144). For 
Nehamas, the goal of writing an “ideal interpretation,” one that situates a work in context in 
order to “account for all of the text’s features,” should generate a “regulative” constraint on the 
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act of interpretation (144). In keeping with such a goal, the comparative approach does not 
subordinate Beckett’s writing to a philosophical thesis, but instead allows for moments of 
disjuncture between Beckett’s work and those he references.  
Illustrative Approaches 
 A body of critical literature surrounds the interpretations of Beckett’s work by 
philosophers such as Theodor Adorno, Stanley Cavell, Gilles Deleuze, and Alain Badiou. These 
interpretations often depend on a notion, as Robert Eaglestone describes it in “Beckett in the 
Wilderness: Writing about (Not) Writing about Beckett,” that literature not only addresses 
philosophical concepts but does the work of philosophy as it forms logical arguments about 
fundamental human concerns such as being, the self, and knowing (43). For Richard Rorty, 
Eaglestone notes, this work entails a programmatic agenda, the movement of its audiences 
toward political engagement (44-5). Yet such an argument does not necessarily demonstrate the 
ways in which Beckett forms a philosophical argument but rather reveals a tendency by 
philosophers to select aspects of his writing that illustrate their own philosophical systems.   
 Most prominently, Beckett’s work has been implicated in the debate between Theodor 
Adorno and György Lukács over the degree to which literature should further the Marxist 
agenda. While Lukács criticizes Beckett for naturalizing the alienation of modern life and 
therefore occluding the audience’s capacity for change (40, 42), Adorno contends that the 
realistic work of art, which is committed to particular ideologies, becomes ineffective because of 
its dogmatism (“Commitment” 301, 302, 304). On the other hand, Beckett’s art, according to 
Adorno, manifests the historical-philosophical situation of its epoch where “metaphysical 
meaning is no longer possible” (“Trying to Understand Endgame” 10). By emphasizing 
meaninglessness rather than political ideology, Beckett has the capacity to “arouse the fear which 
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existentialism merely talks about” and thereby, compel the type of response that Adorno 
promotes (“Commitment” 301, 314-5). Whether Beckett’s plays do indeed arouse fear of the 
nothing remains uncertain since Beckett’s plays have also been known to invoke laughter and 
identification. 6 In that sense, Adorno’s position on the philosophical prowess of literature does 
not necessarily allow the latter to remain as autonomous as it might originally appear. 
 While David Cunningham credits Adorno with welcoming the data of art into his 
investigations as an independent entity (126-7), it would be an oversimplification to say that 
Adorno fully avoids privileging philosophy. As Jay Bernstein writes, Adorno’s interpretation 
approaches the danger of repeating the “celebration of meaninglessness” by existentialists that, 
Bernstein argues, Beckett’s work actually strives to undermine (185). By evading a discussion of 
Beckett’s humor, Adorno appears to “undershoot[]” the ambiguity inherent in Beckett’s work in 
favor of its proximity to his philosophical perspective (185). Furthermore, Simon Critchley adds, 
Adorno assumes not the independence of art but its reliance on philosophy to interpret it 
according to a political agenda (176). Thus, while Adorno’s interpretation of Beckett may 
initially appear to suggest that an autonomous work of literature can do the work of philosophy, 
he nonetheless stresses the aspects of Beckett’s work that supports his view of contemporary life. 
 Stanley Cavell falls into a similar interpretive trap when he argues for the reverse position 
on the effect of meaninglessness in Beckett’s work. In reaction to Adorno’s claim that Endgame 
manifests the absurdity of life without metaphysical meaning, the post-Wittgensteinian ordinary 
language philosophy contends in “Ending the Waiting Game,” that the play’s themes and method 
represent not the total failure of meaning in modernity, but “our inability not to mean what we 
are given to mean,” not to interpret the implications of words (117). His essay on Beckett also 
                                                 
6 Of Lucky’s monologue in Waiting for Godot, Ruby Cohn writes, “I could make no sense of it 
but knew it was me.” “Waiting” 152. 
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partially responds to Martin Esslin who, Cavell writes, applauded Beckett for “accurately 
registering the disintegration of meaning and language in the modern world” (115-6). Esslin, in 
defending Beckett’s plays against charges that they were simply bad and in discussing what 
separated his works from conventional well-made plays, wrote that Beckett’s are marked by 
senselessness with their “incoherent babblings” and absent climaxes (Theatre 21-22). In 
response, Cavell contends that while Beckett’s characters do strive for “solitude, emptiness, 
nothingness, meaninglessness, silence” (156), his audience nonetheless proceeds to interpret the 
play as meaningful (117). Thus, to Cavell, Adorno and Esslin’s defenses were unnecessary; 
Endgame’s themes and method represent not the collapse of meaning but its inescapability. 
 According to Cavell, Beckett contributes to the historical debate between positivists and 
post-positivists over the availability of meaning in modern language. In Cavell’s characterization 
of that debate, positivists imagined the possibility of an ideal language in which everything could 
be said clearly and logically, while post-positivists (including Wittgenstein in his later work) 
state that the ordinary language people speak is perfectly comprehensible even if it is not 
recordable in logical systems since words have different implications for different listeners. 
Cavell argues that Beckett's work offers a proof for post-positivism when his characters parody 
logical systems and nonetheless fail to destroy meaning (117). Thus, while Beckett’s plays 
represent a critique of philosophy through a satire of logic, they nonetheless mirror historical 
philosophy’s critique of itself. 
 Specifically, Cavell’s argument implies that Endgame may be considered philosophical 
insofar as it provides a demonstration, as a post-positivist thought experiment would, of the 
inescapability of meaning. Indeed, Cavell refers to the play as a philosophical argument for the 
way the characters are involved in a dialogue, which continues until one interlocutor concedes 
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because s/he lacks the right to question the conclusion (127). Cavell interprets this dialectic as a 
spoof on philosophical debate, which relies on logical premise and solid conclusions. Such a 
satire of philosophy follows Wittgenstein’s idea that the goal of his philosophy is to bring 
philosophical discussion to a close (127). In that way, Beckett’s works are philosophical insofar 
as contemporary philosophy includes the rejection of the outmoded metaphysical and analytical 
methods. 
 Yet while Cavell’s thesis involves the treatment of literature as a field that contributes 
to philosophical debates, he has been justifiably criticized for distorting Beckett’s work to 
demonstrate his philosophical approach. For example, Jay Bernstein, Benjamin Ogden, David 
Rudrum, and Simon Critchley all declaim Cavell for using Beckett’s text to illustrate ordinary 
language philosophy rather than understand the play for its inherent meaning. Bernstein calls 
Cavell’s interpretation an “overshooting” because it neglects the seriousness with which 
Beckett’s work represents the difficulty of meaning in modernity (184-5). Ogden concurs that 
Cavell, as an ordinary language philosopher, insists in too self-serving a way on the 
“ordinariness” of the language and general scene of Endgame. While Cavell focuses on the 
commonplace themes of family life occurring onstage, Ogden contends that the play’s 
ordinariness competes with what is “utterly strange” about it such as his characters’ placement in 
trashcans (128-9). In addition to representing the discarded family symbolically, Ogden argues 
that the characters’ language is neither entirely ordinary nor entirely strange, rather it is “poised 
between inscrutable nonsense and drolly quotidian chatter” (129).  
 Rudrum similarly claims that the “ordinary” provides an insufficient explanation for 
the character’s language, which predominantly carries “sublime” qualities (548-9). For instance, 
instead of categorizing the line “now as always, time was never and time is over” as a 
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philosophical statement on the nature of time, Rudrum argues that such a line cannot be decoded 
as anything more than lyrical but empty literary language (552). Also affirming Beckett’s 
separation from philosophy, Critchley writes that Beckett’s resistance to interpretations such as 
Cavell’s distinguishes his work in a broader sense from philosophy itself. This resistance, he 
claims, surfaces in the way that Beckett seems to anticipate and undermine philosophers so that 
their interpretations always seem excessive (165-6), as when Beckett’s characters mock the 
audience for making meaning out of Endgame.7  
 Cavell’s essay on Endgame may indeed be worthy of critique insofar as it demonstrates 
his hermeneutic theory rather than adheres to the confines of Beckett’s text. As is outlined in the 
essay “Aesthetic Problems in Modern Philosophy,” Cavell promulgates the pluralistic claim that 
critics are entitled to their personal interpretations. What validates critics’ taste, to Cavell, is not 
their ability to arrive at a “universal truth” but to convince others to taste what they taste (87). 
Following from that hermeneutic theory, Cavell includes in his interpretation the associations 
that arise when listening to Endgame as when he remarks that Hamm’s statement “Did you ever 
think of one thing?” reminds him of Jesus’ injunction “thine eye be single.” In keeping with the 
personal nature of interpretation, Cavell writes in the first-person, “I hear a confession of failure 
in following Christ's injunction” (120-1). Perhaps this line leads Critchley to brand Cavell’s 
essay as “needlessly gratuitous” (Critchley 207). More precisely, the statement indicates that 
Cavell is following the method he developed in “Aesthetic Problems” that requires critics to 
acknowledge the subjective origins of the allusions they hear.  
 Cavell’s hermeneutic theory follows from his larger program of ordinary language 
philosophy, which he outlines in the introductory essay to Must We Mean What We Say? As he 
                                                 
7 As when Hamm asks, “We’re not beginning to...to....mean something?” and Clov responds 
“Mean something! You and I, mean something!” 40. 
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remarks there, the personal implications of words are a necessary part of explication. In a 
Wittgensteinian sense, reminding oneself of the ordinary use of words, such as “think” and 
“know” contributes to close philosophical debates, such as the problem of skepticism, since we 
must admit that “think” and “know” have ordinary meanings that are very different than those 
employed by skeptics (85). Ordinary language philosophers find the definition of words not by 
testing them in a supposedly universal system, as the empirical philosophers did, but by asking a 
native speaker, consulting a dictionary, or thinking about them philosophically (21, 39). Cavell 
writes that when teaching a child the correct usage of “I know,” we would not allow the child to 
say “I Know” when she means “I think” because we would not want the child to learn to speak 
inaccurately (16). In that sense, including what he hears in his interpretation of Endgame 
demonstrates a valid instance of ordinary language explication in which a native speaker’s ability 
to decipher a text indicates that we do partake in a meaningful exchange of language. Yet the 
meaning that Cavell discovers in Beckett’s texts may be considered suspect because it extends 
from his aesthetic and linguistic philosophy, which suggests that his essay on Beckett is designed 
primarily to demonstrate the validity of his own philosophical system rather than to explicate the 
play.  
 Revisiting the conversation between Adorno and Cavell about whether Beckett’s work 
means nothing or proves that meaning nothing is impossible, Gilles Deleuze and Alain Badiou 
have also followed their predecessors in selecting aspects of Beckett’s writing that illustrate their 
theoretical constructs. In “The Exhausted,” Gilles Deleuze provides a totalizing reading of 
Beckett’s work, as one that is “all . . . pervaded by exhaustive series” (4). He situates exhaustion 
in Beckett’s writing as a combination of all variables in a set that, along with the renunciation of 
“preference,” “organization,” “goal,” and “signification,” motivates the characters to go on 
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aimlessly towards nothing (3-4). His argument entails reading literature as a medium that can 
have an epistemological bearing on the truth, which in Beckett’s case involves a “great 
contribution to logic” in his ability to display the “physiological exhaustion” that accompanies 
the pursuit of “nothing” (5). Since, as Deleuze avers, what is being exhausted in this process is 
language itself, Beckett’s textual manuscripts are said to develop an autological “metalanguage” 
that refers to the failure of language (7). The texts then stall in an aporia only to reach an 
apotheosis in the mime plays for TV, which display, through the absence of language, the 
capacity to “summon” or “bear[] witness to [the] void” (6-8, 9, 12, 15, 17, 20). In that way, the 
desire to achieve a formal artwork that manifests the nothing becomes, for Deleuze, the 
overarching goal of Beckett’s entire oeuvre.  
 Since Deleuze claims that Beckett progressively develops from initially generating works 
about nothing to eventually producing images that capture the nothing, it’s reasonable to argue 
that he imposes a teleological order on Beckett’s evolution as a writer. Mary Bryden, Roger 
Clément, and Critchley concur that Deleuze’s reading of Beckett is self-serving rather than 
aligned with the complexities of Beckett’s later work. For instance, Bryden notes that Deleuze 
reads Beckett with a sense of recognition so that his essay becomes autobiographical rather than 
attentive (80). Clément likewise remarks that Deleuze “integrates Beckett with [his] own 
approach” rather than seek to discover “meaning internal to the works” (121). This is evident in 
the way that Deleuze ascribes a continuity of thought, from “lexical and syntactic discontinuity 
to the exploration of the image” onto the chronology of Beckett’s work (Clément 128). While 
Clément celebrates this type of self-serving reading, asking “Who (and in the name of what) 
could deplore it?” (130), Critchley convincingly argues that Deleuze’s insistence on sequential 
reduction blinds him to the necessity of language even in the mime plays, which depend on 
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written instruction and thus render silence an impossibility (180). By imposing a narrative of 
annihilation onto the development of Beckett’s oeuvre, Deleuze neglects the aspects of Beckett’s 
works that frame the nothing positively as a source of creative material; contingently as an ever 
present, marginal aspect of daily life; and negatively as a destination to be avoided. 
 For the reverse position, Alain Badiou challenges what he calls the widespread 
“caricature” of Beckett’s efforts to materialize, “in a linear fashion,” the nothingness of nihilism 
“of the absurd, of despair, of empty skies, of incommunicability and of eternal solitude” (15, 38). 
Instead, Badiou argues that Beckett wavers between being and nothing while ultimately positing 
an ethical gesture toward the other (2). Badiou figures Beckett’s negativity as a form of 
subtraction that excises material possessions to arrive at the essential, what Badiou calls the 
“fundamental tendency toward the generic” (3-4). Such “writing of the generic” depicts the 
movement from “the misfortune of life and the visible to the happiness of a truthful arousal of 
the void” (36). While we might presume that “the truthful arousal of the void” comprises a 
largely negative destination, in Badiou’s formulation, the void represents an interval between 
two beings that makes the “joy, pleasure, enthusiasm, and happiness” of the encounter with the 
other possible (34). As Badiou writes: 
What Beckett offers to thought through his art, theatre, prose, poetry, cinema, radio, 
television, and criticism, is not this gloomy corporeal immersion into an abandoned 
existence, into hopeless relinquishment. Neither is it the contrary, as some have tried to 
argue: farce, derision, a concrete flavour, a ‘this Rabelais’. Neither existentialism nor a 
modern baroque. The lesson of Beckett is a lesson in measure, exactitude and courage. 
(40)  
 
In other words, Beckett formulates the truth of being in relation to the other in his fictions to 
generate a unified ethical message.  
 While Badiou is careful to avoid a totalizing reading of Beckett’s work in terms of 
negativity, he nonetheless approaches that problem when he reductively frames “all of Beckett’s 
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genius” as one that “tends towards affirmation” (41). As Andrew Gibson writes, Badiou’s efforts 
to discover a consistent philosophical position within Beckett’s writing displays “a quite 
unBeckettian attachment to the clarity of narrative sequence” (126-7, 134). Specifically, 
assigning a life affirming philosophy to Beckett’s work requires that Badiou sidestep the aspects 
of Beckett’s writing that do convey a recurring interest in negation. While Beckett repeats the 
motif of endurance “go on,” he also writes the line, “Fuck life,” and unlike Camus’ life-affirming 
Sisyphean hero, he stages attempts to commit suicide that only fail because of external 
circumstances.8 Instead of returning to the “caricature” of Beckett’s writing as a display of 
totalizing meaninglessness, it may be most accurate to acknowledge Beckett’s ambivalence on 
questions of being and nothing, what Gibson calls his “disunity and complicating incoherence” 
(135). Perhaps such conceptual disunity has often elided the philosophers who interpret 
Beckett’s work because of what Anthony Uhlmann identifies as a tendency by philosophers to 
transform Beckett’s material into affirmations of thought, whether of meaning, language, art, or 
being (Poststructuralism 9). Affirming what is only negative or positive about Beckett’s work 
may be precisely what divides literature from philosophy in the way that a literary writer such as 
Beckett prefers unresolvable multiplicity to the philosopher’s coherent, singular thesis.  
Analytic Approaches 
 In the second category of philosophical approaches, critics apply a theoretical construct 
such as the ideas of a particular philosopher, philosophical movement, or philosophical concept 
to Beckett’s work. Since the early years of criticism when Beckett was originally labeled an 
existentialist and Cartesian, Beckett has since been linked to Geulincx, Heidegger, Derrida, Kant, 
                                                 
8 The phrase “Fuck life” is taken from Rockaby 470. In Waiting for Godot, Estragon and 
Vladimir try to hang themselves from the tree but the branch breaks 12. In Act without Words I, 
the unnamed man positions himself to cut his throat when his scissors are pulled away 100. 
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Spinoza, Nietzsche, Hobbes, Wittgenstein, and many other philosophers. These forms of 
criticism largely fall into three main phases in identifying the relationship between philosophy 
and literature in Beckett’s writing. The first type of argument involves tracing Beckett’s 
influence by a certain philosopher to show how Beckett, for instance, read and annotated the 
works of Geulincx, in order to prove that Beckett is a Geulincxian dualist. In these arguments, 
Beckett does not appear to contribute to knowledge in the way we might say that Derrida does, 
but only replicates the ideas of others.  
 To overcome this problem, a second group of critics argues that Beckett actually 
anticipated the philosophical movements that followed him. Notably, Thomas Trezise, Carla 
Locatelli, and Gary Banham contend that Beckett is a proto-deconstructionist since his texts tend 
to waver between possible positions as in, “to tell the truth (to tell the truth!),” where the forward 
movement of Beckett’s prose reverses prior material, suggesting tha t “telling the truth” is always 
deferred (Molloy 32). While this type of criticism does suggest that Beckett’s work is epistemic, 
it is difficult to know if we would be able to name the tendency of his thought without the 
expository essays of the philosophers who followed him or if it is fair to link Beckett with a 
movement he was unaware of at the time he was writing. But the foremost problem with these 
analytic forms of criticism is their tendency to identify Beckett’s writing with a particular 
movement without noting areas of slippage that allow for the comparison to all varieties of 
philosophy.  
 The arguments often run that Beckett is an existentialist; is a proto-deconstructionist; is 
a Cartesian. Since it is clear that Beckett does not convey all of these intellectual movements 
perfectly at once, a third set of critics have recently begun to claim that Beckett’s work is 
structurally philosophical rather than tied in a limited way to one movement. As I argue, these 
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analytic approaches may demonstrate the malleable quality of Beckett’s writing (it can be easily 
shaped to confirm a philosophical thesis) but the first two phases, at least, are unable to overturn 
Plato’s critique of literature as a derivative form of thought since each only upholds the ability of 
philosophy to provide the theoretical explanation for a literary text. 
 One of the most prominent and enduring claims in the philosophical criticism on Beckett 
concerns the writer’s relationship to existentialism. While Martin Esslin has been linked with the 
claim, perhaps unfairly, that Beckett’s work stages “senselessness,” Esslin also promulgated the 
early idea that Beckett’s novels and plays manifest a “deep existential anguish” (Theatre of the 
Absurd 30). In Esslin’s contribution to the book The Novelist as Philosopher, he argues that 
Beckett is an existentialist insofar as the writer is “searching for the nature of reality itself . . . to 
reach the innermost core, the nothingness at the centre of being” (129). Esslin associates this 
discovery of the essence of being as nothingness with Sartre, who, he asserts, Beckett probably 
did not read (142-3). He claims instead that Beckett coincidentally gave form to the theory of 
existentialism “as though by some mysterious osmosis” (143). We now know this not to be true, 
that in fact, Beckett read Le Nausea at least as early as 1938 (“Letter to Thomas McGreevy,” 26 
May 1938, 626). With that information at hand, it becomes more difficult to claim that Beckett is 
an original thinker of existentialism, which spawned from “his genius” and was “too personal” to 
allow for influences (143).  
 Of course the above language is rather dated and the claims are perhaps a bit too lofty; 
yet this type of argument persists in Lance Butler’s book Samuel Beckett and the Meaning of 
Being, in which he argues that while Beckett did not necessarily read the existentialists, his 
work “constitutes a series of parables which, as a matter of fact, illustrate some of the deepest 
ontological reality described by our three philosophical works [Heidegger’s Being and Time, 
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Sartre’s Being and Nothingness, and Hegel’s Phenomenology of the Mind]” (4-5). Michael 
Bennett limits this view arguing that Beckett’s parables display a Heideggerian sense of 
nothingness as open possibility, which generates a roadmap for life, rather than a Sartrean view 
of nothingness as absolute negation (29-30, 33). On the opposite end of the existential spectrum, 
Thomas Trezise argues that Beckett’s oeuvre is entirely incompatible with notions of existential 
humanism that either affirm human dignity or redeem the value of art but instead, Beckett’s 
prose indexes the failure of phenomenology (ix).  
 Indeed, the matter of Beckett’s existentialism has been subjected to doubt since the early 
days of Beckett studies. Ruby Cohn submits that while existentialism is largely based on being 
and freedom, Beckett’s characters “rarely know crucial moments of decision” (“Philosophical 
Fragments” 176). Cohn argues that Beckett’s philosophical bent is, instead, persistently 
metaphysical, which is evident in the fact that he repeatedly returns to questions of mind/body 
dualism, selfhood, and God (169, 176). Similarly, P. J. Murphy argues that Beckett’s relationship 
to existentialism is “complicated as best” claiming that while for existentialists, “existence 
precedes essence,” for Beckett, “expression necessarily precedes existence” (222). Murphy 
instead associates Beckett’s work with the thought of Spinoza and Kant, saying that the character 
Murphy is a Spinozian while “Watt is a Kantian novel,” since it depicts “the journey between 
Kant’s two houses: the house of reason and the house of supersensible reality” (225-6, 229-230). 
Of course, John Fletcher had already noted in the 1960s the influence that Spinoza had on 
Beckett and had claimed, as Cohn did, that Descartes and Geulincx were much stronger 
influences (54).  
 The idea that Beckett’s work primarily deals with the epistemological problem of 
knowledge in light of mind/body dualism held a prominent and early position in the 
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philosophical criticism on Beckett. These interpretations are encouraged by the fact that Beckett 
references Geulincx’s maxim “Ubi nihil vales, ibi nihil velis” in his first novel Murphy (Beckett, 
Murphy, 101), and that he wrote a letter to Sigle Kennedy saying that that line could be 
considered a “point[] of departure” for the novel (Beckett, Disjecta 113). Nearly all of Beckett’s 
texts also do appear to contain references to Cartesian skepticism as in, “it seems to me I am in a 
head . . . but thence to conclude the head is mine, no, never” (Beckett, Malone Dies, 221). The 
overt references in the texts to the work of Descartes and Geulincx have led several critics to 
look for deeper thematic parallels to skepticism, which would suggest that Beckett offers a 
consistent thesis on dualism.  
 Most famously, Hugh Kenner in “The Cartesian Centaur,” offers a structural reading of 
the trilogy in which he argues that the book carries “the Cartesian process backwards” from the 
bodily “I am” of Molloy, to the stasis of Malone Dies, and the final “I think” of The Unnamable 
(Samuel Beckett 128-9). While Kenner ultimately claims that Beckett’s vision is satiric and his 
mode is primarily literary, he neglects to incorporate parody into his own totalizing reading of 
Beckett’s Cartesianism (“Comedian of the Impasse” xviv). Cohn similarly draws neat parallels 
between passages in Beckett’s works and those of Descartes and Geulincx noting that the trilogy 
chronicles the decay of the body, which follows Descartes’ idea that “that body . . . is always 
divisible,” and that Murphy is a demonstration of Geulincx’s maxim “Ubi nihil . . .” because 
Murphy leaves his apartment where he is worth nothing to enter the insane asylum where he 
wants nothing (170, 171). While she does acknowledge differences between Descartes’ texts and 
Beckett’s own—for instance, Descartes’ method led him to an understanding of the self while 
The Unnamable “never arrives at the certainty of a doubting subject”—Cohn argues that 
Beckett’s affinity with Descartes and Geulincx demonstrates his persistent interest in the 
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problem of dualism as an issue for metaphysics (172, 176). But the reading of Beckett as a 
metaphysician who explores the complexities of dualism within his prose, while illuminating, 
cannot encompass his entire body of work.  
 As David Tucker argues in his full length study, Beckett and Geulincx, the importance 
and uses of Geulincx’s work in Beckett’s oeuvre is “mutable” and “protean,” not always present 
but apparent at certain moments in the text such as fragmentary memories (2-3). Shane Weller 
further cautions that, in the aforementioned letter to Kennedy, Geulincx’s “ubi nihil” was 
coupled with Democritus’s line “Naught is more real than nothing” as the key to Murphy. Weller 
proceeds to demonstrate that the two maxims on nothing lead in opposite directions: while 
Democritus’s “naught” refers to the idea that “nothing” could exist, Geulincx’s “nihil” indicates 
the reverse, that “nothing” is an impossibility. Weller argues that Beckett explores the space 
between these polarities as he aims for an art that will demonstrate both the impossibility and 
unavoidability of nothing (121). In that way, the polyvalence of “nothing” in Beckett’s texts 
precludes the type of reading that fastens his ideas to those of one philosopher or one movement. 
 This emphasis on multiplicity has led other critics to read Beckett as a proto-
deconstructionist or post-structuralism, which furthermore, suggests that Beckett’s work is 
philosophical insofar as it was not only influenced by philosophers but also developed alongside 
trends in philosophical thought. For instance, Thomas Trezise charts the continuities between 
Beckett’s work and those of Gilles Deleuze, Jacques Derrida, George Bataille, and Maurice 
Blanchot to argue that Beckett’s writing constitutes a poststructuralist critique of 
phenomenology: Beckett demonstrates that the subject is always implicated in interpretation (5). 
Carla Locatelli associates Beckett with Derrida in a positive sense when she argues, “It is 
obvious that the subtractive practice typical of Beckett’s later works ignites a powerful 
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deconstructive process . . . [which] should never be mistaken for a thematics of silence” (x). 
Gary Banham, on the other hand, finds that Beckett and Derrida share an association with the 
negative because both encounter “the ‘nothing’ that brings both to the edge of nihilism” (56). 
Beckett’s affinities with poststructuralism are illuminating and well-supported; Derrida, after all 
declined to interpret Beckett because he said they were “too close” (60).  
 Yet as I will discuss in greater detail in the next chapter, while Derrida has been credited 
with encouraging such transdisciplinary readings,9 it is important to note that he avoided blurring 
literature into philosophy as when he writes, “Not that I assimilate the different regimes of 
fiction, not that I consider laws, constitutions, the declarations of the rights of man, grammar, or 
the penal code to be the same as novels” (Limited Inc. 134). Derrida’s distance from Beckett may 
be discovered in the former’s defense of “undecidability” not as a methodology designed to 
celebrate “relativism or to any sort of indeterminism” but to achieve “a determinate oscillation 
between possibilities” (148). In other words, Derrida does not advocate for “indeterminacy as 
such” because, in his view, there is “a right track,” a “better way” (144-6). In Beckett’s case, it 
may be more appropriate to say that he wavers between possibilities without a sense of a “better 
way” or even a superficial celebration of indeterminism itself since his characters remain 
displeased with their condition. 
 One way critics have recently found for accounting for the philosophical qualities of 
Beckett’s texts without subsuming his work under one school is to argue that Beckett’s work is 
thematically rather than historically philosophical. For instance, Robert Eaglestone in “Beckett in 
the Wilderness: Writing about (Not) Writing about Beckett” provides a useful overview of some 
of the ways of thinking about philosophical literature while acknowledging the difficultly of 
                                                 
9 Anthony Uhlmann notes in Beckett and Poststructuralism that “Habermas accuses Derrida of 
‘leveling the genre distinctions’ between literature and philosophy” 7. 
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equating one poet with one philosopher. He notes that Beckett’s work constitutes a “thinking 
about literature” that is “structurally philosophical” in the way that his writing probes the 
problem of what literature is (41). Since Eaglestone’s contribution is solely theoretical, he opens 
the way for a critic who can explicitly connect this structural philosophical thought about 
literature to Beckett’s works.  
 Richard Begam follows this method when, rather than equating Beckett with one 
particular school, he identifies Beckett’s thought with what he calls the philosophical problem of 
postfoundationalism, arguing that Beckett explores “the ‘fonds sans fond’” (13). That is, Beckett 
follows Nietzsche in disrupting the notions both that philosophy is the master discipline and that 
there is a fundamental ground for meaning (12). Problematically, Begam proceeds to assign 
Beckett to this one philosophical concept noting that “Beckett’s mind was subtle, not muddled—
given to complexity, not to contradiction” (13). Yet Beckett’s argument for a fundamental 
separation between philosophy and poetry on the basis of their oppositional tendencies in 
relation to universality indicates that Beckett’s work exhibits a conflicting relationship to 
philosophy. After all, as I will discuss in the next chapter, Beckett’s separation of literature and 
philosophy places him in the camp of Plato, that champion of foundationalism. 
 As may be clear by now, the problem with the analytic approach is that it strictly 
identifies Beckett’s work with one particular person, branch, or concept to the detriment of all 
other approaches. Since it is logical that Beckett cannot fully be a Cartesian at the same time that 
he is fully an existentialist, Geulincxian, or proto-deconstructionist, it is evident that these 
approaches do not account for the multiplicity and perhaps incompatibility of Beckett’s 
references. Furthermore, what this approach presupposes is the very question of the relationship 




 The arguments that I am calling “comparative” contrast with the “analytic” ones in that 
they draw analogies or trace influences between Beckett’s work and that of philosophers without 
strictly identifying him as a philosopher of a particular movement. Critics such as Simon 
Critchley, Vivian Mercier, John Fletcher, and Andrew Kennedy may be considered 
comparativists since they do not deny that philosophical ideas play an important role in Beckett’s 
works; what they contest is the overarching systematization of Beckett’s thought under the aegis 
of one method or thesis. For instance, Critchley describes prior philosophical interpretations of 
Beckett as sub-Cartesian, sub-Heideggerian, or sub-Pascalian absurdist interpretations as 
misguided saying, “it might well be that philosophically mediated meanings are precisely what 
we should not be in search of when thinking through Beckett’s work” (166). His thesis, that 
Beckett’s work may be “uniquely resistant to philosophical interpretation” returns Beckett’s 
fundamental orientation toward the writing of literature where “meaning nothing becomes the 
only meaning” (36-37, 165, 175). The comparativist approach allows for my own ambivalent 
thesis that Beckett’s work displays an entangled and yet troubled relationship to philosophical 
discourse. 
 In the debate about whether Beckett is a philosopher, one set of comparativists generally 
argue that while Beckett does incorporate the work of philosophers into his work, he is primarily 
a literary writer. Although Mercier argues that Beckett’s work is philosophical in the sense that it 
dramatizes the fundamental “concept of being and refusing to be” (186), he concludes that 
Beckett ultimately takes an aesthetic approach, which is in keeping with one of Beckett’s 
statements that he prefers “the shape of ideas” to strict allegiances to intellectual schools (163, 
181). Similarly, Fletcher traces the various philosophers who influenced Beckett from the 
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Presocratics to Hume while maintaining that Beckett employed their work in a superficial and 
parodic manner (43, 45). 
 The view that Beckett uses philosophy to garner laughs is shared by Sylvie Debevec 
Henning, who notes that Beckett undermines the totalizing nature of philosophical systems and 
instead affirms the contingency of the singular creative act (1, 5-6). Beckett’s work, she notes, is 
opposed to philosophical discourse in the sense that it occludes categorization under one thesis or 
perspective (7). While, as discussed above, Hugh Kenner elsewhere draws strict parallels 
between Beckett’s thought and Descartes’, in Stoic Comedians he claims that Beckett is 
primarily a satirist, motivated by the desire to fill pages with words rather than prove a 
significant point (xii, xviii, xviv, 80-1). On the question of Beckett’s existentialism, Kennedy 
disavows the notion that Sartre greatly influenced Beckett to instead posit the idea that while 
Beckett felt a sense of loss at the absence of God, it was “a medley of philosophical ideas” from 
Descartes, to Berkeley, to Schopenhauer, to Buddhism that informed his thought (9). Moreover, 
for Kennedy, Beckett’s mode is not “primarily philosophical” rather he was motivated by the 
modernist drive toward the new coupled with an interest in expressing personal despair (10). 
These critics generally claim that the literary qualities of Beckett’s writing, such as his humor 
and experimentalism, override the philosophical concepts he references.  
 In contrast to the claim that Beckett’s mode is primarily literary, a new type of argument 
acknowledges differences between philosophy and literature in his writing while maintaining 
that Beckett’s work is still “philosophical” in the sense that the ideas that he derived from 
philosophers are meant to be taken seriously within his work. This perspective has been 
promulgated by Anthony Uhlmann who focuses on the relationship between Beckett’s thought 
and Deleuze’s while also addressing their points of divergence. Uhlmann notes that both Deleuze 
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and Beckett sought to separate philosophy from literature, each maintaining that while art moves 
from the particular to the general, philosophy moves from the general to the particular (7). He 
also acknowledges that although Beckett’s directionality is negative, Deleuze’s is positive (9). 
 Yet Uhlmann attempts to resolve this difference by locating a ground between these 
writers, where their influences, themes, and historical circumstance are shared (7-8, 23, 34-5). 
Uhlmann escapes the comparativist approach when finally concludes that Beckett is a 
philosophical writer in that he shares the post-structuralist, anti-Platonic emphasis on movement 
and multiplicity: “a multitude so great and so divergent from the model as to render the model 
meaningless” (12). Thus, while Uhlmann’s approach is comparative in the sense that he affirms 
differences between Beckett and Deleuze’s thought, he also insists, perhaps too forcefully, that 
the differences between philosophy and literature “must be breached” (8, 9). Contrariwise, a 
more felicitous philosophical reading of Beckett perhaps would acknowledge the writer’s interest 
in issues of being, selfhood, and the nothing, without losing the sense that philosophy and 
literature offer divergent modes of responding to such questions. That is, while I agree with 
Uhlmann’s claim that Beckett prefers multifarious representations of nothing to a unified vision 
of being, such an observation does not necessarily mean that Beckett is a post-structuralism. 
 The contemporary trend to transgress disciplinary boundaries has penetrated the critical 
discourse on Beckett and perhaps unintentionally demonstrated how problematic such an 
approach can be. While the desire to topple the old hierarchies that set philosophy above 
literature may be merited, philosophical readings of Beckett often unintentionally perpetuate the 
idea that the literary text functions to prove the philosophical one, thus affirming the ability of 
the philosopher to see more acutely than the poet. Moreover, seen through the lens of nothing, 
these various philosophical interpretations of Beckett’s work build a chaotic and disparate 
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portrait of Beckett’s work. That is, Beckett’s work alternately uses language to mean nothing and 
demonstrates the impossibility of meaning nothing; his work exposes the nothingness inherent in 
being and the productive nothing that generates art. The disparate conclusions that these 
interpretations prove together are not wrong, rather they demonstrate that the polysemic quality 
of his language may oppose the thesis-driven approach of his critics without necessarily offering 
polysemy as proper response to postmodernity. 
 For those reasons, I will proceed in situating Beckett as a literary writer whose work 
remains enmeshed within philosophical discourse even while it opposes theoretical 
identification. This approach, I argue, best accounts for the multiplicity of philosophical 
references and interests embedded in his texts while submitting that Beckett’s purpose may 
remain other than the traditional philosophical pursuit of “seeking after the truth” or “loving 
knowledge.” Beckett’s letters, indeed, tell the story of a young writer who, despite numerous 
documented rejections, is persistent in pursuing a career as a literary writer. He is someone who 
had the opportunity to become a scholar, a thinker, a philologist, and rejected that path because 
he had “the itch to write” even though he felt that “the idea of writing seems somehow 
ludicrous” (“Letter...” 111-112). That is, one way of reading Beckett’s work is as a product of a 
person who did not read philosophy with a desire to enter into that discourse but went “phrase-
hunting in St Augustine” in order to build a literary work that would be published and 
appreciated by scholars (Beckett, “Letter...” 62). Yet Beckett’s relationship with philosophy 
remains entangled since, as I will discuss in the next chapter, Beckett’s thoughtful separation of 




CHAPTER 2: BECKETT’S CONTRIBUTION TO THE ANCIENT QUARREL 
 
 As I covered in the introduction, the dominant strand of philosophical criticism on 
Samuel Beckett presents the writer as someone who does the work of philosophy in his 
imaginative texts. For instance, Stanley Gontarski claims that Beckett’s work represents a 
“dramatization of a phenomenological theme” (9), while Lance Butler similarly argues that 
Beckett’s writing presents an “ontological parable” that is “argued consistently” (8, 151). Such 
arguments were part of a general trend beginning in the 1960s, when as Julie Thompson Klein 
writes in Interdisciplinarity: History, Theory, and Practice, prominent French theorists such as 
Roland Barthes, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, and Claude Levi-Strauss initiated “a 
movement toward reintegration” of the humanities and social sciences (31). Yet the notion that 
such philosophers entirely demolished the barriers between literature and philosophy, so much so 
that a literary text could be said to evince a philosophy, may be an oversimplification. The 
purpose of this chapter is to provide a theoretical justification for my hesitation to assimilate 
Beckett’s work with a particular philosophical movement or idea. Returning to twentieth-century 
literary theory on the question of how philosophy and literature are related, I argue in this 
chapter that “neat identifications” between the two fields remain problematic, especially in the 
context of interpreting Samuel Beckett’s work since Beckett himself separated the fields in his 
conceptual writing. Beckett cannot easily be called a philosopher or philosophical writer, since 
he often sides with the philosophers who are most critical of literature. In that way, Beckett may 
be considered a philosophical writer only insofar as his negative attitude toward literature is 
strongly supported by philosophy itself. 
 Like the twentieth-century thinkers whom I will gloss—including Blanchot, Heidegger, 
Barthes, Derrida, Levinas, and Kristeva—Beckett often emphasizes the differences in 
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methodology, aims, and interpretative responses of philosophy and literature rather than their 
contiguity. For instance, while contemporary critics such as Martha Nussbaum highlight the 
similarities between the fields by arguing that despite differences in style and form, writers of 
philosophy and literature are both essentially concerned with life (6, 7), Beckett claims in “Dante 
. . . Bruno . Vico . . Joyce” that “form and content are inseparable” so that generic differences 
generate differences in meaning (502). Beckett’s division of the fields undermines the branch of 
criticism, as Robert Eaglestone identifies it, which seeks to demonstrate how Beckett’s texts do 
the work of philosophy (43). For Eaglestone, Beckett’s works may rightfully be called 
philosophical not because they manifest particular arguments about the nature of truth but 
because they identify “problems in ‘thinking about literature’” and “test the limits of our ideas 
about what literature is and the what [sic] foundations of ‘thinking about literature’ should be’ 
(41). To take Eaglestone’s thesis a step further, Beckett indicates in “Dante . . .” that he agrees 
with the philosophers who would differentiate the literary work from the philosophical one on 
the basis that the former presents the particularities of existence while the latter shapes those 
particularities into abstract concepts (495). In that way, Beckett’s “thinking about literature” 
ironically aligns him not with those who would argue for the integration of the disciplines but 
with those who uphold their division. 
 The difficulty of assimilating philosophy and literature also surfaces in the writing of 
Badiou who discovers resistance to his initial totalizing philosophical reading of Beckett’s work. 
While Badiou, for instance, articulates the goal of understanding how “the truth of being enter[s] 
the fiction,” he encounters passages in Beckett’s texts in which their fictionality directly contests 
their truth-claims (4). Badiou identifies an ethical argument within Beckett’s fictional texts that, 
contrary to the typical view that Beckett’s writing tends toward utter meaninglessness, despair, 
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and total skepticism, the writer actually crafts courageous parables that argue for the value of 
“going on” through characters who are driven by the “imperative to speak” (2, 46). Of Beckett’s 
philosophical contribution, Badiou writes, “What Beckett offers to thought . . . is not this gloomy 
corporeal immersion into an abandoned existence, into hopeless relinquishment [but] the lesson 
of Beckett is a lesson in measure, exactitude and courage” (40). Using the language of 
philosophy, Beckett can be said to contribute to knowledge insofar as he offers “lessons” in 
ethics that, as Andrew Gibson surmises, philosophers such as Badiou then “subtract” (124).  
 Yet while Badiou initially argues that the literary text conveys a philosophical thesis 
when he remarks that “it is entirely possible to take Worstward Ho as a short philosophical 
treatise, as a treatment in shorthand on the question of being” (80), he also encounters features of 
Beckett’s literary texts that undermine the conceptual systems they ostensibly impart. He notes, 
for instance, that any comment on skepticism found in Beckett’s work is coupled with an irony 
so strong that it warps the philosophical content therein: “This is the argument of the cogito save 
for the ironic nuance which derives from the fact that the search for truth is replaced by the 
search for non-being, and, moreover, that by an inversion of values, ‘the inescapability of self-
perception’” (14). While, in this case, Badiou considers the slippage from “the search for truth” 
to “self-perception” to be incidental, a slippage of thought rather than a necessary effect of the 
text, his observation that figurative irony subverts the philosophical search for truth indicates that 
certain literary aspects of Beckett’s writing obstruct his “philosophical treatise.”  
 Badiou’s discovery of a dividing point between philosophical and literary discourse 
becomes more clearly defined when he arrives at the conclusion that Beckett’s texts are not 
purely philosophical but rather link “philosophical abstraction . . . and the strophic poem. The 
latter describes a kind of picture through the incessant repetition of the same groups of words, 
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and through minute variations which, little by little, displace the meaning of the text” (40). In 
other words, the shifting repetitions within Beckett’s texts, particularly the ones written after the 
Nobel Prize award, cause deviations from the conceptual material they purportedly convey. 
Badiou further writes that the poetic aspects of Beckett’s writing obstruct the philosophical 
questions that they implicitly ask: 
 The scraps of fiction or spectacle that Beckett employs attempt to expose some critical 
 questions (in Kant’s sense) to the test of beauty. . . . “Where would I go, if I could go? 
 Who would I be if I could be? What would I say, if I had a voice? . . . Who am I, if the 
 other exists.” . . . The work of Beckett is nothing but the treatment of these four questions 
 within the flesh of language. We could say that we are dealing with an enterprise of 
 meditative thought—half-conquered by the poem—which attempts to seize in beauty the 
 non-prescriptable fragments of existence. (41) 
 
While Badiou’s predominant effort in the passage lies in demonstrating the success of Beckett’s 
integration of philosophical and literary material, so that Beckett’s work can be called “nothing 
but the treatment of [Kant’s] questions,” Badiou nonetheless arrives at the conclusion that the 
poetic aspects of the work “conquer[]” the “meditative thought” within. That may be because, as 
Badiou notes, the artist “differs from the philosopher” in the way that “the operator of thought is 
the fiction within prose” (48). In other words, Beckett’s fictions may diverge from the 
philosophical material they include insofar as they primarily concern their own formal 
properties. 
 Badiou is not alone in observing that Beckett’s texts tend to depart from the philosophical 
ideas from which they derive. In his book The Philosophy of Samuel Beckett, John Calder, 
Beckett’s English language publisher, acknowledges the idea that the fictional aspects of 
Beckett’s texts warp their philosophical content. In the book, Calder qualifies his central claim 




 In the plays philosophy is discussed and its concepts become the property of many of his 
 characters, but he does not use philosophical ideas to be given human form on stage. The 
 nature of dramatic dialogue was both a hindrance to his doing so and an opportunity 
 simply to use his characters to speculate or discuss philosophical concepts, not to embody 
 them. (20)  
 
While contrasting Beckett’s discussion-based approach with the trend in existentialist theatre to 
embody ideas in human form, Calder perhaps accidentally identifies a problem that the figurative 
embodiment of ideas, pervasive in literary writing, presents a “hindrance” to philosophical 
inquiry. In order to adequately convey philosophical concepts, Beckett’s characters must, 
tellingly, express them directly in expository form. Calder nevertheless stresses the ultimate 
“opportunity” that the fictional mode offers to philosophical discourse, but what is of interest for 
this study is the observation that the literary aspects of Beckett’s writing appear to occlude the 
goal of embodying conceptual thought (16). Simon Critchley arrives at a similar interpretation 
when he notes that Beckett’s writing does not replicate philosophy, but rather remains “uniquely 
resistant to philosophical interpretation” (165). While Critchley argues that Beckett’s resistance 
derives from his anticipation of philosophical interpretations (165-6), the question still remains 
as to which precise literary aspects of Beckett’s writing fortify the resistance.  
 Since many studies have emphasized the philosophical nature of Beckett’s texts, it is 
worth taking time to understand why Beckett’s texts tend to preclude philosophical 
interpretation. To respond to that question, in this chapter, I return to the terms of the ancient 
quarrel between literature and philosophy—beginning with Plato and then skipping to the 
twentieth century debate—in order to understand how the relationship between the fields has 
recently been conceptualized. Using Plato’s critique of poetry as a starting point, I will 
demonstrate that contemporary philosophers have not, as might be expected, rejected his 
characterizations of literary writing even as they replace Plato’s consequent suspicion of such 
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material with admiration. For instance, while in rejecting Plato’s critique of poets’ whimsical 
processes, Heidegger frames the poet’s craft as a form of thinking, Julia Kristeva and Emmanuel 
Levinas have affirmed the importance of a rhythmic rather than a deliberate, conceptual 
methodology for generating a literary work. In addition to reviewing recent theory on the 
relationship between philosophy and literature, I will revisit Beckett’s own insistence on the 
categorical separation between philosophy and literature to demonstrate that Beckett’s separation 
of the fields on the basis of their distinct ways of encoding and interpreting material suggests that 
the longstanding mode of interpreting Beckett’s work through the lens of philosophy warrants a 
reexamination.  
The Ancient Quarrel in the Twentieth Century 
 “There’s an ancient quarrel between poetry and philosophy,” so says Socrates in Plato’s 
Republic upon declaring that poets should be banished from the ideal city (76; 607). In this 
section, I will review Plato’s claims against poetry first as a whole and then individually in order 
to offer a platform for the twentieth-century philosophers who responded to them. For instance, 
while Plato characterizes poetry as a product of the “lengthy process of turning upside down . . . 
and cutting and pasting,” he defines the philosopher as “a lover of wisdom” (Phaedrus 82; 278). 
This description of the difference between the disciplines can be broken down into four 
interconnecting claims against poetry: 1) It is mimetic, which is problematic insofar as the truth 
is not to be found in nature; 2) It lacks techne or rigorous craftsmanship; 3) It may provide an 
example of unethical behavior; 4) It is obscure and so may be interpreted incorrectly. These 
characterizations of art linger in current debates on literary theory even while Plato’s degradation 




 Probably the most famous injunction against literary writing is presented in the Republic, 
where Plato’s interlocutors discuss their refusal to “admit any representational poetry” into the 
ideal republic (64; 595). Plato, as is well-known, finds representational poetry to be problematic 
on the basis that the things in the world are already representations of their “type” and therefore 
not “real,” rendering an artistic likeness of one of those objects twice removed from the forms 
(65; 596-597). Moreover, mimesis troubles the pursuit of knowledge because the artist does not 
need to understand the composition of an object to depict its appearance (65; 596). While in the 
twenty-first century we are far removed from Plato’s notion of a metaphysical ideal that is 
blurred in the experience of the material world, the notion that poets merely imitate pre-given 
material persists in post-metaphysical philosophy as does the perception that such imitations do 
not always serve an ethical or veridical function.  
 In post-metaphysical philosophy, the type of material that the poet imitates has shifted 
inward and the implication of this shift has been inverted so that poets’ imitations of inner being 
are now largely praised. The acceptance of the artist’s work coincides with the notion that artis ts 
do not represent the things in the world, but rather, as Heidegger frames it, deal in “the 
reproduction of the thing’s general essence” (Poetry... 37). Nietzsche, in The Birth of Tragedy, 
also presents artists as imitators of the “inmost ground of the world,” a concept he articulated 
while he was in awe of Wagner (38). Praising the artist’s imitative craft as a form of thinking 
toward the truth, Nietzsche writes that the worldliness of poetry is precisely what allows writers 
to speak to truth: “The sphere of poetry does not lie outside the world as a fantastic impossibility 
spawned by a poet’s brain: it desires to be just the opposite, the unvarnished expression of the 
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truth” (61). Since with Nietzsche truth is no longer a transcendent form, a poet who can imitate 
the event of being itself has accessed the truth of the world.  
 While, as Paul de Man notes, Nietzsche initiated the modernist critique of metaphysics by 
turning to aesthetic modes of knowing, such as metaphor, it is important to recognize that 
Nietzsche eventually struggled against the poet over the problem of representation 
(“Resistance...” 7-8, “Semiology” 1375-6). Following his break with Wagner, Nietzsche, in the 
Genealogy of Morals, notes that artists are easily susceptible to corruption, as he writes, “They 
have at all times been valets of some morality, philosophy, or religion; quite apart from the fact 
that they have unfortunately often been all- too-pliable courtiers of their own followers and 
patrons and cunning flatterers of ancient or newly arrived powers” (538). While he does not 
return to Plato’s ascetic ideal or metaphysics, Nietzsche, in this anti-Wagnerian moment, could 
no longer conceive of the poet as a “knight,” who could autonomously speak to truth against 
mass feeling. In that way, while Nietzsche’s former praise for poets’ ability to imitate the inmost 
ground of the world became the model for a new philosophical mode, which would elevate 
aesthetic truth, he also returned to the idea that poets often imitate the ideas of philosophers 
rather than invent new modes of thought.  
 For all of the arguments that present Beckett as a philosopher, it may be surprising to 
note that Beckett’s own ideas about imitation largely cohere with Plato’s criticism and 
Nietzsche’s late-stage denigration of artists. As Stanley Gontarski comments in The Intent of 
Undoing in Samuel Beckett’s Dramatic Texts, Beckett’s works contain Platonic essentialism in 
the premise, expressed in the monograph Proust, that the imitation of surfaces comprises a lesser 
art (4). Moreover, the Beckettian narrator of “Texts for Nothing” intones such disdain for 
mimetic art when he appears to refer to his own works as these “pale imitations of mine” (329). 
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Gontarski parses Beckett’s attack on representation as a response to Balzac’s hyper-realistic 
novels, which were too perfectly crafted to represent the world in its imperfections (9). In 
response, Gontarski notes, Beckett represents the chaotic experiences of being through a formal 
preference for uncertain rather than omniscient writing (12-3). Yet while Gontarski figures 
Beckett as an ontologist because of his turn inward, the idea that Beckett’s work accurately 
represents inner chaos rather than external objects again inscribes his work within the discourse 
of representation (12). Likewise, the turn inward, both for Nietzsche and Heidegger, continues to 
frame the artist’s craft within the problem of representation even if poets are said to represent 
interior perceptions rather than objects. Similarly, Beckett’s critique of mimesis and continued 
representation of inward experiences suggests that he does not seek an escape from Plato’s 
degradation of poetry but instead validates the philosopher’s formulation of writing as a “pale 
imitation.”  
The Question of Craft 
 The imitation of feelings or materials in contrast to the logical ordering of ideas 
comprises one aspect of a larger problem with poetry, which is that, according to Plato, poetry is 
derived from a passive process instead of an active one. In the Phaedrus, Socrates separates the 
philosopher from the poet by defining the philosopher as a true “lover of wisdom” and the poet 
as someone who composes arbitrarily, “by a lengthy process of turning upside down” (82). In the 
Ion, Plato presents the poet’s process as intuitive rather than goal-directed or knowledge-based 
when he depicts the rhapsode as someone who receives “a divine gift” from the gods instead of 
mastering or understanding his own craft (47-8). In other words, poets unlike philosophers create 
through inspiration without knowledge or deliberation. In twentieth-century philosophy, the 
terminology has, of course, shifted away from the notion that the poet is inspired by the gods but 
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the conception that the poet works through an arbitrary rather than conceptually rigorous method 
has endured. Specifically, the discourse of inspiration has largely been supplanted by emphasis 
on the importance of rhythm to the poetic process, which validates Plato’s characterization of the 
poet as someone who assimilates external forces rather than actively seeks to reach essential 
truths (Phaedrus, 80-1; 277). 
 The predominant, anti-Platonic view today that poetry can be a vessel for truth derives 
largely from Heidegger’s characterization of poetry as a new model for non-metaphysical truth. 
Heidegger rejects the concept of a divine exterior Ideal to instead establish the truth as the 
unveiling of what beings are. Heidegger’s ontological notion of truth consequently involves a 
reversal Plato’s characterization of the poet as disorganized and inspired, as Heidegger asserts 
that “Making poetry” like philosophy, “is a matter of thinking” (96). Heidegger returns to the 
original Greek classification of art and craft as “techne” to demonstrate that Socrates was wrong 
to argue that poetry is not created through a rational process. The word “techne,” Heidegger 
defines it, does not mean “art” or “craft” but rather “signifies a ‘mode of knowing’” (59). In 
Heidegger’s ontological conception of truth, “knowing consists in aletheia, that is, in the 
uncovering of beings” in images (59). Thus, poetry is neither technical or arbitrary, but rather, 
through the act of naming, poetry illuminates the knowledge of what it means to be, even if 
“being” is ultimately devoid of essential meaning (59, 72-3, and 76).  
 While Heidegger opposes the notion that the poet’s process is arbitrary and disconnected 
from truth, by following Nietzsche in moving the representative act inward, he validates the 
importance of unconscious rhythms of language in producing poetic material. Following 
Nietzsche, who affirmatively notes that melody generates the poem (Birth 53), Julia Kristeva, in 
“The Ethics of Linguistics,” acknowledges the prominent role that rhythm plays in generating 
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poetic language. Defining rhythm as “sonorous thrusts within and against the system of 
language” (30), she affirms Plato’s conclusion that: 
Any society may be stabilized only it excludes poetic language. . . . The poet is put to 
death because he wants to turn rhythm into a dominant element; because he wants to 
make language perceive what it doesn’t want to say, provide it with its matter 
independently of the sign, and free from denotation. For it is this eminently parodic 
gesture that changes the system. (31) 
 
While she does not agree with Plato’s condemnation of poets’ destabilizing activity, she does 
accept Plato’s characterization of poetry as a non-contemplative processes that upsets political 
systems. 
 Instead of eradicating the notion that the imaginative writer works through a non-
conceptual method, she confirms poetry’s rhythmic, intuitive process precisely because of its 
unsystematic and revolutionary qualities. Such is the case because, as Kristeva states, poetry 
derives not only from “language, subject-producer, history, metalanguage” but also from that 
which it cannot understand (“How...” 94). The poet’s lack of understanding returns us again to 
Plato’s concern with uninformed representation, which Kristeva accepts because the poet is able 
to bring infinite ideas into being (“How...” 98-9). For Kristeva, poetry’s struggle between rhythm 
and meaning places it on the margins of and not as a replica of philosophy, an important point to 
consider when evaluating the type of argument in Beckett studies that frames him as someone 
who conveys philosophical a meaning. 
 Instead, literary writing remains on the margins of philosophy because “sonorous 
language” competes against systems of language and thought that arise around it. In “How Does 
One Speak to Literature?” Kristeva writes of the fragmentation of thought into separate 
disciplines that:  
Literature confirms all the hypotheses of all the human sciences . . . on the condition that 
it remain in the shadows of knowledge as a passive thing, never as an agent . . . not 
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specified as a precise object, delineated in its totality by an autonomous, circumscribed 
theory looking for its truth, literature does not give rise to specific knowledge, but to 
applications of doctrines that are nothing but ideological exercises since they are 
empirical and fragmented. (95)  
 
While Kristeva does not endorse Plato’s disdainful attitude toward poetic writing as an effective 
medium for teaching the truth, she critiques the approach to literature that would treat the 
discourse as an analytical object, which only serves to demonstrate the ideological approaches of 
other disciplines, as so much of Beckett criticism does. Instead, what Kristeva suggests is that the 
poetic discipline is not to be folded into other approaches since the poet’s ability to access and 
convey the rhythms of the subconscious allows it to rupture such ideological systems.  
 Like Kristeva, Beckett interestingly affirms the characterization of poetic writing as a 
product of pre-conscious thinking in opposition to abstract, philosophical frameworks. In his 
critical essay “Dante . . . Bruno . Vico . . Joyce,” for instance, he selects passages from Vico’s 
writing that categorize poetry as a medium that comes closer to the raw material of life than 
philosophy does. Although, as James Acheson notes, in writing this work of criticism, Beckett 
was not necessarily trying to develop a theory of art but was rather attempting to supplement his 
income and support the career of Joyce, there nonetheless “emerges” from the essay an aesthetic 
position in the ancient quarrel (1). In the essay, for instance, Beckett’s frames the differences 
between literature and philosophy this way: 
Poetry, [Vico] says, was born of curiosity, daughter of ignorance . . . Poetry was the first 
operation of the human mind, and without it thought could not exist. Barbarians, 
incapable of analysis and abstraction, must use their fantasy to explain what their reasons 
cannot comprehend. Poetry is essentially the antithesis of Metaphysics: Metaphysics 
purge the mind of the sense and cultivate the disembodiment of the spiritual; Poetry is all 
passion and feeling and animates the inanimate; Metaphysics are most perfect when most 
concerned with universals; Poetry, when most concerned with particulars. Poets are the 
sense, philosophers the intelligence of humanity . . . poetry is a prime condition of 




Beckett’s categorization of poetry as a product of the primary senses that are eventually 
displaced by the abstract reasoning of a philosopher suggests that poetry is unphilosophical in the 
sense that it has not undergone analysis of itself. Beckett’s assertion that “poetry is essentially 
the antithesis of Metaphysics” also runs contrary to the idea that Beckett is a philosophical writer 
who seeks to rupture the boundaries between those fields.  
 The latter thesis can be found in the work of Richard Begam, who argues that Beckett 
should be taken “seriously as a philosophical writer,” insofar as his writing coheres with a 
“postfoundationalist” discourse (13). Defining “foundationalism” as the idea that “philosophy 
finds the first grounds for all other disciplines, it is a master discipline,” Begam argues that 
Beckett’s writing presents a coherent, consistent statement on the “philosophical problem” of 
writing itself, independent of a master discourse (12-13, 23, 33). To make his argument, Begam 
neglects Beckett’s own affirmation of the role of philosophy in generating abstract concepts from 
the less thoughtfully constructed material of poetry. Asserting that the poet offers the particulars 
and the philosopher the universal intelligence of humanity, Beckett contrariwise suggests that, 
while both figures may be writing about human life, their focuses and purposes diverge. By 
emphasizing “particularities” over “universals” in literary writing, Beckett appears to side with 
those philosophers who characterize poetry as a pre-conceptual process that opposes “analysis,” 
“abstraction,” and comprehension.  
 Alternately, the idea that “poetry was the first operation of the human mind” has been 
used to support Heideggerian arguments, such as Anthony Uhlmann’s, that the poetic image 
comprises a conceptually valid form of thought. Seeking a way to understand “how literature and 
philosophy might interact,” Uhlmann argues that “because the image precedes and exceeds 
thought, it is something which is of equal importance to (but made different use of by) literature 
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and philosophy” (“Philosophical Image” 3). Yet Uhlmann is forced to reconcile his goal of 
illuminating the parallels that exist between the work of Beckett and that of the post-structuralists 
with Beckett’s assertions about the differences between those texts (Beckett and 
Poststructuralism 4). Uhlmann is careful to seek after “resonances” instead of claiming that 
Beckett is a post-structuralist, precisely because he encounters “a problem of impurity, of 
interference, of mixing or overlapping” (12). That is, while Uhlmann believes that the “the rigid 
disciplinary boundaries between literature and philosophy (the one concerned with the particular 
the other with the general) must be breached,” he acknowledges Beckett’s own formulation of 
the differences between the disciplines in “Dante...” (7). While Uhlmann reaches a synthesis 
between his and Beckett’s claims when he arrives at the conclusion that “while they are 
concerned with the same questions they move in different directions and approach from opposite 
sides; literature moving from the particular towards the general, philosophy from the general 
towards the particular” (8), we might contend that most fields of discourse ask about similar 
facets of humanity; neurobiology, psychology, and psychiatry are all concerned with the 
processes of human thought, but their differences in methodology and approach are what 
separate them. This separation is not complete but is significant in so far as it determines how 
they approach, test, and ask questions. 
 Returning to the parallels between Plato’s characterizations of poetic craft and twentieth-
century literary theory, Blanchot, Barthes, and Beckett also approach a Platonic view that writers 
do not seek after truth but rather write for the sake of writing. For instance, instead of arguing 
against Plato that poets write for a philosophical or ethical purpose, Blanchot remarks that the 
writer has nothing to say:  
 Whatever he wants to say, it is nothing. The world, things, knowledge, are for him only 
 reference points across the void. And he himself is already reduced to nothing. Nothing is 
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 his material. He rejects the forms in which it offers itself to him as being something . . . 
 The writer’s ‘I have nothing to say,’ like that of the accused, contains the whole secret of 
 his solitary condition. (5) 
 
Here Blanchot affirms the idea that the poet gathers the things of the world, including 
philosophical references, into the work but does so without wishing to prove a philosophical 
point. To Blanchot, the best writing of the day does not celebrate art for art’s sake, but rather 
represents the curse of speech: the writer is “condemned to speak passionately in order to say 
nothing” (14). Confirming, in some senses, the Platonic notion that the writer lacks the 
philosophical purpose of the “lover of wisdom” Blanchot writes, “The writer does not write in 
order to express the concern that is his law. He writes without a goal, in an act that nevertheless 
has all the characteristics of a deliberate composition, and his concern for it craves realization at 
each instant” (15). Barthes upholds the idea that writers do not produce knowledge or reach the 
truth when he notes that the verb “to write” has become intransitive and so means “the one who 
writes—absolutely” (18). Since writing itself is the goal of the work, any “message” within is 
incidental. A similar discovery perhaps leads Blanchot to the conclusion that “Literature is 
unquestionably illegitimate, there is an underlying deceitfulness in it” (22). For the themes that 
are said to comprise the central purpose of a work are actually red herrings intended to conceal 
the void of meaning within.  
 Beckett’s thought aligns closely with Blanchot’s in “Three Dialogues with Georges 
Duthuit,” in which Beckett affirms the idea that the aimless literary process produces material 
that opposes the traditional, philosophical pursuit of knowledge, truth, and goodness. In the 
dialogue, Beckett takes the position that the artist of the day prefers “The expression that there is 
nothing to express, nothing with which to express, nothing from which to express, no power to 
express, no desire to express, together with the obligation to express” (556). Interestingly, such a 
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statement on art, that the artist has “nothing to express” contrasts with the notion, commonly 
held in Beckett criticism, that the writer is expressing a philosophical position, whether it be 
existentialist (Esslin 30), post-structuralist (Uhlmann, Beckett... 4; Begam 13), or even nihilist 
(“Enigmatic, Nihilistic...” 139). Instead, Beckett’s formulation of the writer’s defunct project 
bears remarkable affinity with Blanchot’s conception of the writer as someone who has no 
message to deliver yet who is nevertheless driven by an imperative to speak on.  
 Instead of corroborating the arguments of critics such as Lance Butler who argue that 
Beckett’s texts are “ontological parables” that do the work of philosophy by offering a “unified 
and self-consistent statement about existence” (154), Beckett often works to separate the aims of 
poetic and philosophical modes. For instance, in a line that contests Uhlmann’s view that an 
image can relay an identifiable concept, Beckett writes in a letter to Georges Duthuit dated July 
17, 1948  that “it is hard to believe that poetry and a self-devouring, ever-reducing thought can 
exist” (86). This quasi definition of poetry and philosophy figures the former as that which 
embraces complexity and the latter as that which distills thought to a singular thesis through the 
process of deduction. In contrast to this form of philosophy, Beckett writes: 
I have no wish to prove anything, and watertight theories are no dearer to me than those 
that allow dear Truth to slip through. I am only trying to point to the possibility of an 
expression lying outside the system of relations hitherto held to be indispensable to 
anyone who cannot be content with his own navel. . . . I am no longer capable of writing 
about.” (140-1) 
 
Such a statement contrasts with Butler’s argument that Beckett shows “an inclination to 
reconcile and solve basic epistemological problems (8). Instead, Beckett sides with those critics 
who figure the writer as someone who gathers the particularities of existence into a work in order 






 If we follow Heidegger and Nietzsche in affirming the type of art that represents inward 
experience, and we follow Levinas, Kristeva, Blanchot, and Barthes in affirming the importance 
of external forces such as rhythm in producing such writing, we return, in a sense, to Plato’s 
original question about the ethical implications of such writing. Plato discusses the ethics of 
nonrational, poetic production in the Republic, where his interlocutors discuss the question of 
whether poets offer their audiences a model for achieving the good or for delighting in 
immorality. Socrates welcomes any poet “to try to prove that there’s more to poetry than mere 
pleasure—that it also has a beneficial affect on society and on human life in general” (76; 607). 
His main target is Homer whom he accuses of depicting falsehoods such as the gods behaving 
immorally (57; 391). In doing so, Homer fails to teach social virtues: “to revere the gods, respect 
their parents, and not belittle friendship with one another” (52; 386). Poetry is, according to 
Plato, by definition averse to such a program since good poetry produces pleasure: “the better 
poetry they are, the more they are to be kept from the ears of children” (53; 387). In contrast, the 
appropriate exemplar would teach the value of self-discipline to resist rather than be enraptured 
by the pleasures of the body: “drink, sex, and food” (55; 389). The concern with poetry as a false 
product is then ultimately an ethical one; the poet, by imitating all of life, including raunchy, 
delightful material, may encourage behaviors that society would rather suppress. 
 The concern with the ethical ramifications of representative art has resurfaced in the work 
of Levinas who notes that if art merely reproduces the being of individuals or epochs, it has the 
capacity to reinforce evil rather than altruism, which Levinas considers to be the most 
fundamental aspect of human activity (“Transcendence...” 20). To arrive at this conclusion, 
Levinas first grants Heidegger the position that art makes ontological meaning possible when the 
 
42 
former writes, “Culture and artistic creation are part of the ontological order itself. They are 
ontological par excellence, they make the understanding of being possible” (“Meaning...” 41). 
Levinas comments that if we follow the logical positivists, poets are guided by intuition, the 
aspect of consciousness that welcomes the internal and external data of being including “ideas, 
relations, or sensible qualities” (35) as well as a Beckettian “becoming of the particularities, 
peculiarities, and oddities” (43). A chain of comprehension, then, originates with intuition and 
ultimately ends with a meaningful expression, where meaning is taken to be intelligibility (35, 
43). This is not to say that the artwork that represents meaning becomes a transcendent, 
metaphysical object, but rather the work of art is, in a Heideggerian fashion, considered a 
representation of the particularities of an epoch (40).  
 This Heideggerian notion of the ontological nature of truth in art presents difficulties for 
Levinas because it comprehends others by means of the knowledge of the universal rule that they 
are free and therefore, should be left alone; in other words, it “let[s] beings be” (“Is Ontology...” 
5-6). This cold form of intellectualization concerns Levinas because it grasps the other through 
the knowledge of separateness while not adequately respecting alterity. The relationship with the 
other occurs, instead, through the idea of the infinite; it is a grasping of the ungraspable “while 
nevertheless guaranteeing its status as ungraspable” (“Transcendence...”19). For Levinas, the 
freedom of the other is not the primary principle on which relationships are built; rather, people 
are originally first thrown into the sociality of existence, which demands “a movement within the 
Same in the face of the Other . . . a movement that returns us to neither violence nor fatality” nor 
sameness (20). Thus, Heidegger’s “letting be” is dangerous because Being is nothing but “a 
struggle for life without ethics;” for, as Levinas writes, “the law of evil is the law of being” 
(“The Paradox...” 172, 176). While animals and nature may struggle to survive in this manner, he 
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notes, humans depart from nature and therefore, ought instead to meet the other with “curiosity . 
. . sympathy or love” (172, 175). In this way, the primary relation with the other should not be 
one of comprehension, totalization, and consequential separation but of interlocution, an 
exchange which has the capacity to alter both parties (“Is Ontology...” 6). 
 Thus, conceiving of art as a meaningful expression of the being of an epoch, according to 
Levinas, does not necessarily mean that such production serves the ethical function of meeting 
the other with love. Levinas troubles Heidegger’s positive notion of poetry as a medium that 
grants access to the truth of being by questioning the social implications of this function: “Is not 
art an activity that lends faces to things? . . . We ask ourselves all the same if the impersonal but 
fascinating and magical march of rhythm does not, in art, substitute itself for sociality, for the 
face, for speech” (“Is Ontology...” 10). The vital question remains whether art can invoke an 
ethical response in the onlooker or whether the aesthetic pleasure of receiving an art object quiets 
active consciousness (“Reality...” 12). If art, formulated in a Platonic manner, is the product of 
passive receptivity to the external rhythms of music, images, and muses, it does not necessarily 
bear the face of the other that invokes the highest call to ethical consciousness (3). 
 Despite the ongoing concern with the ethics of literature, the latest trend in the criticism 
on Beckett is to refute Plato’s binary distinctions between literary and philosophical forms of 
writing by figuring Beckett as a moral philosopher. Working against the longstanding 
interpretation that Beckett’s work is nihilistic, Alain Badiou argues, for instance, that Beckett 
posits a prosocial ethical stance: “What Beckett offers to thought through his art, theatre, prose, 
poetry, cinema, radio, television, and criticism, is not this gloomy corporeal immersion into an 
abandoned existence, into hopeless relinquishment. . . . The lesson of Beckett is a lesson in 
measure, exactitude and courage” (40). The idea that Beckett teaches lessons in happiness also 
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enters the work of John Calder who argues in a chapter entitled “Prescriptions for Living: 
Beckett’s Ethics” that Beckett’s “message” is that “if humanity . . . can learn to forego personal 
ambition and think in terms of co-operation, compassion and companionship, it will be happier. 
It would in fact be moving closer to the condition of the artist” (138). Calder presents Beckett as 
a saintly ascetic who works without expectation of success, fame, or “self-aggrandisement” (128-
9). Michael Bennett likewise claims that Beckett offers not a Sartrean notion of nothing as 
negation but rather a Heideggerian version of nothing that offers fertile ground for meaning. 
Waiting for Godot then, to Bennett, provides “a simple roadmap for making meaning in life” by 
teaching the audience to fill empty time with idle talk (29-30).  
 Yet in Beckett’s own discussions about writing, he does not uphold the idea that literary 
works ought to be given an ethical function. Contrariwise, in a letter to Thomas McGreevy dated 
November 28, 1937, he denigrates interpretations that turn the raw material of art into uplifting 
theses: “they want to make [Proust’s] ‘solution’ a little moral triumph, the reward of endeavor & 
the crown of a life of striving a la Goethe” (390). Beckett’s sardonic attitude toward critics who 
impose ethical narratives on texts suggests that when Badiou and others find moral lessons in 
Beckett’s writing, they may not do justice to the ethical ambivalence that Beckett prefers in 
literary works. In other words, Beckett’s own attitude toward ethical criticism may align him 
more closely with Levinas and Plato than with Badiou on the question of whether literary writing 
produces an ethical response. He seems to suggest in this letter, at least, that literature does not 
offer moral lessons, and in contrast with Levinas and Plato, should not offer such lessons. 
 Instead Beckett appears to avoid moral certainty while emphasizing the formal properties 
of art that exceed a philosophically consistent argumentation. As Shane Weller notes in his full 
length study on the matter of Beckett’s relationship to ethics and nihilism, Beckett’s texts match 
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“the failure of both nihilism and the overcoming of nihilism” (24). In other words, there are 
nihilistic aspects of Beckett’s works that cannot easily be surpassed by assigning to Beckett a 
moral occupation. While as Weller notes, Badiou’s promotion of Beckett’s moral stance is “a 
defense of art as such,” the reading of Beckett as a moralist ignores the “literary” aspects of 
Beckett’s work (19). The literary aspects of Beckett’s writing are what Derrida identifies as the 
“composition, the rhetoric, the construction, and rhythm of his works,” or that which “resists 
purely philosophical (or metaphysical questioning)” (qtd. in Weller 18). In that way, the 
argument that Beckett is an ethical philosopher fail to obtain in so far as it ignores the stylistic 
activities in the work that do not necessarily offer moral guidance.  
Interpretation 
 The ethical problem with literature, according to Plato, is not easily solved by providing 
hidden moral lessons in stories, for children, he says, “cannot tell when something is allegorical 
and when it isn’t, and any idea admitted by a person of that age tends to become almost 
ineradicable and permanent” (47). In other words, because the figures encoded in texts are not 
transparent, they are subject to misinterpretations that may lead their audiences to immoral ends, 
even if the stories are not intended to produce that effect. In recent years, the idea that literary 
writing obfuscates interpretation has not disappeared, but has only been displaced by the idea 
that philosophy may also be subject to the same criticism. Indeed, contemporary philosophers 
have recently looked to poetry as an example for philosophy not because the literary writer better 
manifests philosophical ideas but precisely because literary writing presents a model of 
obscurity, of interpreting the other without flattening all discourse into intellectual sameness.  
 The studies of Beckett that figure his work as an ontological parable, or as Bennett 
presents it, “a simple roadmap for making meaning in life,” may misconstrue the terms under 
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which contemporary philosophers have welcomed poetic writing into its discourse. While 
Bennett’s analysis treats Beckett’s works as a moral and overt philosophical system, in twentieth 
century theory, art is more often figured as a medium that offers an alternative to philosophically 
systematic ways of interpreting human life. In that way, Beckett’s critics—including Calder, 
Butler, and Bennett—may be misguided when they turn his writing into systematic, clear 
philosophical discourse rather than appreciate its quality of unattainability. 
 Deconstructionists, who are often credited with toppling disciplinary hierarchies, have 
indeed challenged the binary that figures poetry as a purely pleasurable form in contrast to 
philosophy’s serious search for truth, but have done so without upholding literary writing as an 
easily decodable channel for philosophical discourse. Derrida, for instance, is widely regarded as 
the philosopher who established the foundations for philosophical readings of Beckett’s work 
because he, as Anthony Uhlmann notes, ‘level[ed] the genre distinctions’ between literature and 
philosophy” and displaced the traditional borders between “nonserious” and “serious” writing 
(7).  
 Yet Derrida actually presents a nuanced view of the relationship between the two fields 
that does not assimilate one into the other. Derrida appears to establish a framework for 
integrating stylistic and philosophical forms of discourse in “White Mythology,” where he 
questions the “separation” and “hierarchy” between philosophy and rhetoric (224). In Limited 
Inc., he further investigates the idea that “Only a serious and literal language can fully realize an 
intention” and seems to open the door to literature as the mode of discourse that originates, 
accepts, and understands the metaphorical nature of language when he asks, “to what extent does 
traditional philosophical discourse, and that of speech act theory in particular, derive from 
fiction?” (77, 122). To study the structure of performative speech acts comprehensibly, Derrida 
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announces, the “non-serious . . . will no longer be able to be excluded, as Austin wishes, from 
‘ordinary’ language” (Limited 18). When all modes of writing are accepted into the study of 
discourse, Derrida observes, one begins to understand an effect of speech that ordinary texts 
obscure: the “iterability” of speech, or the structural power that enables texts to be repeated and 
misunderstood when their makers are absent (Limited Inc. 7, 9, 109).  
 Such iterability is exposed especially in metaphorical language because a metaphor opens 
a dehiscence in meaning: a “divided opening” that “makes production, reproduction, 
development possible” (59). When metaphysicians separate philosophy from metaphorical 
language, they avoid the problem inherent not only in literature but potentially in any written 
work, which is that “the structural characteristic of every mark” is “infelicity,” in other words, 
“that all conventional acts are exposed to failure” (17). To summarize, Derrida argues that the 
“loss of meaning” felt in the presence of a metaphor is characteristic of the loss of meaning 
inherent in the use of all iterable language (“White Mythology” 270).  
 Even though Derrida establishes “iterability” as a problem for all modes of discourse, that 
does not mean that he eradicates the barriers that might separate a work of poetry from a grocery 
list or a philosophical treatise, as he has been credited with doing (“Before the Law” 187, 
Limited Inc. 134). Although, as he confesses, his temptation as a philosopher is to totalize 
writing on the basis of its iterability, this is a “lure” he wishes to denounce (“Interview” 34). In 
an interview with Derek Attridge, he instead stresses the differences between literary and 
philosophical writing:  
 On the edge of metaphysics, literature perhaps stands on the edge of everything, almost 
 beyond everything, including itself. It’s the most interesting thing in the world, maybe 
 more interesting than the world, and this is why if it has no definition, what is heralded 
 and refused under the name of literature cannot be identified with any other discourse. It 




Literature’s liminal status in the world and in relation to philosophical discourse returns us, to a 
degree, to the Platonic figuration, where the poetic work derives from external forces that are 
beyond logical understanding. Focusing on the iterability of texts also reconfirms interpretation 
as a central problem for literary writing, even if Derrida’s concern primarily lies with the absence 
of the author during the reading act while Plato’s focus lay with the misinterpretations produced 
by those who are uneducated (Limited 7). While, for Derrida, all meaning is subject to 
misinterpretation in the process of its iteration, not primarily in the literary epic as Plato would 
have it, he does not proceed to argue that the literary text and the philosophical one become 
identical. In other words, Derrida’s identification of iterability as a central problem for writing 
remains opposed to the type of interpretation that would figure Beckett’s works as neat parables 
for philosophical expression containing decodable lessons. 
 While Derrida does not essentialize literature on the basis of iterability or any other 
definition, both Heidegger and Levinas affirm obscurity and not ethical transparency as a 
fundamental aspect of literary writing, even while they use that quality to discuss contrary points 
about literary production. While Heidegger writes that the process of obscuring demonstrates the 
idea that truth is an event, in Levinas’s formulation, the production of art involves an ethically 
problematic “event of obscuring” (“Reality...” 3). In The Origin of the Work of Art, Heidegger 
argues that the process of making art offers access to pure being precisely because it does not 
involve the Platonic or Hegelian imposition of the idea. He writes, “If there occurs in the work a 
disclosure of a particular being, disclosing what and how it is, then there is here an occurring, a 
happening of truth at work” (36). Heidegger defines truth here not as a fixed, unifying, ideational 
truth but the mutable “truth setting itself to work” (36). Truth, in his view is a process, an event 
that “happens as the primal conflict between clearing and concealing,” where clearing the way to 
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truth always involves “refusal and dissembling” (54-5). Art, in this sense, could be truthful if it 
reveals the process of pursuing the truth, which includes encountering un-truth, since, at the core 
of being, there is an abyss in place of universal essence (Origins 54, 92). Instead of presenting a 
metaphysical view in which art fails to cohere with the good and truth, Heidegger repositions 
truth so that it includes its opposite and becomes entirely historical; in other words, truth is only 
the evolving encapsulation of what people are, even if that includes falsehoods (76). 
 Although Heidegger rejects the concept that there is an eternal, metaphysical, 
transcendent essence at the core of each human being, his treatment of literature demonstrates 
that he has not entirely broken with Plato’s idea that the artistic writing involves dissembling. 
Heidegger welcomes literature as a truth-process so long as it serves his philosophical agenda, 
but as he suggests, there are few poets who actually achieve this goal. He asks, “Do we moderns 
encounter a modern poet on this course? Do we encounter that very poet who today is often and 
hastily dragged into the vicinity of thinking, and covered up with much half-baked philosophy” 
(96)? Although these are questions and not conclusions, they serve as a reminder of the role of 
literary criticism in considering obscure works as objects of truth when they are, at least in 
Heidegger’s view, undeserving. That is, the function of art as the process that can uncover being 
goes unrealized and is more often exaggerated except in the case of the rare poet, who for 
Heidegger was Hölderlin (“Letter on Humanism” 242).  
 Replacing the primacy of Heidegger’s ontology with ethics, Levinas returns to the 
importance of criticism in helping to situate the obscure work of art “outside of ‘being in the 
world’” (“Reality...” 12). In other words, Levinas affirms the role of the critic in interpreting the 
nebulous products of intuitive art so that they may serve a beneficial social purpose (3, 12). 
Revisiting the Plato’s concern with the difficulties of interpreting literature, Levinas suggests 
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that individuals may indeed subtract ethically problematic lessons from such works. In an 
attempt to move philosophy to adopt a project of “total altruism” (“Transcendence...” 18), 
Levinas allows for a return to Platonism in the sense that he permits the philosopher to “judge 
civilization,” including artistic production, “on the basis of the ethical” (“Meaning...” 58). In 
reading Levinas, we can see how the question of whether obscure literary works set undesirable 
social examples has not simply disappeared, nor has the difference between literary and 
philosophical discourses been leveled. 
 Contemporary Italian philosophy, Gianni Vattimo, also reclaims Plato’s concern that 
literary writing is not easily understood, but does so to offer respect for the obscurity of the form 
as a hermeneutic model for undermining the tradition of subsuming the Other under a totalizing 
philosophical system. Like Derrida, Vattimo questions “the traditional opposition between 
discursive and intuitive knowledge of things” that allows art to be separated from philosophy. In 
contrast to tradition, he attempts to avoid the type of interpretation that uses philosophy to 
explain the work of art, placing the former once again in a dominant role (44). For his theory of 
hermeneutics, Vattimo draws on the thought of Luigi Pareyson, who argues that the “the 
hermeneutic character of human existence as a whole . . . appears emblematically in the 
experience of art” (78). Art becomes the exemplar for the interpretation of human life after 
metaphysics because it requires the onlooker to undertake analysis of what the art object means 
without being able to fall back on an authorial voice (or god figure) for an explanation (137). The 
otherness of the art object sets the limits of the interpretive act, as the critic in this new 
interpretive method asks, “Is a hermeneutic possible . . . that would really place itself at the 
disposal of its object instead of reducing it completely to itself?” (114). The successful 
interpretation is, then, the one that depends on the “congeniality” of the interpreter who is open 
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to the alterity of the work, which can then divulge an inexhaustible supply of ontological data 
(84, 88). Thus, for Vattimo, if the new hermeneutics obtains, it opens a path of access to a 
Heideggerian notion of the truth of ontology that can be found in a literary work of art.  
 If we follow Vattimo in interpreting Beckett, it is not the philosophical content of the 
work—its existentialism or systematic ethics, for instance—that is of interest, but rather the 
experience of interpreting the work respectfully as an independent entity that cannot easily be 
explained. Beckett’s own theoretical musings on aesthetic interpretation substantiate the claims 
by philosophers that the aesthetic work continues to be characterized by obscurity. In an often 
quoted letter that Beckett wrote to Alan Schneider, the original director of Endgame, the writer 
describes the play as: “Rather difficult and elliptic, mostly depending on the power of the text to 
claw” (“June 21, 1956” 107). Even in the writing of the letter itself, Beckett presents an 
ambivalent attitude toward meaning. Since the word claw can mean both to grasp, vex, or to 
destroy, Beckett could have meant that the play’s language clings to the meaning of words and/or 
that it tears meaning apart. In this passage, Beckett indicates that the text hinges, not on an 
underlying theoretical purpose but rather on the capacity of the literary text to create ambivalent 
meanings.  
 There is a sense in contemporary literary criticism that the Platonic separation between 
the fields of philosophy and literature has been breached or “must be breached” (Uhlmann 7). 
Yet when we return to twentieth century theory on the relationship between philosophy and 
literature, what we find is that many of Plato’s original characteriza tions of literary writing have 
endured, even while they have often been accepted. For example, instead of subverting the idea 
that poetic texts derive from a somewhat arbitrary, intuitive process and can lead to politically 
disruptive behaviors, Kristeva and Levinas argue with varying degrees of approval that such is 
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indeed the case. What is more, Beckett himself frequently applies Plato’s characterizations of 
writing to his own texts when he asserts that they are “pale imitations,” not intended to pursue 
truths, and distinct from the project of teaching morals. In highlighting the differences between 
literature and philosophy in the works of these theorists, I do not mean to fortify a strict 
separation between the two fields or push literature once again beneath philosophy, but rather, 
my purpose is to acknowledge some of the unresolved issues in the ancient quarrel, which inform 
my reluctance to present Beckett as a philosopher of a certain school. Just as it is worth exploring 
the arbitrary qualities of strict disciplinary divisions, collapsing boundaries for its own sake may 
be equally misguided, especially since Beckett resisted neat identifications between the fields.   
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CHAPTER 3: BECKETT’S PHILOSOPHICAL NOTHINGS 
 
 While I previously explored the relationship between philosophy and literature both as is 
discussed in literary theory and by Samuel Beckett, I will now situate Beckett’s literary works 
within the philosophical debate on “nothing,” so as to understand, in practice, how philosophical 
and literary material interact in his novels, short stories, and plays. There is no doubt that Beckett 
read the work of philosophers, and reflecting that fact, this study will offer comparisons between 
his oeuvre and the works of the philosophers who influenced him. Comparing Beckett’s texts 
with those of his sources, though, does not necessarily answer the question of how a fiction 
writer may be said to offer a contribution to philosophy in the broadest sense of seeking the truth 
about human experience. Yet this method does lead to the conclusion that the claims of 
philosophers, often arguments within a system of thought, are transfigured within Beckett’s 
writing into thematic, uncertain stories, which do not posit argumentative claims. In other words, 
Beckett separates the material of philosophy from its context and transfigures it so that original 
claims about nothing become obscure and ambivalent.  
 The choice of “nothing” as the philosophical concept that will serve as a point of 
departure for analyzing Beckett’s work is motivated by the longstanding, dominant tradition of 
considering Beckett as a writer who sought to create a work that would manifest a philosophy of 
nothingness. For instance, in his seminal study, The Shape of Chaos, David Hesla argues that 
“Beckett’s art is finally ontological: it asks the question, What is the being of that entity we call 
man” (v). According to Hesla, Beckett posits the philosophical position that “Being, as Being, is 
nothing fixed or ultimate: it yields to dialectic and sinks into its opposite, which, also taken 
immediately, is Nothing” (209). In other words, Beckett’s texts ask the question, “What is 
being?” and offer an answer, “nothing.” The idea that Beckett’s works embody the nothing at the 
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center of being has endured in Beckett studies from Esslin’s early existentialist interpretations to 
the current writing of Peter Boxall who argues that Beckett’s characters are oriented toward 
“nothinghood as a generative principle” (28-9). Beckett, according to Boxall, “develop[s] a form 
that not only accommodates itself to this ‘being of nothing’ but is in some way derived from it, 
drawing its value and significance directly from an encounter with the ‘nothing’” (28-9). Gilles 
Deleuze similarly encapsulates Beckett’s entire project as an exhaustive pursuit of nothingness, 
which reaches an apotheosis in the films for TV, where his work “bears witness to its void” (4, 
17). Despite some telling variations on the meaning of nothing in Beckett’s work—whether it is 
an internal void or a suspension of the work in the nothingness of language—these critics are few 
among the many who have posited the notion that Beckett’s entire body of work is meant to 
illuminate one vision of an extant nothingness.  
 While such critics inherently argue that Beckett must have believed that the void or 
nothingness, which constitutes the subject of his work, could exist, in this chapter I will 
emphasize the opposite point of view: that Beckett also posits the idea there is no nothing. My 
point is not that prior critics were wrong to argue that Beckett sought after the nothing, for the 
sheer number of nothings in Beckett’s work suggests that absence was indeed an ongoing 
fascination of his. But while Beckett’s work does proffer the notion that there is an extant 
nothing, it also importantly contains the opposite position that this “nothing” is impossible. 
Particularly, the varieties of philosophical positions on nothing presented in Beckett’s work 
include responses on both sides of the questions of whether nothing can exist (it can and it 
cannot exist) and whether language is an extant nothing (nothing is within or nothing is beyond 
language). These irreconcilable conclusions embedded within Beckett’s text suggest that instead 
of producing texts that serve systematic ends, he crafts his imaginative works in such a way that 
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they contribute to the view that literature remains separate from philosophy insofar as, at least in 
Beckett’s case, it dwells in the ambivalence and the particularities of discourse rather than 
abstract singularities. In other words, Beckett’s writing gathers contrary experiences of nothing 
without necessarily formulating a unified thesis about those nothings. 
 Critics frequently support the argument that Beckett’s nothing refers to the singular 
notion of humankind’s absent essence by citing Beckett’s dialogue with Georges Duthuit, 
published in Disjecta, a scant collection of his letters, critical prose, and unfinished works. In the 
somewhat elusive dialogue on art, which has often been taken to represent Beckett’s own 
aesthetics, he writes that the proper art of the day is the one that binds “the expression that there 
is nothing to express, nothing with which to express, nothing from which to express, no power to 
express, no desire to express, together with the obligation to express” (556). While Boxall takes 
this passage to mean that Beckett’s work represents “the relentless effort to give expression to 
nothingness,” even if that effort is “doomed endlessly to fail,” Beckett may not have sought 
single-mindedly after that goal (29). In a newly published letter to Aidan Higgins dated August 
2, 1952, Beckett writes upon finishing The Unnamable, “I used to think all [t]his work was an 
effort, necessarily feeble, to express the nothing. It seems rather to have been a journey, 
irreversible, in gathering thinglessness” (319). This letter suggests that, in contrast to Boxall’s 
interpretation, Beckett came to understand his work not as the expression of a particular 
philosophical view on nothing, but as an effort to “gather thinglessness,” that is to glean forms of 
nothingness from the history of ideas without necessarily asserting the truth of any of them.  
 The difference between expressing and gathering “thinglessness” constitutes a difference 
between assigning words to the perception of a fact, such as the perception that there is a 
“nothing,” and drawing different notions about absence together. If Richard Coe’s well- received 
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“art of failure” thesis is to stand, then we would have to modify his argument that Beckett’s art 
“is by definition trying to do something that it cannot conceivably do—to create and define 
something that which, created and defined, ceased to be what it used be if it is to reveal the truth 
of the human situation: Man as a Nothing in relation to all things which themselves are Nothing” 
(96). While this thesis acknowledges the idea that Beckett’s project to manifest the nothing 
becomes an impossible journey, it suggests that Beckett still may have sought after that futile 
end. The modified “art of failure” thesis would rather have to account for Beckett’s lack of belief 
in the idea that reportedly drives his work—that there is a truth in the idea that nothingness exists 
in the world. Indeed, in Beckett’s work, there are multiple, related though conflicting versions of 
nothing including the idea that nothing “exists,” that nothing cannot exist, that literature derives 
from nothing, that literature does not derive from nothing, that language means nothing, and that 
nothing exists outside of language.  
 In contrast, the idea that Beckett’s nothing is singular rather than disparate, interestingly, 
has been central to the works of criticism that figure Beckett as a philosopher. Badiou, for 
instance, argues that the trajectory of Beckett’s work constitutes an ethical move from solipsism 
to the encounter with the other, or in his words, from the “program of the One—obstinate 
trajectory or interminable soliloquy—to the pregnant theme of the Two, which opens out into 
infinity” (17). In order for there to be two, he notes, there must be a void, which he defines as 
“an interval . . . captured in the between” (34). It is important for this void to be considered an 
interval of nothingness and not one of many nothings, in Badiou’s view, since the void itself is a 
purely abstract concept: “it is a pure gap . . . nothing but its own name” (99). Badiou defines the 
void as another name for being: “pure, being, accompanied by its singular name: the void” (87-
8). As the name for the ground of being, it is “pure gap;” it does not exist in itself (89). 
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Furthermore, as a pure concept, there can be no counting the void; there is no ‘almost’ or 
‘maximum’ void (83, 100). In other words, “nothing” is a unified concept that stands for pure 
absence so that any encounter with such absence is only an encounter with a piece of the whole 
concept not a separate instance. In short, there can be no countable “nothings.” 
 Yet Badiou’s emphasis on the impossibility of an “almost” or countable nothing finds its 
opposition in How It Is, where it is the “almostness” of the void that comprises Beckett’s subject 
as in: “all that almost blank nothing to get out of it almost nothing . . . almost all nothing left 
almost nothing . . . nothing there almost nothing . . . Pim that’s all is left breath in a head nothing 
left but a head nothing in it almost nothing” (104-5). Beckett, like Badiou encounters the nothing 
as a potentially impossible concept; there cannot be “nothingness” itself in the head, only 
“almost nothing.” But while Badiou might call this effort an encounter with an interval of the 
singular “void,” Beckett importantly prefers the word “nothing,” which unlike “the void” allows 
for an “almost” and becomes countable in the sheer multiplicity of meanings that the word 
encourages. Without punctuation, the sentences in his passage take the reader on multiple garden 
paths rendering “nothing” polyvalent. An uncertain “almost blank nothing” that frames 
nothingness as an impossibility is joined with an absolute “nothing to get out of it,” which can 
indicate both that “nothingness” can be gotten and that “there is not anything” that can be 
retrieved, not even “nothingness.” It is precisely this evident ambivalence about the nothing—
that the nothing is both potentially impossible and definitely attainable—that marks Beckett’s 
separation from Badiou’s certain, singular, and non-existing void.  
 Confirming Beckett’s ambivalence, Andrew Gibson remarks that “Badiou has a quite 
unBeckettian attachment to the clarity of narrative sequence” (134). Specifically, Gibson adds, 
“Beckett’s treatment of the event is arguably multifarious, heterogeneous and uneven, and cannot 
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be encapsulated in narrative form” (135). While Gibson focuses on Badiou’s totalizing reading 
of Beckett’s narrative, we can also apply Gibson’s argument to the differences between Beckett’s 
preference for the multifarious meanings of “nothing” in contrast to the abstract, singular theses 
about nothing found in philosophical discourse. In other words, heterogeneity and multiplicity 
may be precisely that which works against the philosophical theses that Beckett presents in his 
texts. 
 Looking at the way the philosophical concept of nothing works in Beckett’s oeuvre 
supports those critics such as Andrew Kennedy, John Fletcher, and Wolfgang Iser who argue 
against the interpretations of Lance Butler, S.E. Gontarski, and Richard Begam that Beckett 
offers a consistent philosophical position on nothing in his work. Kennedy argues, for instance, 
that Beckett does not merely repeat the ideas of philosophy but rather “transmut[es] his own 
idiosyncratic versions of received ideas into visions” (10). Such a position also follows in line 
with John Fletcher’s methodology, which allows for the discussion of Beckett’s multiple, 
philosophical inheritances while avoiding the idea that one philosophical school offers the key to 
his work (2). To take these ideas one step further, I argue that Beckett’s work contributes to the 
idea that there is a difference between the modes of literature and philosophy insofar as the 
philosophical thesis on nothing is generally transformed by its literary context. As Iser writes in 
“When Is the End Not the End? The Idea of Fiction in Beckett,” Beckett’s texts have a tendency 
to “slide away” from restricted meanings: “Their meaning canno t be pinned down (unless one 
takes them to be a revelation of the limitation of ‘meaning in general)” (47). In that sense, we 
could read the philosophy of nothing in Beckett’s work as a means toward formal literary 
production, not necessarily an end in itself.   
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The (Non) Existence of Nothing 
Although Beckett has commonly been named the writer who seeks to express the 
nothing, his works exhibit ambivalence about one of the most fundamental questions in the 
philosophical and scientific discussions on nothing: whether it is possible for “nothing” to exist. 
As I will demonstrate in this next section, Beckett’s texts affirm both sides of this debate, 
positing the idea that “nothing is impossible” and “nothingness exists.” This indetermination is 
evident in a line from Mercier and Camier where Beckett formulates an idiom in the negative: 
“It leads to nothing any more” (97). The choice of “nothing” rather than “not anything” signals a 
preference for ambivalence, which opens contradictory meanings as in “it leads to nothingness,” 
and “it does not lead to anything,” not even “nothing.” What appears to be of primary importance 
to Beckett is not to present a consistent answer to the question of whether nothing is possible but 
to play upon the humorous and conceptually contradictory manner in which the word “nothing” 
doubles upon itself. 
A brief overview of the historical debate on the possible presence of nothingness in the 
universe is necessary in order to understand both Beckett’s position in the debate as well as the 
intellectual history to which he was responding. Beckett had studied the pre-Socratic debate on 
nothing, which largely begins with Parmenides (b. 515 B.C.E.), who argued that “nothing” is a 
logical impossibility (Gottlieb 54). From the premise that only existing things can be discussed 
in a way that leads to universal truth, Parmenides concluded that “nothing” cannot be discussed 
(Kirk 243, 245). As Parmenides claims, “What is there to be said and thought must needs be: for 
it is there for being, but nothing is not” (Fragment 293, Parmenides 247). Here, since Parmenides 
means by nothing, “what is not,” it is a tautology to say that “what is not” “is not” (Gottlieb 55). 
Parmenides then demonstrates, through verbal logic, that as soon as you call nothing “nothing” 
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you turn it into something, and therefore it cannot be nothing (Parmenides 256). The 
cosmological significance of that conclusion is that there can be no coming into being, for 
whatever exists must always have been: it cannot have never existed (Gottlieb 55). Through 
deductive reasoning, Parmenides then arrives at the counterintuitive conclusion that change, 
birth, and death are all impossible.  
Because Parmenides’ conclusion runs contrary to nature, his follower, Democritus, 
(460-357), tried to account for observable flux in nature by developing the theory that the ever 
changing material of life is composed of unchanging and eternal atoms (Gottlieb 61, 94). While 
for Parmenides, there could be no motion because there was no void to move through, 
Democritus could make sense out of change by conceiving of atoms, which move through empty 
space and combine to form the objects of the world (97, 100).  
The debate between Democritus and Parmenides about the possibility of the existence 
of nothingness has persisted through the centuries in various philosophical and scientific 
iterations. In his response to Parmenides, Plato contends that instead of thinking that nothingness 
is impossible, the mere fact that it can be discussed means that it is possible (Heath 1). The stuff 
of fiction, then, such as unicorns and centaurs, provides the ultimate example of the existence of 
“nothing” (1). Disputing Plato, Aristotle returned to the Parmenidean conception of nothing 
when he argued, as physicist Frank Close writes, that because two things cannot be in the same 
place at the same time, “nothing” cannot overlap with a coordinate “something” (10). From that 
point up to the seventeenth century, the longstanding philosophical, scientific and indeed 
theologically ordained position on nothing followed the Aristotelian conception that “nature 
abhors a vacuum” (Close 10). In the middle of the 17th century, however, Newton posited the 
idea that the Earth was floating in a vacuum of “empty space” that is unaltered by the objects that 
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move through it (48, 51, and 52). This conception of the universe floating in a void largely 
prevailed until the twentieth century, when, as science writer Lawrence Krauss writes, Einstein’s 
theory of general relativity demonstrated that space was not empty and fixed but rather 
expanding and full of energy. Einstein’s discoveries eventually led to the formation of the big 
bang theory, which again confirmed the Democritean notion that the universe could expand from 
nothing (1, 5). But returning again to a Parmenidean conception of cosmological origins, 
physicists today largely agree that the space that they had once considered void and empty was 
now full of particles, gravitational waves, electromagnetism, and ever-present “somethings” that 
occlude the possibility of an extant nothing (Close 94, 103). 
 The Democritean notion of an extant void, however, saw its prominence grow in early 
and mid-twentieth century philosophy. In the philosophical climate in which Beckett was 
writing, Sartre would have been Beckett’s primary source for the popularization of the notion of 
an extant void. In Being and Nothingness, Sartre reverses Parmenides’ premise when he notes 
that it is possible to think of “nothing” in the form of negation: as in “there is nothing left,” 
“nobody came,” or “it never arrived” (5). Sartre was arguing with Hegel who had conceived of 
nonbeing as a pure concept that depends on being. More than a conceptual abstraction that is the 
antithesis of being, Sartre argues that the nothingness, encountered through negation, is a 
component of the real and even envelops being (5, 18).  
Several studies have linked Beckett’s work to such a Democritean position on nothing, 
justifiably since Beckett does reference Democritus’ atomism in Murphy and offers Democritus’ 
thought as a key to the novel. In Murphy, the eponymous character appears to have a 
premonition of such extant nothingness:  
Murphy began to see nothing, that colourlessness which is such a rare postnatal treat . . . 
Not the numb peace of their own suspension, but the positive peace that comes when the 
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somethings give way, or perhaps simply add up, to the Nothing, than which in the guffaw 
of the Abderite naught is more real. Time did not cease, that would be asking too much, 
but the wheel of rounds and pauses did, as Murphy with his head among the armies 
continued to suck in, through all the posterns of his withered soul, the accidentless One-
and Only, conveniently called Nothing. (138)  
 
The guffawing abderite mentioned in the passage is Democritus, often called the “laughing 
philosopher,” who followed Leucippus of Abdera in arguing that the world was comprised of 
atoms and the void (Berryman n.p.). Further evidence of Beckett’s Democritean bent surfaces in 
a letter he wrote to Sigle Kennedy dated June 14, 1967 in which Beckett offers Democritus’ 
“Naught is more real . . .” and Geulincx “Ubi nihil vales . . .” as points of departure for his work, 
even while he adds that neither one is “very rational” (Beckett, Disjecta 113). Following 
Beckett’s lead, Michael Mooney, proposes that Democritus had a defining influence on Beckett’s 
thought though Mooney remains wary of suggesting that Beckett’s fiction should be subsumed 
under philosophy (215-6). Likewise, David Hesla contrasts Parmenides certainty that “there is no 
nothing” with the Democritean conclusion that the void remains a possibility to argue that 
Beckett’s vision is ultimately Democritean, shaped by doubt (9). Yet if Beckett’s skepticism is 
the cause of his allegiance with Democritus, Parmenides can hardly be said to represent a 
pinnacle of certainty since his argument—that there is no nothing and therefore no change—
leads to the radically skeptical conclusion that births, deaths, and movement in the world are all 
illusions of the mind (Gottlieb 55-7). Mooney and Hesla’s approaches use Murphy to situate 
Beckett as a writer who sides with Democritus in asserting that nothing can exist. Indeed, 
Beckett may very well have designed Murphy as a philosophical novel meant to illustrate the 
pursuit of nothingness. But it is important to remember that Murphy is an early work that is much 
more programmatic than his later, more ambiguous writing. 
 
63 
 While Democritus’ idea of an extant void is certainly present in Beckett’s early work, 
Beckett’s conception of “nothing” across his oeuvre becomes less definitive. As Shane Weller 
remarks in his essay “Unwords,” the two points of departure that Beckett offers for de-coding his 
work, Democritus and Geulincx, lead to different interpretations of the meaning of “nothing.” 
While Democritus’s “Naught is more real” positions nothing as positive “nothingness,” so that 
“nothing” becomes extant, the “Ubi nihil vales, ibi nihil velis” refers to an ethical version of 
nothing “where you are worth nothing, you should want of nothing” indicating that a vacuum of 
value is impossible (107). While Weller argues a both/and position that from Watt forward 
Beckett’s objective becomes the creation of “art whose object will be a nothing that is at once 
impossible and unavoidable” (121), Beckett may be striving for a “gathering” of various sorts of 
nothing, which does not amount to a consistent discourse on nothing but rather creates an 
assortment of “thinglessness.”  
 In a gesture that further muddles attempts to tie Beckett’s work to a single thesis on 
nothing, he remarks in a letter dated January 16, 1936, “I suddenly see that Murphy is a break 
down between his [Geulincx’s] ubi nihil vales ibi nihil velis (positive) and Malraux’s Il est 
difficile a celui qui vit hors du monde de ne pas rechercher les sience (negation). (“It is difficult 
for one who lives isolated from the everyday world not to seek others like himself”) (299, 302). 
Comparing Beckett’s two points of reference suggests that the particular figures who influenced 
him are of less importance than the fact that he combines influences to join opposites, as he 
signals with the gloss that what interests him are the “positive” and “negative” versions of 
nothing. As Vivian Mercier reports, Beckett had said to Harold Hobson “I take no sides. I am 
interested in the shape of ideas” (qtd. in Mercier 163). Following Andrew Kennedy’s 
interpretation of this famous statement, Beckett may be downplaying the “facts” or truth of 
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ontology in preference for the delightful symmetry that thinking of the word “nothing” as “not 
anything” and “nothingness” engenders (101). 
 My point is not that the Democritean interpretations of Beckett’s work are invalid rather, 
it is because they are valid and because Beckett’s texts also proffer the opposite Parmenidean 
point of view, that we may conclude that Beckett did not have a singular vision of the void. 
Indeed, Weller writes that Beckett recorded the Parmenides conception of nothing “there is no 
nothing” in his philosophical notes and Weller offers a block of text that Beckett quoted from 
John Burnet’s Greek Philosophy, the source for Beckett’s knowledge of the pre-Socratics (112, 
115):  
 In the first place, it cannot have come into being. If it had, it must first have arisen from 
 nothing or from something. It cannot have arisen from nothing; for there is no nothing. It 
 cannot have arisen from something; for there is nothing else than what is. Nor can 
 anything else besides itself come into being; for there can be no empty space in which it 
 could do so. Is it or is it not? If it is, then it is now, all at once. In this way Parmenides 
 refutes all accounts of the origin of the world. Ex nihilo nihil fit. (qtd. in Weller, 
 “Unwords” 115)  
 
Saying that Beckett includes in his thinking and his works (as we shall see) the idea tha t nothing 
is an impossibility, counters the standard view that his work represents the quest for nothingness. 
Instead of consequently arguing that Beckett is a wholehearted Parmenidean, what I claim is that 
Parmenidean thought enters into Beckett’s work in two primary ways: firstly, in the notion that 
“nothing” is an impossibility and secondly, as a literal adaptation of “ex nihilo nihil fit” or 
“nothing comes from nothing,” which Parmenides posits as a way of saying that “something” 
can not come from “nothing,” but which Beckett transmogrifies to figure literature as a nothing 
that derives from nothing.  
 Such a view counteracts the notion summarized by John Fletcher that Beckett’s work has 
a singular purpose in striving toward the nothing as an extant possibility. As Fletcher posits, 
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Beckett’s writing “progresses towards a more and more total emptiness, in which plot, characters 
and language itself crumble to nothing” (Samuel Beckett’s Art 144). Such progress suggests that 
Beckett seeks a more perfect articulation of an extant nothing even though his acknowledgment 
that nothing may be impossible indicates that he found such an aim would be futile. Taking 
Parmenides’ line literally, Beckett instead figures the talking fictions of literature that have no 
real existence except as black lines on a page as “nothings” that come from the nothingness of 
nondoing (the characters come to his mind from nowhere). In relation to the larger question of 
the relationship between literature and philosophy, the concept of ex nihilo production reflects a 
Platonic view of literature—that fiction does not derive from a rational process—all the while 
continuing in the production of the construct. In that way, Beckett can be said to adapt the 
language of cosmological discourse to explore the question of the nature of literature in relation 
to nothing as part of an ambivalence that allows for the shape and meaning of “nothing” to shift 
depending on the context.  
 Beckett’s interest in the Parmenidean problem of whether it is possible to speak about 
“nothing” without turning it into something, appears in his novel, Watt where he writes of a 
failed attempt to articulate the elusive concept: “But to elicit something from nothing requires a 
certain skill . . . he could never have spoken at all of these things, if all had continued to mean 
nothing, as some continued to mean nothing, that is to say, right up to the end. For the only way 
one can speak of nothing is to speak of it as though it were something” (77). In the attempt to 
disprove Parmenides, to draw something from nothing, the lines express the difficulty or even 
impossibility of using language to speak about the nothing. But while here the possibility of 
“nothing” is not thwarted by such a difficulty and instead, drawing “something from nothing” is 
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presented here as a viable possibility, a skill that requires effort, in his later works, the ineffable 
quality of nothing is presented as an indomitable obstacle. 
 While speaking of nothing is presented in Watt as a skill worth mastering, elsewhere 
Beckett depicts the task as a necessarily impossible one. In The Unnamable, for instance, Beckett 
writes in a more Parmenidean spirit of the impossibility of expressing the nothing: “If I could 
speak and yet say nothing, really nothing? . . . But it seems impossible to speak and yet say 
nothing, you think you have succeeded, but you always overlook something” (303). Beckett here 
may not be trying to manifest a Parmenidian view of nothing—that as soon as you try to 
conceptualize nothing, it becomes something—but he does use discourse from the history of 
philosophy on the question of whether “nothing” can exist for a humorous effect as in “you 
always overlook something.” As Mooney writes, drawing a strict philosophical position out of 
Beckett’s work undermines the figure he cuts of the “sagacious clown,” who voices the words of 
philosophers in order to laugh them down (216). Yet the humor of the lines derives from the very 
doubleness of the word play, the way what is being said, in a Parmenidean fashion, is negated by 
its saying. 
 By the time he wrote How It Is in 1961, speaking of nothing had become even less certain 
and less overtly referential in form. There he writes, “I yes without its being said all is not said 
almost nothing and far too much” (65). The saying of nothing, once a skill to be mastered, is now 
“almost nothing,” and since “nothing” modifies “not said,” the “almost nothing is not said” 
becomes, in formal logic, a double negative that can mean not only, “almost something is said,” 
but also “far too much is said.” Although these lines may, more than ever before, manifest the 
goal of saying nothing, since the text lacks punctuation, the reader is allowed to travel down 
multiple paths of meaning without being encouraged to decide on a single or even paradoxical 
 
67 
interpretation. The lines offer the play of meaning found in poetry that may derive from the 
thoughts of philosophers but no longer directly echo them. This is interesting considering the 
argument by Deleuze that Beckett’s later works manifest the writer’s achievement of the ultimate 
literature of nothing (4). Stephen Thomson rightly argues, on the other hand, that “If it all seems 
to point, and to work, towards nothing, what we have seen is a remarkably busy nothing” (67). 
Beckett’s “nothings” are indeed never empty or static. Rather, the ambiguity within his prose 
suggests that he cultivates anything but a certain position on the issue of whether nothing exists.  
 To avoid suggesting that there is a neat teleology in Beckett’s work from a desire to 
speak the nothing to a resignation of that impossibility, it is important to recognize that the 
question of whether nothing exists rather than the resolution of that question pervades Beckett’s 
texts. In “Texts for Nothing,” written between 1950 and 1952, after The Unnamable but before 
How It Is (Auster 568), Beckett writes, “Name, no, nothing is nameable, tell, no, nothing can be 
told” (331). The concluding clause suggests both the positive sense that “nothingness” can be 
discussed and the negative sense that “there is nothing including ‘nothingness’ that can be 
discussed.” We could read these contradictory positions on nothing as evidence of Beckett’s 
move to gather notions of “thinglessness” from his philosophical predecessors, suggesting that 
his interest lies in gleaning and co-joining multiple kinds of concepts of nothing and seeing how 
they play with and against each other. 
 In addition to gathering the Parmenidean notion that “nothing is impossible,” Beckett 
departs from his source fur ther by transmogrifying the philosopher’s conception of nothing as a 
problem for cosmology into a problem for the production of literature so that “ex nihilo nihil fit,” 
meaning that nothingness cannot generate something, becomes a statement about literature as a 
nothing that comes from nothing. Connecting the capacity of language both in referencing and 
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obviating the nothing to the production of a fictional text, Beckett has his characters, who are 
only made of words and so are not physically real, voice the line “we are nothing” in his late 
novel How It Is (93). Beckett’s transformation of Parmenides’ “ex nihilo nihil fit,” into a literal 
description of literature itself as “a nothing that comes from nothing” suggests that when Beckett 
borrows philosophical concepts from his predecessors, he may be motivated by an interest in 
generating reflexively literary material rather than in adhering to the original context of those 
concepts. For, in context, Parmenides’ statement that “nothing can come from nothing” refers to 
the idea that “nothing is impossible” and does not refer to the way in which a character can 
embody an extant version of “nothing” (a figment) that comes from nothing (the imagination). In 
other words, when Beckett uses the concept of ex nihilo creation, he may not be contributing to a 
philosophical discussion on the nature of the origin of thought but may be primarily interested in 
using philosophical material to shape the structure of his works. At the same time, the care with 
which Beckett crafts his texts implicitly works against this notion of inspiration so that the 
felicitous interpretation is the one that accounts for Beckett’s elusiveness without attributing a 
thesis on the nature of nothing to his work.  
 Instead of interpreting Beckett’s references to ex nihilo creation as evidence of his 
contribution to a pre-Socratic question of cosmology, it is possible to see how Beckett excises 
Parmenides’ line “nothing comes from nothing” from its original context to posit literature as an 
example of a “nothing” that derives from “nothing. From the early novel Watt onward, Beckett’s 
presumed goal is to enter into the French tradition of writing about nothing, to perpetuate “An 
innocent little game, to while away the time” (38). In the poetic addenda to Watt, Beckett makes 
this goal quite explicit: 
who may tell the tale 
of the old man? 
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weigh absence in a scale? 
mete want with a span? 
the sum assess 
of the world’s woes? 
nothingness 
in words enclose? (247) 
 
The answer to the riddle Beckett presents may indeed be “nobody” since the ineffable is by 
definition unspeakable. Beckett’s characters encounter the potential impossibility of speaking the 
nothing even as they make the saying of nothing their objective: “If I could speak and yet say 
nothing, really no thing? . . . But it seems impossible to speak and yet say nothing, you think you 
have succeeded, but you always overlook something” (The Unnamable 303). The presence of 
language thwarts the desire to refer to nothing since the word “nothing,” as Parmenides notes, is 
always a something that occludes its nothingness. 
 On initial readings, Beckett’s texts do appear to proffer a literal adaptation of “ex nihilo 
nihil fit,” so that art itself provides an example of a nothing that is created from nothing. In other 
words, the material of his works presumably arrive in his head from nowhere. Beckett’s 
characters return to this formulation repeatedly over the course of his oeuvre and especially in 
the trilogy, which has often been taken as the apogee of all Beckett’s work. There Molloy notes, 
“It came to my mind, from nowhere, as a moment before my name” (27). Molloy, who is an 
author and perhaps a version of the author, relinquishes responsibility for the ideas that arrive 
“from nowhere” both on his page and conceivably on the pages of Beckett’s texts. Elsewhere, 
Molloy appears to confirm the idea that the creation of content arrives without purpose other 
than entertainment when he thinks, “Nothing compelled me to give this information, but I gave 
it, hoping to please I suppose” (23). This idea pervades his work, as is evident if we look beyond 
the trilogy to the “All Strange Away,” for instance, where the narrator writes, “from nothing for 
no reason yet imagined,” extending the claim that the substance of the imagination remains 
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beyond the control of the imaginer (358). If we take Beckett’s works as literal transcriptions of a 
philosophy of art, it would seem as though he proffers the notion that the writer has no control 
over the material that comes to the mind from nowhere and flows onto the page. 
 Unsurprisingly, the idea that Beckett’s work promulgates a notion of ex nihilo creation 
has already received critical traction. Paul Stewart, for instance, relates Beckett’s characters 
horror of sex and reproduction to his troubled relationship with the artistic principle of ex nihilo 
creation (29, 63). The erotic connotations of nothing as the open, zero-shaped, creative organ can 
be found in Beckett’s early series of short stories, “More Pricks Than Kicks,” where Beckett’s 
hero Belacqua compares a woman’s pocket to the reproductive capacity of the vagina: “he forced 
his right hand down past the craggy coxa (almost a woman’s basin in these trousers) into the 
glairy gallant depths and fished up a fifty” (62). What may be Beckett’s disgust with life’s 
origination in a sort of “gallant depth,” can also be read in the play “Not I” where the female 
narrator refers to her own “godforsaken hole” (411). In interpreting such scenes, Stewart 
comments that Beckett replaces the messy human propagation of the species with the pure 
production of literary texts from nothing (162, 196-7). But I would contend, Beckett’s relation to 
the concept of ex nihilo creation, while present, is not entirely “pure” or straightforward.  
 While Beckett repeatedly returns to the conception of literary production as a birth from 
nothing, he also presents the process of creative production as a complicated cosmology, which 
includes a Biblical ex nihilo creation as well as the Greek ordering of chaos. As Esslin reports, 
Beckett turned from writing in English to French in order to avoid the ready-made “glib” quality 
of writing in one’s native tongue (38-9). In other words, writing in another language enabled him 
to escape the ease with which language may occur to a native speaker, so that turning to French 
meant adopting a constraint that would allow him not to produce ex nihilo but to act on the words 
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he received. The contradiction between what he says about his writing and what he says within 
his writing on the matter of the derivation of his texts creates an unresolved tension that may be 
of more importance than the particular cosmology that his creative production embodies. As 
John Pilling writes, Beckett describes his own process as “double and obscure,” involving both 
passive and active forms of creative production: “acting is a receiving, its receiving an acting” 
(“On Not Being There...” 26). Pilling concludes that Beckett’s notion of the creative 
consciousness is ultimately not creation ex nihilo but a “response to something there” (“On Not 
Being There . . .” 26). Such an argument would suggest that Beckett’s works again ultimately 
encounter the Parmenidean view that “nothing is impossible,” for he always must draw on 
something, namely pre-existing language.  
 Indeed, even in his early, more overt writings, Beckett suggests that ex nihilo creation 
may be impossible. In “More Pricks Than Kicks,” his intellectual hero, Belacqua, says as a way 
of explaining why he has suicidal thoughts: “The simplest course, when the motives of any deed 
are found subliminal to the point of defying expression, is to call that deed ex nihilo and have 
done” (142). Notably, the idea that thought derives from nothing is not presented as the most 
accurate causal explanation, but only as the simplest, which may suggest that when Beckett 
returns to the concept of ex nihilo creation as a problem for literature in his later works, his 
characters may be voicing an ironic attitude about literary production rather than offering a 
straightforward discussion of artistic creation. Through such irony, Beckett’s texts occlude an 




Language is Nothing 
 Beckett’s use of the word “nothing” has a way of multiplying so that it not only refers to 
one philosophical debate but reflects many disparate claims at once. For instance, in addition to 
drawing material from the pre-Socratic debate on the origins of the world and adapting those 
ideas to refer to the production of literary texts, Beckett’s nothing slides into the argument about 
whether language has any inherent meaning. Beckett has often been associated with the project 
of exposing the nothingness of language itself, the idea that language is entirely constructed and 
therefore has no natural meaning. Peter Boxall, for example, encapsulates the common view that 
Beckett’s aesthetics are designed to represent “the literature of the unword,” which, however 
doomed to fail, manifests the effort to “give expression to nothingness” (29). Linda Ben-Zvi 
historicizes this view by connecting Beckett’s concern with the limits of language to his readings 
of Fritz Mauthner, noting that whether Mauthner confirmed a notion he already felt or informed 
his linguistic stance from the outset, Beckett developed the radical position that language and 
reality are entirely divorced (183-185). Beckett had, according to Ben-Zvi, read Mauthner’s 
Critique as early as 1932 when he was aiding Joyce in the production of Finnegan’s Wake and 
was greatly influenced by the treatise on language (185). Pilling also argues in Samuel Beckett 
that “only the realm of discourse . . . is different” between Mauthner and Beckett (Pilling 128). 
But here I will emphasize the divergences between Mauthnerian thinking and Beckett’s writing 
so as to ultimately understand the role that genre plays in generating ideas. As in my discussion 
of Parmenides, my point is not to demonstrate that Beckett’s thought holds no ties to the 
Mauthnerian critique of language, but that Beckett’s texts do not manifest a commitment to a 
particular perspective on language.   
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 Ben-Zvi, uses eight points from Mauthner’s thinking to illuminate areas of intersection 
between his thoughts and Beckett’s on the question of the relationship between language and 
nothing. For instance, one of Mauthner’s central arguments is based on the idea that “there is 
only language;” there are no real, natural, or innate meanings that support the quest for 
transcendent knowledge (188). Since words do not have universal meanings, they signify 
different things for different people, rendering communication through language impossible 
(195). To demonstrate Beckett’s affinity with Mauthner’s views on language, Ben-Zvi uses a 
passage from Beckett’s 1976 short story “Fizzles,” in which Beckett writes, “All needed to be 
known for say is known. There is nothing but what is said. Beyond what is said there is nothing” 
(412). Ben-Zvi rightly comments that this passage appears to echo the Mauthnerian thesis that 
“there is only language,” for here, Beckett figures language inside the void (188).  
 It is, however, important to recognize the ambiguities within this passage, which both 
support and deny Mauthner’s thesis. For instance, the sentence “All needed to be known for say 
is known” can also be paraphrased “if the word ‘say’ is known, then the word ‘all’ needed to be 
known” (412). This interpretation suggests that Beckett may be positing the idea that if we 
understand what “say” means, we must have been able to understand what “everything” means, 
which contradicts Mauthner’s skepticism about communicating through language. Additionally, 
the subsequent sentences of the passage may represent both the Mauthnerian tendency of 
language to shift meanings within a context and the non-Mauthnerian idea that language has 
substance while reality does not: “There is nothing but what is said. Beyond what is said there is 
nothing” (412). In the first version of the sentence, “nothing” is most likely assigned to the 
meaning “not anything” so that the sentence reads, “There is not anything but what is said.” This 
paraphrase figures language as a thing of substance in contrast to the reality it is meant to signify, 
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which supports Mauthner’s thesis that language does not touch reality. Yet the opposite 
paraphrase, “Beyond what is said there is nothing,” allows for the interpretation that the 
“nothingness” itself exists outside of language. Such a formulation contradicts Mauthner’s idea 
that language is inadequate to describe the things of the world, which do exist.  
 Beckett’s use of the polyvalent word “nothing,” then, both upholds and contradicts 
Mauthner’s thesis on language indicating a fundamental ambivalence about the philosophy of 
language itself. This playfulness appears in a line further down in the passage from “Fizzles,” 
which Ben-Zvi does not quote, where the narrator says “Beyond the ditch there is nothing” 
(412). Establishing “nothingness” within a deictic reference to “a ditch” generates a humorous 
interplay between absolute absence and the physicality of a breached space. The juxtaposition 
suggests that “nothingness” itself is beyond the sayable and possibly unreal while at the same 
time indicating that the concept of nothing becomes possible through the act of speech. 
 Beckett’s presents the idea that there is nothing behind language throughout his work in 
such a way that the opposite meaning can be taken from single lines of text. In “Texts for 
Nothing,” for instance, Beckett writes, “Name, no, nothing is nameable, tell, no, nothing can be 
told” (331). The idea that “nothing is nameable” or “that there isn’t anything that can be named” 
seems to reflect a Mautherian notion that language fails insofar as things do not naturally carry 
the names that are arbitrarily attached to them. The line, however, is not necessarily designed to 
replicate a philosophical position about language, but rather to play with the idea until it becomes 
a paradoxical joke. The line “nothing can be told” along with its contradiction “nothing is 
nameable” conveys the idea that “nothingness” is a concept we can and can not discuss. While 
the passage depends on and emulates philosophical discourse on the concept of nothing, it also 
rehearses Beckett’s wavering play with the ideas that language both is a failure and is not. 
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 Beckett’s ambivalence about language has rendered the importance of Mauthner to 
Beckett’s work a matter of dispute. For instance, Kennedy posits Mauthner as just one of many, 
mutable influences on Beckett (6). Furthermore, in a 1978 letter to Ruby Cohn, as Pilling reports 
in “Beckett and Mauthner Revisited,” Beckett indicates that he regarded the presence of 
Mauthner’s work in his texts as a “red herring” since he had only skimmed the philosopher’s 
critique of language (158). Pilling does note that Beckett responded to Mauthner in the margins 
of his book, though he ultimately arrives at the sound conclusion that Beckett’s philosophical 
influences are “diverse and disparate” (159).  
 Ultimately, Ben-Zvi, too, cautions against the temptation of shaping Beckett’s writing to 
fit entirely into Mauthner’s system since, as she notes, Beckett’s views were not only less certain 
than Mauthner’s—after all one of Beckett’s favorite words in the trilogy is “perhaps”—but that 
Mauthner was only one of many sources of material for his creative works (185, 192). The point 
is that while Beckett may have incorporated some of Mauthner’s ideas into his work, he was not 
a vigorous Mauthnerian just as he was not wholeheartedly a Cartesian, Sartrean, or Geulincxian. 
In fact, the Mauthnerian elements of his writing would be in conflict with the Cartesian elements. 
As Ben-Zvi notes, Mauthner’s premise that “What stands most clearly in the path of knowing 
truth is that men all believe they themselves think, when actually they only speak” undermines 
the cogito, which presents thought as the logical indicator of existence (188). While the Cartesian 
cogito demonstrates the existence of the self, Mauthner’s thesis only indicates that thought 
proves the existence of language, so that the self remains elusive. Moreover, Mauthner’s own 
skepticism about language does not slide into a skepticism of reality, as he writes of the problem 
of mind/body dualism that the problem only exists in language since “mind” and “body” are only 
figures of language and have no correspondent distinction in reality (194). On the matter of 
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whether Beckett’s texts evince a philosophy of language, we might conclude that the writer 
promulgates many views but maintains his distance from a thesis by avoiding such expositions 
found in philosophy that would force him to confront areas of incompatibility among his sources.  
 In that way, his writing remains distinct from another philosopher who may have 
influence his understanding of nothingness in relation to language, Sartre. In Nausea, which 
Beckett read by May of 1938 and found “extraordinarily good,”10 Sartre writes, “Things are 
divorced from their names. They are there, grotesque, headstrong, gigantic, and it seems 
ridiculous to call them seats or say anything at all about them” (125). While Sartre’s novel 
positions such a critique of language at the center of his character’s transformation, the example 
of Nausea serves as reminder of the distance between a philosophical novel such as Sartre’s and 
Beckett’s work; that is, while Nausea adheres to and demonstrates the philosophy of its author, 
Beckett’s characters remain unchanged by their mutable views on the nature of, in this case, 
language. 
 The contrary interpretation that Beckett’s texts posit a commitment to a skeptical position 
on language found its support in a widely quoted letter that the author wrote to Axel Kaun on 
July 9, 1937 to explain why translating the poems of Joachim Ringelnatz would not contribute to 
this writerly agenda (702): 
 More and more my language appears to me like a veil which one has to tear apart in order 
 to get to those things (or the nothingness) lying behind it. Grammar and style! . . . To drill 
 one hole after another into it until that which lurks behind, be it something or nothing, 
 starts seeping through—I cannot imagine a higher goal for today’s writer . . .On the road 
 toward this, for me, very desirable literature of the non-word, some form of nominalistic 
 irony can of course be a necessary phase. However, it does not suffice if the game loses 
 some of its sacred solemnity. Let it cease altogether! Let’s do as that crazy mathematician 
 who used to apply a new principle of measurement at each individual step of the 
 calculation. Word-storming in the name of beauty. (518)  
                                                 
10 For evidence of Beckett’s interest in Nausea, see a letter dated May 26, 1938 to Thomas 
McGreevy in which he writes, “I have read Sartre’s Nausée & find it extraordinarily good” 626. 
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Ben-Zvi cites a portion of this letter, which had been published in Disjecta, when arguing that 
Mauthner and his idea that language is meaningless had an important influence on Beckett’s 
thought (188). Yet now that Cambridge has published this letter in its entirety alongside the ones 
that Beckett sent to more personal acquaintances during that period, it becomes apparent that this 
letter carries a more hyperbolic tone than the ones that surround it, suggesting that Beckett’s 
writing may not be as programmatic as he frames it. 
 Kaun, importantly, worked for the publisher Faber and Faber, which perhaps explains 
why the tone of certainty, flamboyance, and drama in the letter clashes with the more personal 
letters that surround it. For example, Beckett writes to his friend Tom McGreevy on August 14, 
1937 in a more modest tone “I used to pretend to be working at something, going about with the 
preoccupied look & de quoi érire, but I really don’t any more” (539). Beckett, in the former 
letter, was perhaps trying to impress his receiver so as to encourage future projects that would 
better suit his interests and in so doing encapsulated, a bit too heavily, his attitude toward 
language. After all, the end of the letter indicates that Beckett’s project already involved the 
application of multiple and even incompatible “principles,” since he notes that the abuse of 
language is done “in the name of beauty,” which suggests an ultimate interest in the aesthetic 
value of the word.  
 There is good reason, then, why critics such as Esslin and Bennett have argued that, in 
contrast to the notion that language has no value, Beckett places an ultimate weight on 
meaningful, artistic construction in opposition to the void (Esslin 88; Bennett 2). Beckett 
identifies this value in “Company,” where he writes, “Devising figments to temper his 
nothingness” (443). Here Beckett presents language construction as a fortification against the 
nothingness that his stories address. The speaker of Malone Dies takes this idea further when he 
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posits, “what truth is there in all this babble? I don’t know. I simply believe I can say nothing 
that is not true, I mean that has not happened, it’s not the same thing but no matter” (236). 
Reflecting a Heideggerian notion of truth as the event of being, the character continues, “I have 
only to open my mouth for it to testify to the old story, my old story, and to the long silence that 
has silenced me, so that all is silent. And if I ever stop talking it will be because there is nothing 
more to be said, even though all has not been said, even though nothing has been said” (236). 
While the last part of this formulation articulates the idea that literature expresses nothing, 
Beckett in “Company” also voices the idea that the language presented in the story ultimately is 
and should be more than nothing: “if this no better than nothing cancel” (443). Of course, the 
line can also be taken to mean that “nothingness” is such a desirable goal that it would be rare for 
something to be better than it. In that way, to read for Beckett’s position on language is to 
encounter the recognition that Beckett’s texts represent the unfiltered particularities of the 
discussion rather than a clear thesis on the matter.   
 The openness of Beckett’s texts may be one of the reasons why critics have found fertile 
ground for demonstrating their own arguments by using Beckett’s writing; as Maurice Nadeau 
writes of Beckett’s work, “everyone sees in it what he wants to see” (33). The ordinary language 
philosopher Stanley Cavell, for instance, uses Beckett’s work to argue the counter-Mauthnerian 
view that Beckett’s texts demonstrate the idea that communication through language remains 
possible. In his essay on Endgame, “Ending the Waiting Game,” Cavell argues that the themes 
and method of the play represent not the total failure of language to facilitate in communication, 
but “our inability not to mean what we are given to mean” not to understand the implications of 
words (117). While Beckett’s characters may joke about the audience’s inability to understand 
their words, as in the line, “We're not beginning to mean something?” the laugh this line invokes, 
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to Cavell, demonstrates the fact that audiences continue to understand the play (qtd. in Cavell 
149).  
 Gary Adelman reaches a similar conclusion when he argues that despite Beckett’s 
declarations that his words mean nothing, as a whole “words, paradoxically, are his only 
camouflage [from society], his wings, his element, the amazing spittle of words his unmistakable 
signature” (15). Badiou, also recognizes the tendency of Beckett’s denunciation of language to 
encounter its opposite, which he names, “a fortunate disposition of language: a sort of phantasm 
of correspondence that haunts language” (97). The tendency of language to “ring true” is what 
for Badiou, constitutes the very center of Beckett’s courage, which allows him to speak on (97). 
Yet while Badiou characterizes this speaking on at the core of Beckett’s message as “an 
imperative for the sake of the oscillation or the undecidability of every thing” (2), such 
undecidability would run contrary to the notion, which Badiou posits, that Beckett’s works offer 
ethical lessons since the shaping of a lesson involves a decicive prioritization of values. But 
instead of framing Beckett’s oscillations as evidence of his reprioritization of artistic production, 
it may be more fitting to say that Beckett offers the event of undecidability itself, which contains 
rather than parses philosophical positions on the potential communicability of language. 
 Upon examination of his attitude about the relationship between language and 
nothingness, it becomes evident that Beckett does not decide whether language itself is a 
nothingness in the sense that it does not hold inherent truth, or that language provides the only 
access to truth that we have, or even that both positions are true. As with the other types of 
nothing in his work, such as his ambivalent contributions to the debate about whether nothing 
can exist, Beckett does not hold, explicate, or illustrate a philosophy of nothing but rather toys 
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with multiple perspectives on the matter as, perhaps, a means of generating the literary content of 




CHAPTER 4: BECKETT’S LITERARY NOTHINGS 
 
 As I discussed in the prior chapters, much of the scholarship on Beckett’s “nothing” has 
been dominated by philosophical interpretations of the term, that it represents the existentialist or 
nihilistic void, for instance. In Martin Esslin’s early essay “Samuel Beckett,” Beckett is 
presented as an existentialist writer insofar as he is said to be “searching for the nature of reality 
itself . . . to reach the innermost core, the nothingness at the centre of being” (129). More 
recently, Terry Eagleton has argued that Beckett’s work represents the “the modern subject 
confront[ing] itself as a void” (xx). Michael Bennett alternately claims that Beckett’s works posit 
a Heideggerian sense of nothingness as open possibility (29-30, 33). For Gary Banham, on the 
other hand, Beckett, along with Derrida, approaches the “‘nothing’ that brings them both to the 
edge of nihilism” (56). The scholarly market has been so saturated with philosophical 
interpretations of Beckett’s nothing as an issue for nihilism, as Badiou comments, the approach 
has become hackneyed (2, 4).  
 While the quantity of these interpretations does not necessarily invalidate them, in this 
chapter I will depart from the longstanding tradition of considering Beckett’s nothing within the 
discourse of philosophy to instead demonstrate how Beckett’s use of the word “nothing” places 
him within a literary history. That is, while his nothings reflect multiple philosophical 
inheritances, his primary intervention in the field of writing in general was to dismantle the 
linguistic and structural force that images of emptiness traditionally carry and to instead use the 
word “nothing” abstractly and repetitively. Moreover, Beckett did not produce this effect 
autonomously but rather he developed his style as a response to a literary tradition that includes 
Baudelaire, Joyce, and Proust. To establish his own voice in the literary marketplace, he departed 
from his predecessors by turning away from the mythological, theological implications of the 
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abyss as a pivotal image of redemption and instead repeatedly used the abstract word “nothing” 
as a reference to his philosophical predecessors. Beckett’s preference for the word “nothing” is a 
way of transforming, as Michael Mooney argues, “philosophic material . . . into literary images” 
(218-9). Similarly, I argue that by using the word “nothing” pervasively throughout his texts, 
Beckett shifts toward the abstract and philosophical but importantly does so as a means to 
institute a new aesthetic mode.  
 Such a reading follows from Derrida’s definition of literature as an institution whose 
main criteria for inclusion in the category is singularity. As I will discuss at length in a 
theoretical chapter, Derrida does not define “literature” as “the great books” but rather as the 
modern historical institution that developed when property rights enabled authors to claim 
ownership over their texts (“Before...” 214). As an institution, literary texts are the products of 
writers who intend to make literary texts and then are granted literary status by a legion of 
gatekeepers: “critics, academics, literary theorists, writers, and philosophers” (215). But the only 
texts that the gatekeepers will admit into the classification “literature” are those that institute new 
laws. Thus, paradoxically, literature is the historical institution that developed its own rules, 
conventions, and genres but whose primary rule is singularity, that is, the breaking of rules to 
generate a work that will be both related to and different than its predecessors (“This Strange...” 
37; “Before...” 213). Following Derrida, J. Hillis Miller and Derek Attridge have posited the 
ethical reading as the one that acknowledges the singularity of the writer’s work rather than tries 
to subsume literature into philosophy, as do the arguments that I reviewed in chapter one (Miller 
4; Attridge 65). 
 Following from a theoretical paradigm that respects the alterity of literature and with 
more access to the evidence of Beckett’s participation in the literary marketplace, recent critics 
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have situated Beckett not as a stoic, arm chair philosopher, or saintly ascetic, but as an active 
participant in entering into the institution of literature. For instance, using evidence from 
Beckett’s letters and the advertising campaigns he participated in, Stephen Dilks has argued that 
Beckett willingly engaged in marketing strategies that would figure him as a thinker of the void 
so that he could gain access to the literary economy (162). Similarly, Jürgen Siess writes that 
Beckett proactively adopted the posture of “the exceptional writer who lays claim to a unique 
aesthetic project” in contrast to the philosophical literary movements such as surrealism and 
existentialism, which were then dominating the French field (177-9, 188). Meanwhile, by 
fashioning himself as an artist of impoverishment, Beckett entered into the longstanding tradition 
of the French poëte maudit (181). These interpretations may underestimate the role that Beckett’s 
wife, Suzanne Déchevaux-Dumesnil, played in selling his early texts to publishers, but they do 
help to identify the site of Beckett’s innovation in his artistic production. Specifically, the 
recognition that Beckett intensely wanted to be a writer, as opposed to a scholar, helps to make 
sense out of the immense interest that critics have taken in his use of the term “nothing.” That is, 
it may have been Beckett’s ability to develop stylistic techniques associated with the word 
nothing—such as inversion, repetition, and abstraction—that garnered persistent critical attention 
and instigated so many philosophical interpretations of the word.  
 In this study, I will situate Beckett’s use of the word “nothing” within a French and Irish 
literary history—specifically in relation to Baudelaire, Joyce, and Proust—to demonstrate that he 
strategically built upon and departed from the work of his predecessors to develop a new style. 
There is a large critical body of work comparing Beckett to his literary predecessors though not 
specifically regarding his singular use of the word “nothing.” James Knowlson, for instance, 
documents Beckett’s connection to Synge, Joyce, Racine, Chaucer, and Pope (71, 112, 383, and 
 
84 
576). John Fletcher in Samuel Beckett’s Art, places Beckett in a literary continuum with Dante, 
Swift, Rimbaud, and Goethe (83, 106). Beckett’s connections to Proust and Joyce are also well-
established,11 helped along by Beckett’s critical writings on both authors (Proust and “Dante . . . 
Bruno . . . Vico . Joyce”), his longstanding friendship and working relationship with Joyce, and 
discussions of both of their works in his letters. As I will discuss in the next section, a great deal 
less has been written in English about Beckett’s connection to Baudelaire.  
Sublime Inversions  
 While Beckett has often been associated with existentialist angst, in this section I will 
focus on the ways in which he developed a new style by reversing such a negative attitude 
toward nothingness. We might find a prototype of existentialist dread in Sartre’s novel of ideas 
La Nausée, which Beckett read before May 26, 1938 (“Letter to Tom McGreevy” 626). There 
the aspiration for nothing is associated with a feeling of angst from which Sartre’s protagonist 
ultimately turns in order to propel himself more fully into existence (Sartre 100). While Beckett 
found the text to be “extraordinarily good,” his own early and middle-stage works depart from 
the horror of nothing to instead strive for nonexistence as a desirable goal (“Letter to Tom 
McGreevy” 626). Such is the case in Beckett’s second novel, Watt, which was written between 
1942 and 1945 (Pilling, Chronology 89-94). There he writes: 
The panting the trembling towards a being gone, a being to come . . . Then the gnashing 
ends, or it goes on, and one is in the pit, in the hollow, the longing for the longing gone, 
the horror of horror, and one is in the hollow, at the foot of all the hills at last, the ways 
down, the ways up, and free, free at last, for an instant free at last, nothing at last. (Watt 
201-2) 
 
                                                 
11 See Barbara Reich Gluck’s Beckett and Joyce: Friendship and Fiction; Beckett, Joyce and the 
Art of the Negative, ed. Colleen Jaurretche. Daniel Albright’s Beckett and Aesthetics. Nicholas 
Zurbrugg’s Beckett and Proust. James Reid’s Beckett, Proust and Narration.  
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Here the achievement of the nothing provides a peaceful freedom from the “trembling,” 
“gnashing,” and “horror” normally associated with the existential void. In that way, Beckett 
departs from his philosophical antecedent preferring to invert the conventionally negative 
implications of total emptiness. Such a reversal does not necessarily derive from a particular 
desire to carve a new philosophic position but to build upon the work of another literary 
predecessor whom he also admired, that is Charles Baudelaire.  
 Baudelaire’s series of poems, Les Fleurs du Mal, often include moral inversions of 
abyssal imagery, turning the dark, hellish, negative image into a positive, liberating form for 
humorous effect. Beckett follows Baudelaire in reversing the moral implications of abyssal 
imagery, but he develops a new voice when he prefers the philosophical term “nothing” (relating 
to the pre-Socratic question of how “nothing” can be “something”) to the theological term 
“abyss” (relating to the theological image of primordial origins).  
 In the English criticism on the literary contexts for Beckett’s themes and style, very little 
has been said about his relationship to Charles Baudelaire. This is surprising since Beckett’s 
critical monograph Proust, which has largely been used to tie him to the eponymous writer, 
contains a substantial discussion of Baudelaire in relation to the idea of involuntary memory. In 
the monograph, Beckett interprets Proust's figuration of memory’s abyss as a Baudelarian 
“gouffre interdit à nos sondes” (“gulf you cannot sound”) (Beckett 31). Beyond recall in the 
abyss, inaccessible memories allow the Baudelairian speaker and the Beckettian interpreter to be 
liberated from remorse. As Beckett writes, “The good or evil disposition of the object has neither 
reality nor significance. . . . The aspirations of yesterday were valid for yesterday’s ego, not for 
to-day’s (13). Beckett’s reference to Baudelaire’s amoral gulf may indicate that Beckett 
emulated and surpassed Baudelaire when he transforms nothingness into a desirable goal. 
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 Along with the monograph Proust, Beckett’s connection to Baudelaire is well-
documented in his letters, where Beckett frequently quotes the poet as a source for his negative 
aesthetics. Writing to Morris Sinclair on January 27, 1924, Beckett jokingly advises his cousin to 
comfort his sulky horse by reciting to him a line from Baudelaire’s “Madrigal triste,” that is: 
“Que m’importe que tu sois sage? / Sois belle! et sois triste!” (“What does it matter whether you 
are wise? / Be beautiful! and be sad!”).12 Referring to Baudelaire’s prose poem, “Le Gateau,” he 
continues, “Mais puisque la tristesse ajoute toujours à la beauté, puisqu’elle le ‘devin gâteau’, 
du moins à mon avis, j’aimerais mieux que notre cheval reste fidèle aux attitudes, boudeuses et 
mélancoliques, que je lui ai toujours connues” (178) (“But since sadness always adds to beauty, 
since it is the eternal, invariable element of what Baudelaire calls the ‘divine cake,’ in my view 
at least, I would prefer our horse to remain faithful to the pouting, melancholic attitudes that I 
have always know him to have”) (Trans. Richard Howard 181, 184, Note 4). Beckett refers to 
Baudelaire throughout his letters revealing his affinity for Baudelaire’s ability to generate beauty 
out of darkness. 
 As John Paul Riquelme writes in his article, “Toward a History of Gothic and 
Modernism: Dark Modernity from Bram Stoker to Samuel Beckett,” Beckett cultivates his sense 
of internal malady through the intervention of Baudelaire (586-7). This aesthetic of negativity, as 
critics often note, is what helped Beckett to develop a voice that would distinguish him from the 
other writers of his period. In “The Rapture of Vertigo,” Paul Lawley follows Knowlson, Coe, 
and Acheson in claiming that Beckett experienced a transformative moment in which he decided 
to develop his own voice by allowing his negativity to shape his texts (28-9). This epiphany is 
often said to have entered into the play Krapp’s Last Tape in the line “What I suddenly saw then 
                                                 
12 My translation unless otherwise indicated. 
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was this . . . that the dark I have always struggled to keep under is in reality my most—” (Beckett 
226). While the vision of the epiphany supports the romantic conception of the aesthetic, 
autonomous genius? the idea that he would find his poetic voice by accepting the darkness 
within him? his artistic development may have also been encouraged by his predilection for 
Baudelaire’s melancholy aesthetics.  
 Specifically, in relation to images of emptiness, Baudelaire’s abyssal imagery, like 
Beckett’s nothing, tends to proliferate, not necessarily manifesting a singular, philosophical 
vision but drawing an aesthetic principle from the perception of nothing everywhere and in 
everything. Baudelaire indicates as much in a journal entry he wrote near the end of his life: 
In the moral as in the physical world, I have been conscious always of an abyss, not only 
of the abyss of sleep, but of the abyss of action, of day-dreaming, of recollection, of 
desire, of regret, of remorse, of the beautiful, of number...etc. I have cultivated my 
hysteria with delight and terror. Now I suffer continually from vertigo. (The Intimate 
Journals 106) 
  
His perception of manifold abysses and the feelings of “delight and terror” they evoke is 
prevalent throughout Les Fleurs du Mal, which contains thirteen “abîmes” (abysses), twenty-
three “gouffres” (gulfs), and thirteen “enfers” (hells) (Cargo). While Beckett may very well have 
borrowed this tendency to multiply images of nothing from Baudelaire, here I will focus on 
Baudelaire and Beckett’s shared “delight” in abyssal images.  
 For a brief background on Baudelaire, the poet was writing at the periphery of 
Romanticism, Catho licism, and Modernity so that his particular position among these discourses 
has been greatly debated. One older interpretation of Baudelaire’s work, by biographer Enid 
Starkie, figures Baudelaire as a theological writer with the claim that his poems “evoke the 
spiritual crisis of modern youth” but do not advocate for such rebellion (307). For W.H. Auden, 
though, Baudelaire was ultimately a modernist because he developed as a writer in response to 
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the collapse of religious autocracy “after the mutation of the closed society of tradition” (22). 
Baudelaire, who it should be noted, faced charges that his book offended public morality (Starkie 
307), defended the moral purpose of his work by claiming that the structure of the collection 
holds a theological purpose: it represents the Catholic idea of man’s vice when he is separated 
from divine grace (Aggeler xxxvi). Damian Catani, bridging the gap between these religious and 
secular interpretations of Baudelaire’s work, observes that the poet waffled between 
philosophical and theological paradigms though he ultimately pursued a unified goal of 
accepting the value of negativity (993). Whether for the purpose of presenting a theodicy or for 
the pure delight of rebellion, Baudelaire’s poems often invert the theological definition of the 
abyss as the site of hell and the romantic definition of the gulf as the site of natural 
consciousness, and it is these heretical, perverse abysses that serve as a point of departure for 
Beckett’s own aesthetic of nothing. 
 Such inversions are evident in Baudelaire’s poem, “Alchimie de la Douleur” (“Alchemy 
of Grief”), where instead of converting lead into gold as an ordinary alchemist would, 
Baudelaire’s speaker exchanges the most highly valued metal for the most common one: “Par toi 
je change l’or en fer / Et le paradis en enfer” (316) (“Through you, I change gold into iron / And 
heaven into hell”). Baudelaire enacts this reverse alchemy again in the poem “Le Voyage,” where 
the journey, a common metaphor for life, becomes a plea to Death to deliver him and his 
affiliates into the afterlife, whether that be heaven or hell. Voicing this distaste for existence, he 
writes, “Nous voulons . . . Plonger au fond du gouffre, Enfer ou Ciel, qu’importe?” (Baudelaire 
400) (“We want . . . to plunge to the depths of the abyss, Hell or Heaven, what does it matter?”). 
Connecting the abyssal waters to the classical Greek conception of hell as a watery underground, 
the speaker upends reigning hierarchies of pleasure over pain, morality over immorality, life over 
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death, and heaven over hell. He does this when he draws an equivalence between hell and heaven 
on the basis that they both represent death, the eternal “fond de l’Inconnu pour trouver du 
nouveau!” (400) (“the depths of the Unknown to find something new”). With a shrug of 
indifference he upholds newness as the value that trumps all the old ones, since it at least 
provides an escape from boredom.  
 Following Baudelaire, Beckett, for humorous effect, also inverts the dark, hellish, 
negative image of nothing into a desirable goal. The comic inversion of nothing’s negative 
connotations can be found in Endgame, where Clov responds to Hamm’s idiomatic statement 
“nevertheless, better than nothing” with its reverse “Better than nothing! Is it possible?” (68). It 
may be no coincidence that Beckett was reading Baudelaire poetry while he was writing 
Endgame (“Letter to Pamela Mitchell,” 22 July 1955, 522). Beckett’s use of the desire- for-
nothing trope also appears in Mercier and Camier, where the narrator associates their aimless 
meanderings with a desirable sense of oblivion: “blessed sense of nothing, nothing to be done, 
nothing to be said” (87). Probably the most famous and overt passage that illustrates a longing 
for nothingness can be found in Murphy, where the titular character finally achieves the peaceful 
oblivion he had been seeking in the asylum:  
Murphy began to see nothing, that colourlessness which is such a rare postnatal treat. . . .  
Not the numb peace of their own suspension, but the positive peace that comes when the 
somethings give way, or perhaps simply add up, to the Nothing, that which in the guffaw 
of the Abderite naught is more real. Time did not cease, that would be asking too much, 
but the wheel of rounds and pauses did, as Murphy with his head among the armies 
continued to suck in, through all the posterns of his withered soul, the accidentless One-
and Only, conveniently called Nothing. (138) 
 
As with Baudelaire, Beckett figures the nothing not as an angst-ridden image to be avoided but 
as an end worth seeking. But while Baudelaire’s inversions of the abyss as the site of the afterlife 
inscribe him within the Catholic discourse of original sin as well as the aesthetic discourse of 
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sublime terror, Beckett’s use of nothing in this passage situates him between two philosophical 
claims—the Geulincxian “where you are worth nothing, you shall want nothing” and 
Democritean “nothing is more real than nothing” (Disjecta 113). In other words, Beckett 
develops an original use of nothing but moves away from Baudelaire’s theological and natural 
sublime and toward a more abstract, conceptual version of nothingness. 
 While Baudelaire’s abysses and gulfs connect him to the Christian idea of original sin in 
nature as well as the codification of theological power relating to the romantic sublime, even if 
only as a means of protecting himself from further liability, by turning to an image of absolute 
nothingness, Beckett breaks away from the theological or naturalistic implications of abyssal 
images. When Baudelaire turns the abyss of primeval origins and hellish ends into an object of 
delight, he is working against the romantic tradition of associating the gulf with natural goodness 
to instead posit nature as a source of original sin. As Baudelaire describes in “L’Idéal,” the 
highest form of beauty is achieved only when the artist unflinchingly depicts humankind’s 
perverse nature:  
 Je laisse à Gavarni, poët des chloroses, 
 Son troupeau gazouillant de beautés d’hôpital, 
 Car je ne puis trouver parmi ces pâles roses 
 Une fleur qui ressemble à mon rouge idéal. 
 
Ce qu'il faut à ce coeur profond comme un abîme, 
C'est vous, Lady Macbeth, âme puissante au crime. . . . (253)  
 
 To Gavarni, the poet of chloroses, 
 I leave his troupe of beauties sick and wan; 
 I cannot find among those pale, pale roses, 
 The red ideal mine eyes would gaze upon.   
 
 You, Lady Macbeth, a soul strong in crime, 




Beauty here is not to be found in nature, as is suggested by “the flocks of beauties from the 
hospital,” but in humankind’s criminal essence. The delight that Baudelaire takes in abyssal 
depths, derives partially from his affinity for the work of Edgar Allen Poe and his rejection of 
Rousseauian political philosophy with its turn to nature as the source of the good. Baudelaire, 
following Poe, whom he considered a “spiritual brother,” developed the idea that nature was not 
inherently innocent but rather represented the original sin of humankind, which could be 
celebrated (Notes Nouvelles 13, 30). In his Notes Nouvelles Sur Edgar Poe, published in 1857, 
Baudelaire reveals his own pessimism about humankind and nature’s essence: 
But more important than anything else: we shall see that this author . . . has clearly 
seen, has imperturbably affirmed the natural wickedness of man. There is in man, he 
says, a mysterious force which modern philosophy does not wish to take into 
consideration; nevertheless, without this nameless force, without this primordial 
bent, a host of human actions will remain unexplained, inexplicable. These actions 
are attractive only because they are bad, dangerous; they possess the fascination of 
the abyss . . . such is the thought, which, I confess, slips into my mind, an 
implication as inevitable as it is perfidious. But for the present I wish to consider 
only the great forgotten truth,—the primordial perversity of man,—and it is not 
without a certain satisfaction that I see some vestiges of ancient wisdom return to us 
from a country from which we did not expect them. It is pleasant to know that some 
fragments of an old truth are exploded in the faces of all these obsequious flatterers  
of humanity, of all these humbugs and quacks who repeat in every possible tone of 
voice: “I am born good, and you too, and all of us are born good!” Forgetting, no! 
Pretending to forget, like misguided equalitarians, that we are all born marked for 
evil! (Baudelaire 125-6) 
 
In describing Poe’s work, Baudelaire voices perhaps his own preference for the idea that 
humankind was not born with a propensity for good but with a Hobbesian and rather Catholic 
“primordial perversity.” Baudelaire’s rejection of Rousseauian philosophy is made overt in 
another passage where he writes: 
But these illusions [idea that there is a positive progress] which, it must be added, are 
selfish, originate in a foundation of perversity and falsehood,—meteors rising from 
swamps,—which fill with disdain souls in love with eternal fire, like Edgar Poe, and 
exasperate foggy minds like Jean-Jacques Rousseau, in whom wounded and rebellious 
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sensibility takes the place of philosophy. . . . Nature produces only monsters, and the 
whole question is to understand the word savages. (129) 
 
While Rousseau had instigated the romantic quest for truth in natural settings such as the sea, 
Baudelaire would convey the idea that evil is inherent in nature by characterizing the gulf as a 
hellish, abyssal zone.  
 Romantics often employed watery imagery to represent the inward depths of the soul 
where one could attempt to reconnect with natural goodness, as Douwe Draaisma writes: 
The unconscious appeared in psychology and in literature as “depth.” In the 
topography of the Romantic's soul “inward” generally meant “downward,” down the 
shafts, to the “subterranean gardens” [or] to the depths of the sea, as in Heine's Die 
Nordsee: “I love this sea like my soul. Often I even feel as if the sea is really my soul 
itself; and just as in a sea hidden water plants grow which rise to the surface only at the 
moment when they bloom and when they finish blooming disappear again into the 
depths, so occasionally splendid images of flowers float up from the depths of my 
soul.” (76) 
 
The sea, for romantic poets, symbolized humankind’s inner life—it was a source of inspiration, 
evidence of free will, and a point of connection to the purity of nature. Baudelaire, on the other 
hand, would, in L’Albatros, depict the watery depths as “gouffre amer” or “the cruel sea” (240). 
Perhaps because he grew up following the disappointments of revolutions in France (Starkie 
190-1), Baudelaire revisited the depths of the mind and found not Heine’s “splendid images of 
flowers” but “les fleurs du mal,” the flowers of sickness or evil.   
 While Baudelaire’s use of the “gouffre amer” in a positive fashion separated him from his 
romantic predecessors, such a formulation does have its roots in the proto-romantic theory of the 
sublime (Frye 66). For the conservative thinker, Edmund Burke, the ocean is the quintessential 
symbol of the sublime because of its vastness, depth, apparent infinity, and eternal repetition (53-
4). For Burke, the great depth and width of the ocean causes a “delightful horror,” the emotional 
response that serves as a “test of the sublime” (67). The person who looks upon the seemingly 
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infinite deep will feel delight because his imagination is allowed to wander without check over 
the boundless waters (67). But the site of the boundless sea also causes “astonishment . . . that 
state of the soul, in which all its motions are suspended, with some degree of horror” (53). The 
fear of danger incited by the vastness of the sea, importantly for Burke, manifests itself as 
paralysis, which serves to solidify the political or religious power of those who wield it (59-60). 
Although Frederic Jameson has called Baudelaire’s use of the abyss or gulf an “artificial 
sublime,” one that parodies romantic longing rather than directly emulates it (qtd. in Teukolsky 
712), what is noteworthy in comparing Baudelaire’s work to Beckett’s is that the former inverts 
images that are associated with the sublime but continues to use romantic symbols: seas, gulfs, 
and chasms. 
 Whether by choice or force, the poems Baudelaire added to the 1867 edition of his 
collection, after the morality charges, more often reflect “terror” in response to the sub lime than 
his original delight. Baudelaire’s speaker still champions the perilous plunge into the gulf but 
now warns against becoming entranced by the abyss. The desired reader is the one whose eye 
“sait plonger dans les gouffres” (“knows how to plunge into gulfs”) “sans se laisser charmer” 
(“without being charmed”) (403). The danger of being charmed by infinite and destructive ideas 
is expressed most explicitly in his late poem “Le Gouffre,” where the speaker conveys a mood of 
despair at being now located within a figurative abyss: 
Pascal avait son gouffre, avec lui se mouvant. 
—Hélas! Tout est abîme, —action desir, rêve, 
Parole! Et sur mon poil qui tout droit se relève 
Mainte fois de la Peur je sens passer le vent. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
Et mon esprit, toujours du vertige hanté 
Jalouse du néant l’insensibilité 




Pascal’s abyss went with him, yawned in the air— 
Everything’s an abyss! Desire, acts, dreams, 
Words! I have felt the wind of terror stream 
Many a time across my standing hair.  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
My spirit, haunted now by vertigo, 
Years for extinction, insensibility. 
—Ah! never to be free of Being, Ego! (Trans. Jackson Mathews 193-4) 
 
While in his earlier poems the abyss was most often figured below and occasionally up in 
heaven, in this later poem, a terrifying infinitude surrounds the speaker. The reference to Pascal 
is pertinent, for after proving the possibility of a vacuum, Pascal grew interested in a second 
infinity, God. In his journal, he wrote that the person who perceives his position in the middle of 
the abyss of nothingness and the abyss of infinity will experience a feeling of awe: 
Anyone who considers himself in this way will be terrified at himself, and, seeing his 
mass, as given him by nature, supporting him between these two abysses of infinity 
and nothingness, will tremble at these marvels. . . . Equally incapable of seeing the 
nothingness from which he emerges and the infinity in which he is engulfed. What else 
can he do, then, but perceive some semblance of the middle of things, eternally 
hopeless of knowing either their principle or their end? All things have come out of 
nothingness and are carried onwards to infinity. (Pascal 90) 
 
Pascal had opened for Baudelaire the possibility of a vacuum, an absence of meaning and value 
that could be lingering all around. As also with Pascal, who famously took his chances on the 
existence of God, a few years after Baudelaire wrote “Le Gouffre,” he became a Jansenist. At 
that point, he wrote in his intimate journal: “Hygiene. Morality. Conduct. Too late, perhaps! . . . 
My humiliations have been the graces of God” (Baudelaire 109). As with the terror of the 
sublime, the anxiety felt at the nothingness of God’s absence was a powerful enough force, if his 
journals are to be believed, to compel theological acceptance. As such, Rachel Teukolsky 
ultimately considers Baudelaire’s vision to be Victorian because his sense of doubt is always 
coupled with such “gothic spiritualism” (716). 
 
95 
 One manifestation of Beckett’s departure from Baudelaire rests in the ordinary rather 
than sublime quality of his nothing. The indifference of nature in Beckett’s works, can be 
understood quite explicitly in the early novel Watt, where the narrator writes: 
And all the sounds [of nature], meaning nothing . . . the little sounds come that demand 
nothing, ordain nothing, explain nothing, propound nothing, and the short necessary night 
is soon ended, and the sky blue again over all the secret places where nobody ever comes, 
the secret places never the same, but always simple and indifferent, always mere places, 
sites of a stirring beyond coming and going, of a being so light and free that it is as the 
being of nothing. (39)  
 
Beckett turns away from the theological implications of the abyss as hell and from the romantic 
associations of the abyss with the inspiring sea to instead draw on the playful, conceptual word 
“nothing,” a word he uses to indicate the idea that truth is not to be found in nature. The 
Shakespearean echoes apparent at the beginning of the passage surface more overtly in The 
Unnamable where the narrator writes two iterations of the line from Macbeth “noises signifying 
nothing” (351) and “all this noise about nothing” (376). Unlike the sublime abyss, which has a 
referent in the oceanic space, “nothing” is a humorous, abstract word that refers to an absolute 
emptiness signifying an absence of meaning to be found in nature. 
 Turning to “nothing” serves another function; it provides a way of talking about infinite 
absence without the political and aesthetic baggage of the sublime with its connotations of 
transcendence through nature and affirmation of theological or regal power. As Franz Maier 
writes, Beckett replaces the sublime with the banal thereby exposing the appearance of the abyss 
in the work of Baudelaire as a literary spectacle (376). Beckett’s awareness and rejection of the 
romantic sublime is evident in Molloy, where the narrator writes: 
The treacherous hills where fearfully he ventured were no doubt only know to him from 
afar, seen perhaps from his bedroom window or from the summit of a monument which, 
one black day, having nothing in particular to do and turning to height for solace, he had 




Here the sublime experience of gaining perspective from the height of the mountaintops is 
pursued only as an escape from boredom and is associated with base monetary exchange. In one 
of his rare uses of “the abyss,” Malone, perhaps Beckett’s most bourgeois character, uses the 
word to refer to an object of human construction rather than a vast object of nature: “I can 
scarcely even see the window-pane, or the wall forming with it so sharp a contrast that it often 
looks like the edge of an abyss” (Malone Dies 208). The character here is probably drawn to the 
vertiginous aspect of the window as a pathway to suicide, but by endowing a constructed 
window with such sublime qualities, Beckett is perhaps undermining his predecessor’s 
naturalistic aesthetics.  
 As his oeuvre unfolds, his language shifts from such Baudelairian images of sublime 
abysses and heights to iterations of the word “nothing” in an expository and playful manner, 
expository in the sense that the words on the page remain abstract, disconnected from the things 
of the world. In “Texts for Nothing,” he writes,  
How is it nothing is ever here and now? It’s varied, my life is varied, I’ll never get 
anywhere. I know, there is no one here, neither me nor anyone else, but some things are 
better left unsaid, so I say nothing. . . . I would know that nothing had changed, that a 
little resolution is all that is needed to come and go under the changing sky. . . . Leave it, 
leave it, nothing leads to anything, nothing of all that, my life is varied. (314) 
 
His choice of the word “nothing” instead of “not anything” instigates a double reading, which 
could refer to the production of fiction itself as a source of more nothings as in “how is it nothing 
is ever here and now,” meaning both “how is it that the nonexistent material of the imagination is 
manifested on the page” and “how is it that nothingness itself is ever here and now.” While the 
abyss has a referent in hell, in the gulf, and in primeval chaos, the “nothing” here conveys the 
language of the mind as it appears on the page. In other words, Beckett’s aesthetic ingenuity may 
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be identified in this linguistic shift from the naturalistic sublime to the abstract, polyvalent, 
reflexive, and repetitive use of the word “nothing.”  
 As the above passages and his letters suggest, while at first Beckett may have used 
Baudelaire as a model to develop his own negative aesthetic, by the 1940s when his style was 
solidifying, he came to mock the hyperbolic qualities of Baudelaire’s work. In one letter, for 
instance, Beckett reverses Baudelaire’s text when he writes to Charles Monteith, an editor at 
Faber and Faber, that he will probably not write a memoir because “J’ai moins de souvenirs que 
si j’avais six mois” (“I have fewer memories than if I were six months old”). This reference, as 
the editor of the letters notes, inverts a line from “Spleen”: “J’ai plus de souvenirs que si j’avais 
mille ans” (603) (“I have more memories than if I was a thousand years old”). Such a reversal 
may reflect a larger turn in Beckett’s work from the “terror” and political baggage of the abyss to 
“nothing,” a word that allowed Beckett establish a more purely abstract way of taking delight in 
absolute absence without divinity. Since, whereas the abyss is still connected by implication to 
the watery gulf of creation and romantic inspiration, the word “nothing,” as I discussed in the 
previous chapter, has a source in philosophical inquiry.  
Narrative Dissolution 
 Beckett is also able to distance himself from mythological associations with the abyss of 
primeval origins by dispensing with the structural weight traditionally given to images of 
absence. In mythological figurations, an image of the abyss usually appears at a turning point in 
the text indexing the nadir from which the plot moves toward resolution. In the Odyssey, for 
instance, the descent into the abyss of hell constitutes a turning point in the story since it is only 
through Odysseus’ meeting with Tiresius that the former gleans the knowledge necessary to 
arrive home (Homer 170-1). As Northrup Frye writes, “to gain information about the future, or 
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what is ‘ahead’ in terms of the lower cycle of life, it is normally necessary to descend to a lower 
world of the dead, as is done in the nekyia . . . in the eleventh book of the Odyssey” (321). 
Dante, importantly for Beckett, similarly descends into the depths before climbing to Purgatory 
and Paradise. That is because, in classical formulations, the depths are a site of the renewal of 
life through the contemplation of death as well as a site of origins, since, as in the Bible, the 
narrative is drawn out from creation (Frye 315). This pattern repeats itself, perhaps surprisingly, 
in the modernist works of Joyce and Proust, which contain plots that pivot around images of 
nothingness.  
 Beckett’s connection to Joyce and Proust is well-known: Beckett was friends with Joyce, 
conducted research for Finnegan’s Wake, wrote a critical essay on Joyce at his request, wrote his 
only scholarly monograph on Proust, and even applied to a doctoral program at Ecole Normale 
with the intention of writing a thesis about Proust and Joyce (“Letter to Ecole Normale,” 5 Oct. 
1929, 9-10). The scholarship on Beckett’s relationship to Joyce and Proust though generally 
concerns Beckett’s turn away from the former’s encyclopedic style and his critical essay on the 
latter but does not specifically address their lexical divergences regarding the word “nothing.” 
Yet Beckett considered Proust to be an immature essay bearing less relevance to his work than 
Democritus and Geulincx. In a letter to Thomas McGreevy dated February 3, 1931, he says of 
his work on Proust that it is “disgustingly juvenile—pompous almost—angry at the best. Tant 
pis” (65). In a letter to Sigle Kennedy dated June 14, 1967, Beckett further distances himself 
from both Joyce and Proust, “I simply do not feel the presence in my writings as a whole of the 
Joyce & Proust situations you evoke. If I were in the unenviable position of having to study my 
work my points of departure would be the ‘Naught is more real . . .’ and the ‘Ubi nihil vales . . .’ 
both already in Murphy and neither very rational” (Disjecta 113).  
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 Some critics have taken Beckett’s rejection to heart and consequently avoided Joyce and 
Proust as literary precursors. For instance, Martin Esslin echoes Beckett when he says that 
Beckett did not incorporate Joyce’s tendency to synthesize material or Proust’s tendency to 
analyze it, but rather Beckett “does neither of these things: he is searching for the nature of 
reality itself” (“Samuel Beckett” 129). While Esslin conceived of Beckett’s “genius” as “too 
personal” to allow for influences (143), an appropriate response to Beckett’s letters is to 
acknowledge that Beckett was not trying to emulate Joyce or Proust, and it is precisely in his 
awareness of their work and his departure from them that he was able to develop a work that 
would achieve the status of literature. Beckett’s effort to distance himself from Proust can be 
read in a letter to Thomas McGreevy from the summer of 1929 where he writes of Swann’s Way 
that he finds the work, “strangely uneven . . . Some of his metaphors light up a whole page like a 
bright explosion, and others seem ground out in the dullest desperation” (11). With such a 
statement in mind, we can begin to conceive of Beckett’s departure from Proust as a stylistic 
movement away from climactic unevenness and toward a toneless approach to nothing. 
 Scholars who compare the work of Joyce and Beckett have typically agreed that the two 
writers move in quite stylistic opposite directions though Colleen Jaurretche equates Joyce and 
Beckett’s thematic interest in nothing, saying that for both and for modernists generally 
“negation is the dark metaphysical heart of . . . literature” (11). Contrariwise, James Acheson, 
Barbara Gluck, and Richard Coe have all named Beckett’s aesthetic an “art of failure” in contrast 
to Joyce’s celebration of knowledge (Acheson 96, Gluck 97). Beckett signaled as much in an 
often quoted interview with Israel Shenker, in which he said, “[Joyce is] tending toward 
omniscience and omnipotence as an artist. I’m working with impotence, ignorance. I don’t think 
impotence has been exploited in the past” (qtd. in Dilks 165). As Stephen Dilks comments, while 
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previous scholars have taken this quote to mean that Beckett’s “impotence” is a genuine “art of 
failure,” the key word of the passage may be “exploited” because it attests to Beckett’s efforts in 
distancing himself stylistically from Joyce for the sake of establishing a unique posture in the 
literary marketplace (165). 
 Dilks’s thesis is substantiated when we review the negative reception of Beckett’s early 
works and his subsequent shift in style. As a young writer, Beckett had been criticized and even 
rejected for publication because his editors considered his style to be too Joycean. In a letter that 
Charles Prentice wrote to Thomas McGreevy, the former writes that “the Joyce bit” in a Beckett 
story that would eventually appear in Dream of Fair to Middling Woman, was “not his own 
style” (Letters Vol. I, 82, Note 1). Prentice later rejected Murphy as well, citing similar reasons, 
including “Beckett’s frequent abstruse allusions and his generally somewhat recondite manner of 
writing” (353, Note 6). Beckett’s subsequent shift toward a minimalistic style that generally 
lacks direct philosophical allusions may stem in part from such rejections.  
 In relation to the nothing, Beckett would depart from Joyce’s structural and linguistic use 
of the terms “abyss” and “void” not necessarily to posit a new or original notion of nothingness 
but to develop his own style? one that would be accepted by publishers, audiences, and 
philosophers? by drawing attention to the linguistic and conceptual problems inherent in the 
word “nothing.” Beckett’s exasperation at being denied publication and, what follows, his desire 
to be accepted by the gatekeepers of literature can be identified in an early letter to Thomas 
McGreevy dated January 3, 1930 in which he responds to a rejection letter with sarcasm, “As if I 
were trying to sell him a load of manure or a ton of bricks” (19). Perhaps out of a desire to see 
his work valued, Beckett, in his middle and late-stage works subsequently avoided the structural 
turn that classically follows the image of nothing. 
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 The classic narrative pattern of using the word “abyss” at the site of recognition and 
reform, appears in the heretical reverse in Joyce’s Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man at the 
point when Stephen rejects religion. In Chapter three, Father Arnall delivers a sermon on hell 
that propels the narrative of the Künstlerroman forward: “And through the several torments of 
the senses the immortal soul is tortured eternally in its very essence amid the leagues upon 
leagues of glowing fires kindled in the abyss by the offended majesty of the Omnipotent God. . . 
. The yells of the suffering sinners fill the remotest corners of the vast abyss” (106). Joyce 
modeled the speech after the genre of “The Spiritual Exercise,” which was designed to produce 
an ekphrastic experience of hell so that, “the fear of the pains may help me not to come into sin” 
(“St. Ignatius of Loyola” 278). In the speech, the abyss is the site of eternal damnation that 
awaits sinners who do not repent, and as it appears in the novel, the image signals the point of 
departure for the shift in Stephen’s relationship to the church. 
 Scholars have tended to agree that Joyce uses the “Sermon on Hell” as a structural pivot 
point marking Stephen’s turn from Catholicism to artistic pursuits. As James Thrane observes, 
while the harrowing sermon initially serves its intended purpose of drawing Stephen closer to the 
church, the coercive use of terror ultimately repels him from entering the priesthood and 
ultimately solidifies his identity as an outsider and artist (172). John Paul Riquelme also writes 
that section three—including the sermon, Stephen’s temporary acceptance of Catholic doctrine, 
and his eventual rejection of it—comprises the turning point away from the first section of the 
book and toward “the climactic fourth part” (308), so that, as Kenneth Burke observes, while the 
mathematical center of the book takes place in the sermon on hell, chapter four in which Stephen 
finds his new vocation as a writer receives the greater emphasis (322). The use of the descent 
into hell to accelerate the Künstlerroman indicates that Joyce is both emulating and inverting the 
 
102 
classical scheme of the return home from hell since the end goal here is not achieved through 
devotion to God but through rejection of religion. 
 The structural shift from theology to aesthetics is also marked by a linguistic shift from 
“abyss,” signifying hell, to the secular word “void,” signifying the now empty space that had 
been previously occupied by religion. After Stephen “had fallen” he thinks, “[His soul] flickered 
once and went out, forgotten, lost. The end: black cold void waste” (Joyce, Portrait 122). 
Lacking a soul, the body is now empty and, in keeping with such a formulation, the sentence 
structure shifts from the heightened, eloquent syntax of theological oration to the mundane, 
broken, unpunctuated syntax of aesthetic modernism.  
 Joyce’s preference for the word “void” surfaces again in Ulysses, where he uses the term 
to substitute the mythology of origins from nothing for a scientific notion of the spatial void. 
This shift away from the cosmology of primeval chaos is apparent in the line “world founded on 
the void” (207), which, according to the editors of Ulysses Annotated, becomes a secular 
replacement for “the church founded on the void” and for the mythic vortexes “Scylla and 
Charybdis” (Gifford and Seidman 9.840-42, 241). Joyce associates the concept of the world 
founded on a void with a newfound epistemological uncertainty, “a conscious rational reagent 
between a micro- and a macrocosm ineluctably constructed upon the incertitude of the void” 
(Ulysses 697). He also replaces the primordial abyss with the scientific concept of the macro and 
micro voids of particula te and planetary space: “the universe of human serum constellated with 
red and white bodies, themselves universes of void space constellated with other bodies . . . 
nought nowhere was never reached” (Joyce 699; Gifford and Seidman 17.1064-69, 582). But 
while the Joycean hero would be “a conscious reactor against the void incertitude” (Joyce 734), a 
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void that has the potential to produce and sustain the material of the universe and of knowledge, 
Beckett’s characters would seek absolute, ever present nothingness.   
With the linguistic shift to nothing, Beckett also divorces his works from the 
mythological structure that, in Joyce’s novels, positions the void as a hurdle to overcome. 
Beckett uses the word nothing as an atonal motif that pervades his texts and is not followed even 
by aesthetic redemption. In Waiting for Godot, for instance, nothing appears at the beginning of 
the play “Nothing to be done” (2), in the middle “Nothing happens, nobody comes, nobody goes, 
it’s awful (43), and as a source of humor at the end: “It’s like nothing. There’s nothing. There’s a 
tree” (99). Constituting a dwelling within and about nothing, Beckett’s characters maintain a 
close connection to nothingness instead of the quasi-redemptive filling of a void or the turn away 
from the abyss that can be found in the work of Joyce. By turning to the abstract nothing, Beckett 
is able to draw on the philosophical and linguistic problem of nothing as an impossibility; after 
all, there is no nothing, “there’s a tree.”  
 Beckett may have learned to use “nothing” as a philosophical referent through his 
readings of Proust, who utilized the term “néant” to describe an absence of consciousness. As 
Walter Benjamin writes in his essay “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire,” Proust’s depiction of 
preconsciousness alludes to Henri Bergson's theory of “involuntary memory” (Benjamin 157). In 
Swann’s Way, Proust describes this pure memory, which collects every detail of life independent 
of consciousness, in metaphorical terms, as a rope let down from heaven over an abyss. This 
rope becomes not only the starting point for conscious experience, but also the starting point of 
the novel, which is drawn out from memory. Thus, while Proust and Beckett both bear a debt to 
philosophical precedents in their uses of term nothing, in Beckett’s thematic, the repetitive use of 
nothing also runs contrary to Proust’s classical use of nothing as a starting point for the work of 
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literature. In other words, while Beckett is not the first to draw a work of literature out of the 
philosophy of nothing, his work becomes innovative insofar as it eschews the connection 
between the word “nothing” and narrative progress. 
 As with Joyce in the Portrait, the presence of nothingness in Swann’s Way signals the 
point of departure from which the product of literature arrives, reflecting a mythological 
cosmology of literary origins. Prior to the flood of memories that direct the content of his novel 
onward, Proust’s overture documents Marcel’s experience of momentary nonbeing as he moves 
from sleep to consciousness. Unable to reorient himself by himself, pure memory, acting as his 
savior, “venait à moi comme un secours d’en haut pour me tirer du néant” (“would pull me from 
nothingness like help from on high”) (Proust 14). This passage has most often been taken to 
reveal Proust’s conception of the centrality of involuntary memory in giving a person a sense of 
self. According to Benjamin, in this passage, Proust was testing Bergson's theory of experience 
that there is an ideal, pure memory that contains the content of the past and is deposited in the 
mind at moments of inattention (Benjamin 157; Bergson 175). This pure memory lies dormant in 
the infinite mind and enters consciousness spontaneously (Bergson 178, 182, 187). Following 
Benjamin’s interpretation, in the moment between waking and being fully conscious, the narrator 
of Swann’s Way is not yet himself and the narrative is not yet written until his memories appear. 
In that way, the image of nothing serves as catalyst for the memories which constitute the plot of 
the novel.  
 Beckett’s departure from narrative ebbs and flows is evident if we compare his early 
work, which generally follows the conventions of plot, to his later prose and plays, which eschew 
narrative development. In Murphy, which is probably Beckett’s most overtly philosophical novel 
in the sense that it manifests an idea, Beckett does use images of nothing to signal turning points 
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in the text, much in line with Proust and early Joyce. Beckett transcribes Geulincx’s dictum 
“where you are worth nothing, you will want nothing” almost verbatim as a way to describe 
Murphy’s journey over the course of the book: “it was not enough to want nothing where he was 
worth nothing” (102). Ruby Cohn posits the importance of this line for determining the direction 
of the novel, when she writes, “Murphy departs from the room he shares with his prostitute-
mistress, where he is worth nothing, in order to meditate in the heated garret of an insane asylum, 
where he wants nothing” (170). Although it’s worth noting that Geulincx’s line is presented as 
inadequate—“it was not enough”—Beckett does appear to use the word “nothing” here to 
foreshadow Murphy’s impending demise. After losing at chess to Endon, as quoted above, 
Murphy has a vision of nothingness itself that prefigures his eventual death (Murphy 138). 
Murphy finally achieves nothingness as death; whether by suicide or accident, the narrator 
reports, “Soon his body would be quiet, soon he would be free. The gas went on in the wc, 
excellent gas, superfine chaos. Soon his body was quiet” (142). In this, Beckett’s first novel, we 
can see that he may have emulated the classical and early modern structural importance given to 
the image of nothing as a point of departure and tragic ends. 
 But unlike Joyce and Proust, Beckett would later use the word nothing repeatedly and 
pervasively in his texts, not at the usual climactic point of turn. An example of this can be found 
in almost any passage of Beckett’s middle and late stage texts but I will take one from the The 
Unnamable where there is an especially abundant series of nothings that do not lead anywhere 
but on:  
All for nothing again. Even Mahood has left me, I’m alone. . . . All lies. I have nothing to 
do, that is to say nothing in particular. I have to speak, whatever that means. Having 
nothing to say, no words but the words of others, I have to speak. No one compels me to, 
there is no one, it’s an accident, a fact. Nothing can ever exempt me from it, there is 





Beckett repeatedly uses the word “nothing” in this passage to play of its double sense as “not 
anything” and “nothingness itself” so that the character is saying he “does not have anything to 
say” and “he has nothingness itself to speak of” (24). The production of the text does not arrive 
after “nothing,” as it does in Swann’s Way, but rather in the midst of these multiple meanings of 
the word “nothing.” 
 The use of the nothing as a playful, repetitive motif becomes musical (in the variety of 
Philip Glass) in the play Cascando, written in 1963, in which “Music,” “Opener,” and Voice” 
form a trio. Reflecting on his own function in the play “Opener” speaks the line: “They say, He 
opens nothing, he has nothing to open, it’s in his head . . . they say, He opens nothing, he has 
nothing to open, it’s in his head. . . .There is nothing in my head” (346). This character, if we can 
call “Opener” that, plays here with the multiple meanings of his essential function as that which 
opens the text and with the word “nothing.” In the negative sense of the word as “not anything,” 
he does not have anything to open: the text itself is not worth anything. In the positive sense of 
the word as “nothingness” his head and the play are themselves manifestations of “nothing.” By 
preferring the word “nothing,” to the “void” or “abyss,” or even “nothingness,” Beckett is able to 
draw attention to the slippery quality of language while reflexively positing literature itself as a 
nothing tha t is something. If this were a Proustian story, the lines might be followed by an 
epiphany of the self that propels the story forward, but instead what follows is more nothing, or 
more nothings. 
 Instead of perpetuating the mythological and theological association between the abyss, 
hell, the sublime, and narrative structure, Beckett uses the word “nothing” pervasively, playing 
off of its multiple philosophical and linguistic senses. While he did draw from the work of 
philosophers in his turn toward “nothing,” as I discussed in the third chapter, perhaps his greatest 
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claim to originality derives not from such allusions, but from his development of new formal 
techniques associated with the word, namely abstraction and repetition without redemption. Yet 
interestingly, these traits may once again place his work in proximity to philosophical discourse 
since they indicate that he tends to dwell reflexively and in an almost expository manner on 
conceptual material. Moving away from concrete, naturalistic images and narrative form, Beckett 
maintains an enduring interest in nothingness itself that, as I will argue in the next chapter, places 
his work on a continuum with the format of the philosophical essay. 
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CHAPTER 5: BECKETT’S ESSAYISTIC MODE AS A BRIDGE FORM 
 
 Thus far, I have sought to trouble a line of criticism that presents Beckett’s work as a 
consistent, philosophical argument on nothing.13 As I have contended, such a thesis that posits a 
systematic, philosophical purpose at the heart of Beckett’s oeuvre presents a problem insofar as 
Beckett’s use of the term “nothing” is multifarious, polyvalent, inconsistent, and moreover, 
primarily designed to surpass his literary predecessors rather than his philosophical ones. He has, 
in the words of How It Is, “no nothing to prove” (97). To make such a claim, I have relied on an 
implicit definition of philosophy as a genre characterized by singular, consistent arguments in 
contrast to non-purposive modes of discourse. Yet the notion that Beckett’s writing is not 
philosophical because he does not offer a consistent argument on being may itself be overly 
simplistic considering Derrida’s interrogation of the binary that defines philosophy as a singular, 
serious system in contrast to literature as an ambiguous mode of play (Limited 18, 77). With a 
recognition that there are areas of overlap between the discourses, I will now seek to understand 
the intersection of philosophy and literature by comparing Beckett’s work to a genre that exists 
in between the two, the essay. In this chapter, I argue that Beckett’s work bears an uncanny 
affinity with the essayistic mode, in their shared reliance on stylistic tropes of uncertainty—
including parataxis, contradiction, digression, and a personal voice—that is worthy of remark 
insofar as the comparison helps to clarify the proximate relationship between Beckett’s work and 
philosophical discourse in terms of style.  
                                                 
13 For instance, Fletcher articulates the idea that “Beckett’s work has a unity that is not the result 
of chance, but rather of a consistency of approach that is extraordinary over so many years. His 
fiction progresses towards a more and more total emptiness, in which plot, characters and 
language itself crumble to nothing” 144. Similarly, Butler argues that Beckett creates parables 
that directly illustrate philosophical themes such as the nothingness of being 4-5. Instead of 
demonstrating a nihilistic position, Bennett argues that Beckett revolts against meaningless by 
creating parables that display a Heideggerian sense of nothingness as a ground of possibility so 
that “nothingness and emptiness create[] a fertile ground for meaning” 2, 27, 33. 
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 My previous argument relied on a Habermasian definition of philosophy, summarized by 
Anthony Uhlmann in Beckett and Poststructuralism, that “Philosophy is that discipline which is 
supposed to be serious and to search for truth, the single meaning, through logic alone while 
literature requires ambiguity . . . uncertainty, several meanings at once” (7). In that sense, 
Beckett’s work may be rightly separated from single-minded philosophical discourse insofar as 
his multifarious “nothings” display a preference for the literary modes of “ambiguity,” 
“uncertainty,” and polyvalence. Yet following a poststructuralist approach, Uhlmann has argued 
that the fields of writing share characteristics, as he writes, “a problem of impurity, of 
interference, of mixing or overlapping” occurs particularly strongly when comparing Beckett’s 
work and philosophy (7, 12). While Uhlmann and other critics such as Locatelli and Begam have 
taken a post-structuralist approach in claiming that the collapse of boundaries between literature 
and philosophy in Beckett’s work renders him a proto-deconstructionist (Locatelli x; Begam 21), 
such a notion, as I have argued, reconfirms the idea that Beckett’s work is only philosophical in 
the sense that his writing serves as an example of a particular branch of philosophy. 
 With an interest in investigating an area of intersection between the fields of philosophy 
and literature but without further subsuming Beckett’s work under another philosophical 
movement, this chapter presents a formal comparison between Beckett’s work and the essay, a 
medium that experimental philosophical discourse sometimes takes. The essay derives from the 
writing of Michel de Montaigne who called his prose works “essais,” as a way of characterizing 
them as “attempts” or “experiments” designed to test ideas rather than convey particular 
arguments (Philip Lopate, “What Happened...” 76). Following Montaigne, as Wendell Harris 
notes, the essay genre largely split into two main contiguous modes, formal and informal essays, 
with formal essays being the programmatic, argument-based inquiries that may be immediately 
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associated with systematic, philosophical discourse and informal essays being personal, 
apparently freestyle explorations that tend toward the literary in their emphasis on style (937). 
There are, however, philosophers who employ a less formal, essayistic style in their performance 
of open dialogue; for instance, we might consider Derrida an informal essayist when he follows 
the method of wavering between point and counterpoint. György Lukács identifies Plato’s 
dialogues and Kierkegaard’s imaginary works as examples of philosophy written in an essayistic 
mode since their open, dialogic formats allow for the testing of ideas rather than neat 
argumentation (3). Plato’s dialogues may be considered literary in the sense that they use a 
dramatic format to relay the experience of open conversation. For his part, Kierkegaard creates 
multiple personas to achieve a dialectic between aesthetic, ethical, and religious phases of 
thought. Turning to the essay as a mode at the intersection of literary and philosophical 
discourse, then, presents a method for paying deference to the shared implications of the genres 
as sites of conceptual experimentation while respecting the formal differences of their styles. 
After all, the essay form does not entirely breach the formal boundaries between literary and 
philosophical discourse, but represents a mode of experimentation akin to philosophy and 
occasionally adopted by philosophy.  
 As I will discuss in greater detail, the informal essay may be thought of as a hybrid form 
between philosophy and literature since it appears in the guise of non-fiction, with an apparently 
candid voice articulating the ideas of the author, while remaining highly literary in conveying 
such candor through a persona who employs rhetorical strategies such as fragmentation, 
digression, and contradiction. In that way, the essay subsists at a site of contention over whether 
philosophy derives from a formal, methodological system or could instead comprise a literary 
performance, a demonstration of the discontinuous quality of thought itself. As such, the essay 
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provides an exemplar for troubling the equivalence between Beckett’s work and philosophy 
while exploring areas of intersection.  
 Rhetorically speaking, the difference between the more philosophical, formal, 
programmatic essay and the more literary, informal, experimental essay can be attributed to their 
diverging logical patterns, which Harris identifies in the formal essay’s reliance on deduction for 
narrowing an argument to a singular point in contrast to the informal essay’s reliance on 
induction for conveying the organic movements of the mind (944). At the syntactic level, this 
disparity results from an essayist’s primary preference either for a hypotactic or paratactic style. 
Common to the philosophical argument, the hypotactic style indexes logical relationships 
between clauses with subordinating conjunctions such as “while,” “because,” and “if.” Hypotaxis 
generates the analytic effect of a speaker who, according to The Princeton Encyclopedia of 
Poetry and Poetics, remains “somewhat detached from the immediacy of the action . . .  
[providing] a more reflective account of its meaning” (650). Parataxis, on the other hand, 
includes both the effect of fragmentation achieved through the absence of conjunctions and the 
“coordinate” or “additive” style produced through the use of serial coordinating conjunctions 
such as “and,” and “but” (650). Writers employ this style when they wish to portray “thoughts 
and actions from the urgent perspective of a participant caught in the immediate flow of events” 
(650). While the informal essay produces an effect of a free-flowing, naturalistic, authentic voice 
unbounded by the conventions of genre (John Snyder 150; Lukács 1), essayists achieve such an 
effect through their deliberate, adoption of the additive style (Adorno 151-2; Klaus 12-3). 
 Using such a stylistic preference as a point of departure, in this chapter I demonstrate that 
Beckett’s imaginative works bear an affinity with the Montaignian mode of informal 
experimentation. In doing so, I am following Adorno’s characterization of essayism as a mode of 
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performative experimentation designed to manifest the discontinuity of consciousness and a 
consequent uncertainty about what can be known. In quoting Max Bense, Adorno conveys the 
idea that the essayistic mode can extend beyond its traditional home in nonfiction:  
He writes essayistically who writes while experimenting, who turns his object this way 
and that, who questions it, feels it, tests it, thoroughly reflects on it, attacks it from 
different angles, and in his mind’s eye collects what he sees, and puts into words what the 
object allows to be seen under the conditions established in the course of writing. (164)  
 
In that way, the essayistic mode, as a mode of experimentation, is not restricted to nonfictional 
prose writing but may be said to appear in fictional works when the process of composition 
emulates the fluctuations of a changing mind.  
 Bense’s definition of essayistic writing, then, justifies a reading of Beckett’s fictional 
works in terms of the Montaignian tradition. It would be more conventional to interpret Beckett’s 
critical monograph as an example of essayistic writing, but his early book, Proust, displays a 
more assured, programmatic voice than his later novels. There, he writes in a declarative voice 
that the self is discontinuous “We are not merely more weary because of yesterday, we are other, 
no longer what we were before the calamity of yesterday” (emphasis mine, 13). In his fictional 
works, however, he eschews certainty by relying on contradiction to convey rapidly shifting 
thoughts “Where now? Who now? When now? Unquestioning” (291). The narrator here 
expresses uncertainty through a series of coordinated questions only to undermine the 
interrogation by offering an answer in the form of the humorous inversion “unquestioning.” Such 
an essayistic contradiction, essayistic in the sense that the author includes reversals thoughts, 
subverts the notion of a unified, consistent self not through a declaration but through a stylistic 
performance.  
 In addition to Beckett and Montaigne’s analogous styles, there is some historical 
evidence available to warrant the comparison between the two writers. Beckett’s awareness of 
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Montaigne’s essays is evident in a letter he wrote to Thomas McGreevy dated August 14, 1937 
in which he criticizes the writer Denis Devlin for using “ye olde,” a remnant from Montaigne’s 
writing (541). Contrary to expectation, Beckett’s distaste for the appropriation of Montaigne’s 
language, or more accurately, the Elizabethan translation of his writing, does not necessarily 
mean that Beckett abhors the Montaignian tradition but only that he finds it misplaced in 
twentieth century prose. Ironically, Beckett’s critique of nonnatural language places him 
squarely in the essayistic tradition, at least according to Virginia Woolf, who argues that the 
essay calls for a plain style: “the essay must be pure—pure like water or pure like wine, but pure 
from dullness, deadness, and deposits of extraneous matter” (810). As part of a program to 
display the genuine patterns of thought, Woolf calls upon essayists to “think your own thoughts . 
. . and speak them as plainly as you can” (812). As if in alignment with such a call to avoid 
recycling antiquated language, esoteric, long words are rare in Beckett’s post-war works, after he 
developed a sparse style. 
 Beckett would have also gained familiarity with the essay through the mediation of 
Samuel Johnson whom he greatly admired. Indeed, Dirk Van Hulle and Mark Nixon report in 
Samuel Beckett’s Library that the works of Samuel Johnson comprise the “largest number of 
books in Beckett’s library” (32). Johnson’s writing apparently had a formative influence on 
Beckett, as Stephen Dilks notes in “Samuel Beckett’s Samuel Johnson.” According to Dilks, 
Beckett began reading Johnson’s work after Joyce as a way of separating his voice from his more 
immediate literary predecessor (268, 289). Dilks argues, moreover, that Johnson, with his fame 
for being a “lexical stabilizer and staunch defender of the political and literary status quo,” 
served as an antidote to Joyce’s destabilizing approach (287). Counterbalancing Joyce with 
Johnson did not, of course, render Beckett a formal essayist, but rather, as Dilks further 
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comments, Beckett fashioned “his own version of Johnson” one that avoided the codification of 
established knowledge and instead focused on the personal horrors that Johnson suppressed 
(291). For example, whereas Johnson claimed to believe that “mere existence is so much better 
than nothing, that one would rather exist even in pain” (Fehsenfeld 511, note 9), in a letter to 
Joseph Hone dated 3 July 1937, Beckett reads into Johnson’s assertion that he “must have had 
the notion of positive annihilation” (509). In other words, Beckett ignores Johnson’s rejection of 
complete nonexistence to instead appreciate the fact that at least Johnson considered nothingness 
a possibility. His insertion of doubt into Johnson’s work and biography reflects his larger 
dissatisfaction with codified knowledge and preference for uncertainty as becomes apparent in 
his adoption of an aesthetics of uncertainty. 
 More to the point on the philosophical allegiances between Beckett and Montaigne, 
several critics have identified Heraclitus as a common link between the writers. Shane Weller 
remarks in A Taste for the Negative: Beckett and Nihilism that both Beckett and Montaigne pair 
Democritus and Heraclitus as thinkers who offer the void as an extant possibility (2). Alain 
Badiou similarly argues that the linguistic inability to capture a shifting thought compels the 
Beckettian speaker to speak on, which places him in a Heraclitean tradition for, “as soon as it is 
named that which is and of which we are obliged to speak escapes towards its own nonbeing. 
This means that the work of naming must always be taken up again. On this point, Beckett is a 
disciple of Heraclitus: being is nothing other than its own becoming-nothingness” (48). In 
connection with the essay, Carl Klaus notes that Montaigne’s espousal of experimentation comes 
in reaction to the great systematizers of knowledge: Aristotle, Cicero, and the medieval 
scholastics. By initiating the posture of the essayist as an independent skeptic who seeks to 
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understand the slippery nature of the self, Montaigne, according to Klaus, falls into a Heraclitean 
cadre (10).  
 Indeed, Heraclitus’s well-known epigram “As they step into the same rivers, other and 
still other waters flow upon them” (Gottlieb 45) captures the version of truth that Montaigne 
assumes: that truth is discovered by observing the constant flux of the self. In “Of Repentance,” 
Montaigne articulates in a characteristically peripatetic fashion this version of truth that his 
essays perform: 
I cannot keep my subject still. It goes along befuddled and staggering, with a natural 
drunkenness. I take it in this condition, just as it is at the moment I give my attention to it. 
I do not portray being: I portray passing. Not the passing from one age to another, or, as 
the people say, from seven years to seven years, but from day to day, from minute to 
minute. My history needs to be adapted to the moment. I may presently change, not only 
by chance, but also by intention. This is a record of various and changeable occurrences, 
and of irresolute and, when it so befalls, contradictory ideas: whether I am different 
myself, or whether I take hold of my subject in different circumstances and aspects. So, 
all in all, I may indeed contradict myself now and then; but truth, as Demades said, I do 
not contradict. If my mind could gain a firm footing, I would not make essays, I would 
make decisions; but it is always in apprenticeship and on trial. (610-11) 
 
Montaigne here espouses, through content and style, a desire to depict a version of the truth, 
which involves the portrayal of the self as it shifts. He manifests such a principle through a 
stylistic performance that uses right branching syntactic additions that contradict prior material. 
In doing so, he formally demonstrates that recording consciousness reveals the apophatic quality 
of thought as in “I do not portray being: I portray passing” (611). Essays following in the 
Montaignian tradition, commonly called familiar, informal, or personal essays follow his 
approach of qualifying rather than “resolving” an author’s idea. Such essays, then, appear to 
unfold according to the organic fluctuations in the writer’s consciousness, allowing for 
contradictions and rapid shifts in focus. But it is important to recognize that while the claim of 
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the Montaignian essay is one of non-generic liberality, the form nonetheless adheres to a specific 
version of the truth that bears an affinity with the Heraclitean philosophy of flux.  
 Beckett likewise signals his affinity with a Heraclitean notion of the self when he remarks 
in a passage from Proust that “The aspirations of yesterday were valid for yesterday’s ego, not 
for to-day’s” (13). In this model, the desires of the past are lost with the consciousness that 
invented them since, as Beckett says, the self depends on the ever changing objects that surround 
it (13). But as I have noted earlier, while in his earlier works, Beckett’s declares this point 
emphatically, his middle and late stage works appear to illustrate this point stylistically, through 
their essayistic organizational patterns. For instance, in his earliest novel Murphy, Beckett 
conveys his mastery over the plot by using an omniscient narrator: “Soon he would have to make 
other arrangements, for the mew had been condemned,” he writes, highlighting the knowledge he 
has about what future events would unfold (5). In the past perfect, the narrator also reveals 
information that only an omniscient consciousness could know: “Celia spreadeagled on her face 
on the bed. A shocking thing had happened” (62). Beckett would later substitute the sense of 
complete knowledge signified by the use of the third-person, past tense with the use of the 
essayistic first-person, singular present to exhibit a greater sense of an uncertain “I” speaking on 
the page. Though he does not connect these characteristics to the essay, Edmund Smyth 
comments that Beckett utilizes the first-person present to construct “a discourse which presents a 
vivid formal and stylistic metaphor for disintegration” (156). Judith Dearlove similarly 
comments that for Beckett “Style and form become content, become surrogate characters and 
plots,” which convey, at least in the trilogy, the sense that the narrator is “recording the sounds of 
the mind . . . struggling with its words” (105-6). As I will parse in this chapter, Beckett achieves 
such a stylistic metaphor for discontinuous consciousness through four primary essayistic 
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modes—parataxis, contradiction, digression, and presence—that place his writing on a 
continuum alongside experimental philosophical discourse. 
Parataxis 
 Despite the rich critical conversation on the correspondence between Beckett’s rhetoric 
of discontinuity and Heraclitean philosophy, there are few studies that connect these 
characteristics with the essay. Porter Abbott compares “Texts for Nothing” with the Montaignian 
tradition because of the way the series of short stories trades narrative progress for “the broad 
nonnarrative genre of the meditative personal essay” (Abbott 90). In her chapter on “Textes pour 
rien,” Cohn adopts Abbott’s thesis and subsequently identifies “fragmentation of thought” and 
contradictory, negative words as key stylistic features of the non-narrative texts (195). Going 
beyond the narratology of the “Texts,” pairing the essay with Beckett’s broader oeuvre is a way 
of specifying an argument that has been latent in Beckett studies since the sixties: that Beckett’s 
texts use syntactical strategies such as parataxis to perform the unsystematic qualities of 
consciousness in order to undermine the possibility of unified knowledge.  
 For instance, while not directly comparing Beckett’s work to the essayistic mode, Hugh 
Kenner, in his now classic text Flaubert, Joyce, and Beckett: The Stoic Comedians, identifies a 
source of the similarity between the two forms; namely, the reader of Beckett’s trilogy 
encounters the thoughts of the narrator “in the immediate act of occurring to a mind, which 
appeals to us by its very proximity” (85). As Kenner implicitly notes, Beckett’s work manifests a 
proximate consciousness through a stylistic preference for parataxis: “the writer’s pen setting 
down words, and then setting down more words, and then setting down the same words over 
again, so that we have before us a piece of writing, and a piece of writing with little of great 
importance to communicate” (80-1). Building on Kenner’s observation that Beckett’s writing 
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tracks temporal shifts in thought, identifying the informal essay as a generic mode that shares 
this stylistic trope of “coordination” aids in understanding how Beckett’s work relates to 
philosophy since the fragmentary style is said to manifest epistemological uncertainty. 
 Beckett frequently utilizes a fragmentary, coordinate style to stage the narrator’s 
nonlinear thought patterns, including aporias, doubts, contradictions, and digressions. In such a 
coordinate style or “essay style” as Stanley Fish defines it, “successive clauses and sentences are 
not produced by an overarching logic, but by association; the impression the prose gives is that it 
can go anywhere in a manner wholly unpredictable” (62). Evidence of such a style in Beckett’s 
writing can be found prior to the “Texts” in The Unnamable, where the narrator voices an 
associative flow of thoughts: “quiver and hurry on, all life before me, on and forget, what was I 
saying, just now, something important, it’s gone, it’ll come back, no regrets, as good as new, 
unrecognizable, let’s hope so, some day when I feel more on high-class nuts to crack. On” (312). 
Beckett’s use of short, fragmentary clauses, and even interruptions, as in “what was I saying,” 
closely resembles the essayistic style with its tendency to track the thoughts of the author in the 
present tense. 
 Another example of such an essayistic style can be found in the Malone Dies, where the 
narrator uses right branching additions to convey the tortured movements of the mind: 
“Decidedly this evening I shall say nothing that is not false, I mean nothing that is not calculated 
to leave me in doubt as to my real intentions” (207). While the initial clause here conveys 
certainty about the narrator’s ability to speak the truth in the future, the second part of the 
sentence reverses course as it draws his ability to speak the truth into doubt. Beckett’s syntactical 
procedure in both these instances represents his broader tendency to use additive clauses to 
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undermine preceding material in order to perform the messy operations of thought without 
staking a conceptual position. 
 Melanie Foehn argues a similar point without identifying the essay as a mode of 
comparison when she ties Beckett’s rhetorical strategies to those of Pascal. In “A Rhetoric of 
Discontinuity: On Stylistic Parallels between Pascal’s Pensées and Samuel Beckett’s 
L’Innommable,” she notes that Pascal and Beckett share an “aesthetics of discontinuity” or 
writing that emulates the chaotic nature of reality in the formation of sentences (127). 
Specifically, she claims that Beckett may have gleaned Pascal’s use of contradictions and 
oxymorons to generate an “aporetic effect,” one that conveys radical uncertainty about what can 
be known (125). For evidence of the connection between the two writers, Foehn joins Beckett’s 
statement of his “mocking attitude towards the word, through the word” with Pascal’s “la vrai 
éloquence se moque de l’éloquence” (true eloquence mocks eloquence). We could easily extend 
their parallel statements on unaffected language to Montaigne’s own preference for artful 
artlessness. As Klaus notes, Montaigne “often characterizes his prose as being natural, simple, 
ordinary, plain, or free, rather than artificial, affected, pedantic, studied, or strained” (9). Such a 
naturalistic bent surfaces in a line from his essay, “A Consideration Upon Cicero,” where he 
writes of his own style, “I naturally drop into a dry, plain, blunt way of speaking. . . . I am prone 
to begin without a plan; the first remark brings on the second” (186). While Montaigne claims to 
transcribe his thoughts in the plain style of his thought, the perfectly placed semicolon that enacts 
his description of a linked fissure between initial and subsequent thoughts indicates a level of 
syntactical deliberation that undermines his claim of happenstance. 
 The “natural” voice that Beckett and Montaigne employ stems from a stylistic pattern, 
which as Foehn identifies as a coordinate mode of writing. Foehn notes that Pascal and Beckett 
 
120 
achieve the effect of naturalness through particular stylistic effects: “juxtaposition, repetition, 
ellipsis, aposiopesis—a rhetorical artifice in which the speaker comes to a sudden halt, as if 
unable or unwilling to proceed—parataxis . . . syncopated rhythm to suggest the broken 
movement of thought” (127). This sense of fragmentation, achieved through the absence of 
transitions that Foehn connects to Pascal’s style, is also precisely the effect Montaigne achieves 
in the sentence “I am prone to begin without a plan; the first remark brings on the second” where 
the semicolon exchanges a verbal connector with a semiotic break. Essayistic writers, of whom 
Beckett is arguably a part, use such stylistic abrogations to manifest the fragmentary, organic 
qualities of thought. 
 Beckett’s preference for the additive style and distaste for methodical thinking also 
surfaces in his jocular use of the subordinate style of deductive logic, the stylistic antithesis of 
coordination. The subordinate style, in contrast to additive one, proceeds through logical 
sequences marked by transitional words such as “thus” and “so.” As Fish writes, unlike the 
coordinate style, the subordinate style conveys a sense that the text has been pre-arranged and 
sorted into a classification system (50-1). Throughout his works, Beckett often satirizes the 
subordinate, logical style found in analytic philosophy. In Watt, for instance, he writes, “The fact 
of his having requested the tram to stop proves that he did not mistake the stop, as you suggest. 
For if he had mistaken the stop, and thought himself already at the railway station, he would not 
have requested the tram to stop” (19-20). Here, Beckett employs a deductive style signaled by 
conditional language such as “if,” “proves,” “would,” to reach a banal conclusion that did not 
require logic to draw.   
 Likewise, in the trilogy, he repeatedly mocks Descartes’s cogito, using variations on the 
subordinating format of “I think therefore I am” to reach several self-evident conclusions: 
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 It follows at least that I am not in the basement. (219) 
 That I am not stone deaf is shown by the sounds that reach me. (295) 
 Since, having always been here, I am here still. (302) 
 I, of whom I know nothing, I know my eyes are open. (304) 
 
These sentences begin conventionally enough but turn toward the unexpected when they 
exchange the abstract discourse of philosophy “I, of whom I know nothing,” into the humorous 
and tangible “I know my eyes are open.” Such lines have received a great deal of attention as 
proof of Beckett’s position in the field of skepticism, since he often uses logic to demonstrate his 
character’s doubts about material reality. Gontarski, for instance, argues that such lines indicate 
that Beckett and his characters are epistemologically skeptical since they realistically represent 
the experience of being uncertain (5, 9). Kenner, in “Comedian of the Impasse,” likewise 
remarks that a “note of uncertainty plagues the whole Beckett cosmos” (67). But while Kenner 
elsewhere rightly suggests that Beckett’s vision is satirical, he does not apply his own thesis to 
the recognition that Beckett satirizes skepticism itself in his mocking use of logic (xiv).  
 Importantly, Beckett’s syntax satirically conveys the dubious ends to which logic can be 
drawn in proving that nothing can be known while avoiding, as is evident in his rhetorical savvy, 
the conclusion that he and his characters are authentically, truly, or purely skeptical. In other 
words, while we might consider Beckett’s adoption of an essayistic mode as a means to perform 
uncertainty, it may be overreaching to consider Beckett, as I will discuss in greater detail in the 
final section of this chapter, a philosopher of skepticism. As Ruby Cohn argues, Beckett’s 
writing remains distinct from Descartes in that the latter’s skepticism led him to knowledge of 
the self while the voice of The Unnamable “never arrives at the certainty of a doubting subject” 
(172). On the relationship between satire and skepticism in Beckett’s work, Simon Critchley 
remarks that the laughter of Beckett “arises out of a palpable sense of inability, impotence and 
inauthenticity . . . [where] the condition of possibility for the hypothesis ‘if....then...’ is an 
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impossibility. Beckett’s sentences unfold by falling apart in what he calls his ‘syntax of 
weakness’” (On Humour 106). Although Critchley does not name it, the syntactic form he is 
describing is an essayistic one in which the experience of the inability to unify thought manifests 
on the page in the effects of fragmentation, contradiction, and digression. Such a syntax indexes 
the failure of philosophical logic to adequately mirror the experience of uncertainty while also 
avoiding the codification of such failure by stressing the stylistic performance at their core. In 
other words, Beckett’s dominant use of parataxis may not be a natural expression of 
epistemological skepticism, but rather a rhetorical strategy designed to produce particular 
responses such as laughter. 
Contradiction 
 The appearance of an essayistic rhetoric also surfaces in Beckett’s use of contradictions 
to indicate that a veracious representation of consciousness includes reversals in thinking. While 
Foehn attributes the appearance of such an effect in Beckett’s writing to his readings of Pascal, it 
is also possible to trace the style to Montaigne, whose use of contradiction initiated the essay 
tradition as one that favors the juxtaposition of opposites over systematic unity. For instance, 
Montaigne’s inclusion of inconsistencies appears within the organizational structure of his 
appropriately titled essay “On the Uncertainty of Our Judgment.” In the essay, Montaigne begins 
with an argument against overconfidence: examples from antiquity indicate that those who rest 
on their laurels become vulnerable to attack. The text then reverses position to consider the 
wisdom of the opposite argument: people also open themselves to danger when they 
continuously strive for further gains. By alternating between a claim and its counterclaim, 
Montaigne’s structure implicitly unseats the possibility of having certain rules about how to 
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behave in war (and by analogy, life) so that as he writes on the theme of uncertainty, his essay 
also leaves the reader with doubts about what can be known (205-209). 
 Such a structural display of uncertainty can be found in Philip Lopate’s contemporary 
essay, “Against Joie de Vivre,” where he undermines a peremptory claim with mounting self-
analysis. Lopate opens the piece with a declamation of a social behavior he disfavors: “What 
rankles me is the stylization of this private condition [joie de vivrism] into a bullying social 
ritual” (“Against...” 142). He then takes a turn to expose bits of autobiography that serve to 
undermine the argument he originally presented against joyful living. After declaiming the joie 
de vivrist as an “an incorrigible missionary,” Lopate rotates toward self-analysis: “A warning: 
since I myself have a large store of nervous discontent (some would say hostility), I am apt to be 
harsh in my secret judgment of others, seeing them as defective because they are not enough like 
me” (143). From here the essay features an autobiographical account of “when [his] dislike for 
joie de vivre began to crystallize” (“Against...143). These personal meanderings embody what 
Lopate elsewhere refers to as the personal essayist’s “dialectic of self-questioning or ‘thinking 
against oneself’” that characterize this apparently organic mode of discourse and undermine any 
singular argument that might be found in more formal essays (“Introduction” xxix-xxx). 
 Beckett likewise uses additive syntactical arrangements in such a way that latter clauses 
reverse former ones, conveying the sense that the mind recorded in the process of thinking 
generates inconsistencies. A passage on the opening page of Molloy exemplifies Beckett’s use of 
oppositional thinking: “All I need now is a son. Perhaps I have one somewhere. But I think not. 
He would be old now, nearly as old as myself. It was a little chambermaid. It wasn’t true love” 
(7). Here, the forward movement of the prose indicates that the plot of the story consists not in 
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the delivery of a factual narrative or an argumentative thesis but in the representation of the 
tortured movements of a dissembling mind that perpetually negates prior truth claims.  
Digression 
 Beckett further undermines formal logic by contextualizing systematic thinking within an 
essayistic structure of digression. Klaus defines digression as the “repeated, unanticipated shifts 
of attention from one subject to another. Frequent enough to create the impression of a 
consciousness so absorbed by its kaleidoscopic interests as to be almost oblivious of an audience. 
A mind turn in upon itself. Digression—the rhetorical outcome of free association” (24). As 
Klaus further remarks, Montaigne employs such digressions to avoid “the tyranny of a single 
image, idea, memory, or problem,” a thesis we might extend to Beckett for his use of digression 
to draw the text on rather than to prove a cohesive message (24). As Montaigne acknowledges in 
“A Consideration upon Cicero,” “I pile up only the headings of subjects . . . bear[ing] outside of 
my subject, the seeds of a richer and bolder material” (185). 
 One of the great digressions of Beckett’s work may be the sucking stone episode, where 
Molloy famously devises a system for sucking each of his four stones by circulating them 
through his four pockets (69). For the description of the combination game, Beckett employs the 
hypotactic style, evident in the use of three subordinate clauses beginning with the word 
“which,” which he places in one sentence:  
Taking a stone from the right pocket of my greatcoat, and putting it in my mouth, I 
replaced it in the right pocket of my greatcoat by a stone from the right pocket of my 
trousers, which I replaced by a stone from the left pocket of my trousers, which I replaced 
by a stone from the left pocket of my greatcoat, which I replaced by the stone which was 
in my mouth, as soon as I had finished sucking it. (emphasis mine, 69) 
 
The six-page digression of which this passage is a part humorously concludes with subverting 
indifference: “And deep down it was all the same to me whether I sucked a different stone each 
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time or always the same stone, until the end of time. For they all tasted exactly the same,” which 
suggests that the passage is not designed to narrow an idea deductively toward the truth but 
rather to pass the time (74). Moreover, the text’s subsequent shift toward the confessional with “I 
don’t remember having been seriously molested” suggests that the logical game has all along 
been designed to avoid an uncomfortable memory, one that will fade in the forward movement of 
text (74).  
 By framing logic within the essayistic mode of digression, Beckett suggests that the 
deductive style delays and occludes a fuller representation of human consciousness. Connecting 
such a program to the representation of the self, Smyth remarks that Beckett’s narrators often 
employ the strategy of digression to represent the inner workings of consciousness stylistically, 
or as he writes, to “explore the meanderings of a disintegrating consciousness, and thus deviate 
from any unified concept of subjectivity, in order to translate the fragmentation of the self in a 
discourse characterized by repetition, instability and fracture” (156). Beckett’s tendency to 
subvert logical sequence by placing it within the structure of digression may also be considered 
part of a larger project of “abandon[ing] linear argument,” according to Gontarski, who argues 
that Beckett’s texts ultimately convey not a sense of prearranged perfection but the chaos of the 
composing process (4, 7). In that way, Beckett’s essayistic proximity to philosophy occurs not at 
the site of argumentation about the self but rather in the performance of an uncertain “I” that 
destabilizes the logical structures of the text.  
Presence 
 The sense that the self lacks control over the process of thought relates to another key 
feature of the essay, what Wendell Harris identifies as a sense of the author’s “presence” on the 
page (934). As Harris writes, informal essays derive from the author’s perspective and so follow 
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“unexpected turns” of thought as the author implicitly declares ‘here I stand, this is where my 
honestly described thoughts lead me” (936). The perception that the written words are falling out 
of his mind onto the page occurs, for instance, in Molloy, where Beckett writes: 
And once again I am I will not say alone, no, that’s not like me, But how shall I say, I 
don’t know, restored to myself, no, I never left myself, free, yes, I don’t know what that 
means but it’s the word I mean to use, free to do what, to do nothing, to know, but what, 
the laws of the mind perhaps, of my mind. (13)  
 
The first-person interruption that highlights a gap in thought “free, yes, I don’t know what that 
means” conveys a sense that the writing itself represents the uncontrollable process of thinking 
and, as such, derails the notion of an accountable, unified self. 
 The sense that Beckett explores his own elusive selfhood in his fiction writing has 
encouraged a strand of criticism that relates his work to autobiography. In his 1977 book 
Beckett/Beckett, Vivian Mercier comments that Beckett’s switch to first person indexes a 
newfound “deep personal involvement with his material,” so that the “I” on the page could be 
said to reference the voice of the implied author (169). More recently, Carla Locatelli has argued 
that Krapp’s Last Tape and Not I can be read as autobiographies because the reader “can relate 
the name of the author (on the first page) to the text, seeing them as . . . correlated figures of self-
portraiture, and of autobiographical understanding” (68, 70). Drawing a connection between 
Beckett’s autobiographical mode and his philosophical contributions, Anthony Uhlmann argues 
in “Samuel Beckett and the Occluded Image” that Beckett adopts Geulincx’s concept of 
autology, the “inspection or examination of the self, which leads immediately to . . . disregard for 
the self and its power” (88). While Uhlmann claims that Beckett appropriates Geulincx’s process 
of self-examination as part of a broader process of generating philosophical images (88), 
Beckett’s exposure of the self as an unsteady concept can be more precisely compared to the 
persona constructed in the essay, which figures the author as a literary construction.  
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 When Locatelli and Gontarski argue that Beckett’s work is autobiographical, they use the 
word “autobiography” loosely to refer to Paul de Man’s concept that all writing inevitably 
involves self-representation (Locatelli 70). While such a broad definition of autobiography 
provides a useful medium for recognizing instances of self-portraiture in Beckett’s work, the 
type of self- fashioning found in the personal essay more closely aligns with that found in 
Beckett’s oeuvre. That is because the personal essay offers a more nuanced definition of 
representation, one that accounts for the intimate voice of the author without ascribing the 
historical details of the author’s life to that persona. Following a narrower definition of 
autobiography than Locatelli utilizes, Lopate remarks that while autobiographical writers 
exhaustively divulge specific details of their lives in a narrative fashion, personal essayists only 
use vignettes of autobiographical experience to move outward from the individual persona to the 
universal (Lopate xl, xxix). While Lopate’s claim to universality may be overshooting, the key 
point is that the essayist’s claim to authenticity is always undercut; the performance is only ever 
of a partial self, a persona, Klaus remarks, that derives as much from “self-dramatization” as 
from “a masking and an unveiling, a creation and an evocation of the self” (47).  
 As Virginia Woolf writes, the essayist highlights the artifice of its own creation through 
an emphasis on style so that such writers are “Never to be [themselves] and yet always” (qtd. in 
Klaus 79). While the events in an autobiographical work are ostensibly designed to require a 
literal interpretation of the writer’s life, the personal essayist’s appearance as a persona demands 
a literary inquiry into how such an artifice was constructed (Klaus 13). The contingent quality of 
the essay’s persona, then, renders the genre a more useful model for analyzing Beckett’s work 
since the author does not consistently appear, as Locatelli would have it, in such a way that the 
reader “can relate the name of the author (on the first page) to the text” (70). For, as P. J. Murphy 
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asserts, Beckett fashions “versions of the self” rather than depictions of himself in his 
imaginative works (224). Beckett’s characters may indeed be more akin to personas; after all 
they diverge strikingly from his biography: they murder, they are buried in sand, they commit 
suicide, etc.  
 Whereas with autobiographical writing, the relationship between the narrating persona 
and the authorial name is presumably one of identification, even if that identification remains 
incomplete or suspect, there is a greater implied gap between the author’s name and the narrating 
voice in works of fiction and in essays. As Foucault notes in his own discussion of the intentional 
fallacy (123-4), Beckett did not advocate for the idea that writers claim final authority over their 
texts. As such, he offered few clues to decoding his work and when he did, they undercut his 
own ability as the author to reveal intimate truths about his texts. For instance, in a letter to 
director Alan Schneider dated December 29, 1957, he writes of Endgame: 
It would be impertinent for me to advise you about the article you are doing and I don’t 
intend to. But when it comes to these bastards of journa lists I feel the only line is to 
refuse to be involved in exegesis of any kind. That’s for those bastards of critics. And to 
insist on the extreme simplicity of dramatic situation and issue. If that’s not enough for 
them, and it obviously isn’t, or they don’t see it, it’s plenty for us, and we have no 
elucidations to offer of mysteries that are all of their making. My work is a matter of 
fundamental sounds (no joke intended), made as fully as possible, and I accept 
responsibility for nothing else. If people want to have headaches among the overtones, let 
them. And provide their own aspirin. Hamm as stated, and Clov as stated, together as 
stated, nec tecum nec sine te, in such a place, and in such a world, that's all I can manage, 
more than I could. (No Author... 109)  
 
Following Beckett’s approach, even if that means consequently ignoring Beckett’s instructions 
not to follow his approach, undermines the theory that Beckett’s writing is autobiographical in 
the sense that the mysteries of a character’s actions cannot be traced back to a writer who takes 
responsibility for their historical origins.  
 It is undeniable that there are moments of self-representation in Beckett’s texts, and the 
personal essay provides an apt model for recognizing the disconnect between the narrating 
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persona and the historical writer while acknowledging those personal elements. In The 
Unnamable, for instance, the reader might easily assume that the author wonders aloud why he 
has refracted himself into multiple characters when he asks, “Why did I have myself represented 
in the midst of men, the light of day? . . . We won’t go into that now. I can seem them still, my 
delegates” (297). Comparable admissions appear in How It Is, where the narrator/author writes, 
“how can I efface myself behind my creatures” and “I say it as I hear it,” suggesting that the 
material on the page derives from an unfiltered transmission of overheard material within 
Beckett’s thoughts (52, 93).  
 Beckett’s apparent acknowledgement that he created characters to represent aspects of 
himself led Gontarski to argue that Beckett’s works are autobiographical insofar as he and his 
characters struggle to represent an unsteady “I,” one that remains uncertain about the veracity of 
its identity (4, 5, 17). But Beckett’s impersonations of the voice of the author expounding on the 
page more closely resemble the sense of presence cultivated by personal essayists. For example, 
in Molloy, Beckett writes: 
For to contrive a being, a place, I nearly said an hour, but I would not hurt anyone’s 
feelings, and then to use them no more, that would be, how shall I say, I don’t know. Not 
to want to say, not to know what you want to say, not to be able to say what you think 
you want to say, and never to stop saying, or hardly ever, that is the thing to keep in 
mind, even in the heat of composition. (28)  
 
Stylistically, the lines, with their second guesses, such as “I don’t know,” align with Virginia 
Woolf’s assertion in “The Modern Essay” that the effect of immediacy comprises an integral part 
of the familiar essay whose “present is more important than its past” (809). Woolf demonstrates 
this sense of intimacy on the page in “The Death of the Moth” where she tracks the activity of a 
moth and her thoughts about it as they overlap in her observation of an unfolding event:  
The helplessness of his attitude roused me. It flashed upon me that he was in difficulties; 
he could no longer raise himself; his legs struggled vainly. But as I stretched out a pencil, 
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meaning to help him to right himself, it came over me that the failure and awkwardness 
were the approach of death. I laid the pencil down again. (267)  
 
Even though this passage is written in the past tense, the story unfolds with a sense of surprise as 
the writer appears to react to the moth’s death in sequential time. Similarly, we are meant to 
presume with Beckett’s clause “how shall I say” that the writer is placing words on the page as 
they enter his thoughts. 
 E. B. White cultivates a similar feeling of immediacy in his essay “Once More to the 
Lake” where his memories of visiting a lake in Maine appear to fall on the page in the immediate 
act of their retrieval: “I have since become a salt-water man, but sometimes in summer there are 
days when the restlessness of the tides and the fearful cold of the sea water and the incessant 
wind that blows across the afternoon and into the evening make me wish for he placidity of a 
lake in the woods” (246). Through use of serial conjunctions, White performs the additive 
quality of his memory where one image engenders the next. Through such techniques, White and 
Woolf’s essays typify what Harris identifies as the sense of intimacy, reliability, and presence on 
the page that are vital to developing the familiar persona of the personal essay (934). In other 
words, what separates these works from autobiography is that the historical facticity of their 
narratives becomes less important than their stylistic displays of immediate thought.  
 Such lyrical displays of reminiscence can be found in Beckett’s 1958 play Krapp’s Last 
Tape where his protagonist literally replays his memories on a tape recorder. Locatelli names the 
play one of Beckett’s autobiographical texts (70), and many critics have identified within the 
play Beckett’s own epiphany that he would cultivate a singular voice by accepting the darkness 
within him (Lawley 28-9). The epiphany scene runs as follows:  
Spiritually a year of profound gloom and indigence until that memorable night in March, 
at the end of the jetty, in the howling wind, never to be forgotten, when suddenly I saw 
the whole thing. The vision at last. This I fancy is what I have chiefly to record this 
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evening, against the day when my work will be done and perhaps no place left in my 
memory, warm or cold, for the miracle that . . . [hesitates] . . . for the fire that set it alight. 
What I suddenly saw then was this, that the belief I had been going on all my life, 
namely—[Krapp switches off impatiently, winds tape forward, switches on again]—great 
granite rocks the foam flying up in the light of the lighthouse and the wind-gauge 
spinning like a propeller, clear to me at last that the dark I have always struggled to keep 
under is in reality my most— (226) 
 
Here, Beckett uses a familiar style to achieve what Klaus refers to as the essayistic effect of the 
“mind in the process of thinking” (Klaus 8). Through right-branching additions, Beckett 
accumulates not only the vivid memory of a particular place including, unusually for Beckett, its 
temperature and natural features, he also displays the intimate voice of the one who remembers, 
who qualifies, hesitates, and builds momentum. Of course, Beckett’s version of recollection is 
less forthright than E. B. White’s as the former mediates the act of remembering through the 
intervention of a future self who impatiently skips ahead, perhaps highlighting the editorial work 
of the personal essayist in shaping his or her persona. 
 Before we conclude, as David Lodge does, that Beckett, fully presents “a narrative voice 
talking to itself, or transcribing its own thoughts as they occur” (221), it is important to return to 
the idea that the essayistic sense of “presence” on the page is an effect of the genre deliberately 
chosen to achieve the appearance of immediacy not entirely to convey a philosophical point 
about the elusive nature of knowledge or the self. Indeed, as Harris comments, “even the most 
personal of essays creates a persona,” so that sincerity becomes a generic goal (941). The idea 
that personal essayists use particular stylistic tools to achieve a sincere tone contrasts with John 
Snyder’s characterization of the essay as “textuality untrammeled by generic boundedness” 
(150). That is, Snyder claims that the essay “deploys power freely” demonstrable through the 
fact that the end goal of the essay appears to be “unintended,” which suggests that the 
representation of the self in the essay runs closest to the truth of self-representation (151). In 
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arguing as much, Snyder may mistake the verisimilitude of freedom for the actual freedom of its 
writer when he asserts that “the art of the essay is liberationist artifice” meaning that the essayist 
writes without constraint, “chooses not to choose, wills not to will, shirks stable identity, directs 
himself or herself not to find but to be surprised” (150).   
 Contrariwise, Klaus demonstrates that personal essayists endow their texts with the 
appearance of sincerity by performing his own activation of a Montaignian voice. He first notes 
that even Montaigne “openly espouses a policy not of naturalness but of studied casualness or, to 
be more exact, of artful artlessness” (12). To substantiate this point, Klaus refers to a passage 
from Montaigne’s essay “Of Vanity”: “Lord, what beauty there is in these lusty sallies and this 
variation, and more so the more casual and accidental they seem” (761). Following in the 
Montaignian tradition, in his chapter on the “discontinuous” structure of personal essays, Klaus 
introduces a “muddle” of questions referring to an incident with a librarian; he then marks the 
text with a typographical line, proceeds to puzzle over the typographically segmented text of E. 
B. White, includes another typographical line, and then admits that he’s been “playing dumb” to 
enact his surprise at reading E. B. White in the 60s before the traditional structure of the essay 
had been challenged (31-2). The effect is unmistakable: authors can and do deliberately give 
their works a personal voice in order to enter into the tradition of essay writing. Thus, to say that 
the Montaignian essay “is pure prospect—groundless, wide open, empty, like the Platonic 
matrix,” as Snyder does, is to ignore the stylistic choices that make the appearance of artlessness 
desirable (152).  
 In relation to Beckett’s work, the recognition of a personal as opposed to an 
autobiographical voice is a way of distinguishing between the manifestation of an authentic 
voice of consciousness purely representing ideas on the page and the mediated voice of an author 
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who obfuscates direct interpretation. Smyth arrives at a similar conclusion when he asserts that 
instead of reading Beckett’s trilogy as a “confessional narrative,” which underscores the 
“completeness of the inner self,” it is more accurate to recognize that the compilation was 
constructed as a highly reflexive piece of literary writing of which its authorial persona is one 
fiction (166-7).  
 The obvious fictional aspect of Beckett’s work also elicits the acknowledgement that both 
autobiography and the personal essay are imperfect modes for understanding his writing. As 
Gary Adelman remarks in Naming Beckett’s Unnamable, critics often ignore the most basic 
recognition that Beckett is primarily a fictional storyteller (13). Adelman rightfully argues that 
despite Beckett’s prominent dislike of the usual conventions of narrative storytelling, his 
attachment to style indicates that “words, paradoxically, are his only camouflage [from society], 
his wings, his element, the amazing spittle of words his unmistakable signature” (15). Not purely 
an essayist, Beckett’s work is voiced by more than a persona, but by characters who ostensibly 
originate not from his historical self but ex nihilo. In other words, Beckett claims to bear little 
responsibility for generating his fictions since his ideas reportedly come to the mind from 
nowhere.  
 Despite the imperfect means of comparison, Beckett, to a greater degree than most other 
imaginative writers, approaches the non-fiction essay in the way he often employs the direct, 
personal language of the essay, which, as Adorno remarks, works through the mode of “telling” 
rather than “showing” (165). In Molloy, for instance, the narrator expresses distaste for the 
conventional means of producing fiction when he asks the personal question, “Must I describe 
her?” (35). Answering no, Beckett’s writing often appears essayistic because he prefers a mode 
of abstract telling as in The Unnamable:  
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All lies. I have nothing to do, that is to say nothing in particular. I have to speak, 
whatever that means. Having nothing to say, no words but the words of others, I have to 
speak. No one compels me to, there is no one, it’s an accident, a fact. Nothing can ever 
exempt me from it, there is nothing, nothing to discover, nothing to recover, nothing that 
can lessen what remains to say. (314)  
 
The language of the above passage contains the expository, abstract nouns, and first-person 
pronoun often found in the personal essay. Most relevantly, Beckett repeatedly uses the abstract 
word “nothing,” as in “I have nothing to do,” to refer not to a material reference point but to a 
pure concept that morphs into many related ideas. Perhaps with such passages in mind, Adelman 
acknowledges that Beckett’s works are also not purely fictional since they do rely on modes of 
telling found in the “confessional monologue” (67). We might further compare Beckett’s mode 
to the essay because of the sense of authorial presence that nonetheless depends on persona that 
surfaces in the line “No one compels me to, there is no one, it’s an accident, a fact.” This passage 
perhaps indicates that there is no author compelling the narrative forward; there is only an 
authorial persona that operates through the mode of trial and error found in the essay. 
The Essay and Philosophy 
 Until now, I have been comparing Beckett’s work to the familiar essay without exploring 
the relationship between the form and philosophical discourse in depth. It might be tempting to 
conclude that analytic philosophers employ the hypotactic style with its subordination of ideas 
into logical order, while Beckett’s writing, with his reliance of parataxis represents a stylistic 
performance of nonpurposive experimentation. Additionally, I have suggested that the personal 
essay conveys a sense of uncertainty through its use of a familiar, coordinated syntactic style that 
emphasizes the progression of thought with all of its inconsistencies. In that way, his essayistic 
style may be said to manifest a philosophy of skepticism because it suggests, as Kenner writes, 
that what the mind knows is constantly shifting and grasping at knowledge that it cannot obtain 
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(Flaubert... 79). At the same time, it is important to recognize that the logical effect of hypotaxis 
and the doubt-ridden effect of parataxis are both just that, effects of discourse, rendering the 
comparison between Beckett’s work and philosophy, as ever, incomplete and yet proximate. 
 The question arises as to whether the formal or informal style provides a more 
appropriate medium for the philosophical pursuit of truth. Following Montaigne, as Harris 
writes, the placement of programmatic essays at one end of a continuum and personal essays at 
the other end largely depends on their distinct primary purposes (937). We might situate 
philosophy with its primary purpose of seeking truth and knowledge at the formal end of the 
continuum while noting, as Harris does, that the purpose of the personal essay is primarily 
archival; the informal essayist records rather than asserts ideas (936, 937, 944). Yet in some 
ways, the informal essay actually provides a more appropriate medium for dialectic philosophy 
than the formal essay, since, as Levinas, Adorno, and Lukács discuss, its open format mirrors the 
conceptual flexibility that certain philosophers wish to portray. In that sense, the essay is 
implicated in the debate over whether philosophy represents the pursuit of truth best when its 
form mirrors its results; and, it is at that site of contention that Beckett’s writing finds its parallel, 
unresolved tension. 
 The essay, as has been said earlier, provides capacious room for thought to grow, expand, 
contract, and reverse itself. As such, it allows for lengthy exposition and digression, 
explanations, and experimentations with thought. The sense of openness that the essay creates 
led Levinas to consider the format to be more conducive to philosophy than fiction. That is 
because the enclosed world of fiction, in which a distant author does not directly contribute to 
the themes being discussed, conveys a sense of conceptual closure. As Levinas writes: 
That the characters in a book are committed to the infinite repetition of the same acts and 
the same thoughts is not simply due to the contingent fact of the narrative, which is 
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exterior to those characters. They can be narrated because their being resembles itself, 
doubles itself, and immobilizes. Such a fixity is wholly different from that of concepts, 
which initiates life, offers reality to our powers, to truth, opens a dialectic. By its 
reflection in a narrative, being has a non-dialectical fixity, stops dialectics and time.  
 The characters of a novel are beings that are shut up, prisoners. Their history is 
never finished it still goes on, but makes no headway. (10)  
 
As he posits, while the direct discussion of concepts in an essay allows for dialectical 
engagement, the thematic treatment of ideas found in fiction occludes ideational flexibility. In 
that way, the familiar style of the experimental essay, in contrast to both fiction and doctrinal 
writing provides the format most conducive to Levinas’s philosophical project of remaining open 
to the Other.  
 Adorno similarly elevates the informal essay as the form that most closely mirrors the 
content of post-metaphysical philosophy while devaluing the results produced by the formal 
style. He claims that while the strategy of hypotaxis aids in the producing the semblance of 
logical, planned hierarchies, making the form desirable for systematic metaphysical 
philosophers, the hypotactic effect lacks the capacity to represent the truth of experience as 
effectively as the informal essay does. He writes: 
Since the airtight order of concepts is not identical with existence, the essay does not 
strive for closed, deductive or inductive, construction. It revolts above all against the 
doctrine—deeply rooted since Plato—that the changing and ephemeral is unworthy of 
philosophy; agains t that ancient injustice toward the transitory, by which it is once more 
anathematized, conceptually. The essay shies away from the violence of dogma, from the 
notion that the result of abstraction, the temporally invariable concept indifferent to the 
individual phenomenon grasped by it, deserves ontological dignity. (158) 
 
According to Adorno, the informal essayist’s preference for the coordinate style, where 
transitions derive from internal associations, represents the experience of uncertainty more 
realistically than the “airtight deductive systems” of metaphysical philosophy (163, 169-170). 
 Epistemologically speaking, he argues, the essay, more authentically than other forms, 
embodies the feeling in contemporary life that we cannot know anything outside of our own 
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experience of reality. Instead of concealing the subjective origin of ideas by presenting them in 
subordinate, prepared, objective systems—a problem Adorno ascribes to Descartes and Hegel—
essayists highlight “self- revelation” by depicting thought in fragments (163, 166). As Adorno 
writes, “[The essay] thinks in fragments just as reality is fragmented and gains its unity only by 
moving through the fissures, rather than by smoothing them over” (164). The unfinished 
thoughts on the page found in the essay, which are conventionally regarded as the hallmarks of 
untruth, then represent the truth as an inclusive process, for as Adorno writes, “the essay 
becomes true in its progress” (161, 166). The truth of the essay, then, for Adorno, is a 
performative one in which its “methodically unmethodical” form manifests the unvarnished 
patterns of thought (161). That is, the informal essay may be considered philosophical in the 
sense that its characteristic “luck,” “play,” and display of “childlike freedom” manifest the 
uncertainty of perceived experience more accurately than other modes of discourse (151-2). In 
that sense, the essay can be considered philosophical only insofar as we may define philosophy 
broadly as a manifestation of the representative truth of the event of subjective being. 
 Before we conclude that Beckett’s writing, through its comparison to the essay, 
represents the truth of subjective experience, it’s important to recognize that Adorno may 
overemphasize the philosophical capacity of the essay mode, which does not necessarily depict 
reality more accurately than the subordinate style. As Stanley Fish notes, the claim of the essay, 
that it, in opposition to analytic philosophy, better manifests the shakiness of a mind at work, 
sidesteps the notion that both styles are rhetorical effects of a deliberate strategy; neither is 
purely mimetic or planned (62-3). Klaus similarly remarks that writers following in the 
Montaignian tradition actively adopt the stylistic strategies discussed here—including parataxis, 
contradictions, digressions, and authorial presence—in order to achieve a representation of the 
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mind at work in a seemingly authentic fashion (12-3). The word “seemingly” is important in the 
recognition that the essayistic mode does not actually depict reality in a more authentic manner 
than other forms.  
 Instead of fetishizing the essay as the mode that most accurately records the writer’s 
perceptions, we might more realistically frame the essay as the generic site of controversy over 
what mode best represents the traditional philosophical pursuit of truth, with truth either being 
the derived result of a logical system or a process of experimentation that recognizes deception 
as an integral part of the truth telling process. Not quite philosophy, the informal essay, in 
Adorno’s view, holds a middle ground between rigid, programmatic scientific discourse on one 
side and “the empty and abstract residues left aside by the scientific apparatus,” which enter into 
philosophy (170). The essay, through its emphasis on critique, provides concrete examples that 
contradict abstractions and emphasize contingent experiences (170). Not quite philosophy 
because it lacks a rigorous methodology, the informal essay is also not quite literary fiction since 
it claims to express the candid voice of its author.  
 The in-between status of the essay interested Lukács who considered the essay to be a 
hybrid form, an entity that combines elements of philosophical and literary writing while eliding 
identification with either (2, 13, 151). Lukács separates philosophical and literary writing on the 
basis that the indirectness of literary writing, with its preference for symbols, distinguishes it 
from philosophy, which is concerned with direct signification (3-5). Lukács further notes that the 
essay’s inclusion of messy stylistic flourishes elides “the icy, final perfection of philosophy” (1). 
Yet essayists can also never be identified with poets since they, as critics, only comment on the 
forms that artists shape (1, 9-10). Adorno likewise distinguishes the essay from both art and 
theory while claiming that the essay does achieve “aesthetic autonomy.” He argues that the essay 
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“resembles art” in the way that the essayist is conscious of the disconnect between form and 
content; in other words, the form of the essay does not entirely relate back to its content in the 
way a tightly constructed poem might (165). While essayists do write in a literary register of 
high style, such writers otherwise relate “exclusively to theory” in the way they work through 
direct telling rather than showing (165). Yet the essay remains distinct from philosophy since its 
primary purpose is, according to Adorno, not to deliver a thesis but to place everything into 
doubt (166). Lukács and Adorno encourage the conclusion that the essay holds a middle position 
between literature and philosophy on the basis that it relies on direct modes of telling while 
inhering in its own style and critiquing the work of all others. 
 The essay, then, provides a model for understanding the entangled and yet distinct 
relationship between Beckett’s writing and formal philosophical discourse. His work may be 
considered essayistic in the sense that he frequently utilizes parataxis, contradictions, 
digressions, and a personal voice to portray an organic process of thinking that performs 
perpetual doubt, even satire of doubt, without aligning with a formal philosophical thesis. 
Perhaps Beckett’s texts have often been considered philosophical because they share many 
generic qualities with the essay, the mode that includes both the format of formal philosophical 
discourse and the informal meanderings of prose in the Montaignian tradition. Not quite 
philosophy in the sense that he illustrates ideas through a stylistic and persona-driven 
performance; his work also flouts conventional literary practices in the way he often prefers 
modes of personal telling to image-making. 
 To return to the question of nothing in relation to the essay, we might consider Beckett’s 
adoption of the abstract word “nothing” in response to his predecessors’ use of the theological 
“abyss” and scientific “void,” as is discussed in chapter four, as part of a broader turn toward the 
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essayistic mode of “telling” rather than “showing.” Moreover, his use of multiple, contradictory, 
philosophical sources on nothing, as is covered in chapter three, may be part of a larger tendency 
to gather perspectives on “nothing” without necessarily arriving at a firm conclusion about any 
of them. Furthermore, his position that literary writers have nothing to say, as is explored in 
chapter two, may be reflected in his use of an essayistic style that tests ideas to fill pages with 
words rather than to derive theses on philosophical matters. Overall, Beckett’s essayistic 
approach to nothing is expressed in his tendency to gather images of “thinglessness,” not 
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